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The Concept of Action and Responsibility in Heidegger’s Early Thought 
Christian Hans Pedersen 
ABSTRACT 
In his early thought (which for our purposes will be considered to be roughly the 
time period from his first post World War I lecture course in 1919 to the publication of 
Being and Time in 1927), Heidegger offers a rich description of our practical engagement 
with the world.  The aim of this project is to develop a Heideggerian conception of action 
from these early, concrete descriptions of the practical dimension of human life.  The 
central feature of this Heideggerian conception of action is that action is understood as 
involving interdependent aspects of passivity and activity (or receptivity and spontaneity, 
in a more Kantian formulation).  Considered in its entirety, my dissertation provides what 
I take to be a fruitful interpretation of Heidegger’s early thought from the standpoint of 
his understanding of action.  It also provides the provisional basis and framework for the 
further development of a general conception of human agency that can be extended 
beyond Heidegger’s thought. 
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PREFACE 
 
 
I should perhaps preface the main body of this work with a short clarification of 
the title, The Concept of Action and Responsibility in Heidegger’s Early Thought.  This 
title might justifiably lead the reader to expect an entirely historical work whose aim is 
the interpretation and explication what Heidegger says about action and responsibility in 
his early thought.  My aim here is slightly different.   
For centuries philosophers have been struggling with the problem of free will.  
The problem, generally speaking, is that we typically hold two seemingly incompatible 
beliefs about ourselves and the structure of nature as such.  On the one hand, we believe 
that we, as individuals have a significant degree of control over our actions and that our 
actions for the most part are of our own making and not the product of external, 
environmental influences.  On the other hand, we tend to see the whole of nature as 
governed by strict causal laws, which determine all actions and events that take place.  
The sort of determinism assumed to be a threat to free will is often taken to be a 
naturalistic determinism.  That is, the worry is that our actions as human beings are 
determined by natural laws at the physiological level, e.g. our genetic code makes us 
determined to act the way we do.  Alternatively, one could see a threat to our free will 
posed by a sort of social determinism.  The worry in this case is that our actions are 
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completely determined by various social forces, e.g. the way we were raised, the norms 
and expectations of our society, etc.   
In Heidegger’s early thought, we find an analysis and description of human 
agency that focuses on the fundamental role that our social and historical 
contextualization plays in our actions.  Because of this, Heidegger’s early thoughts on 
what it means to be human agent also potentially generate a worry about social 
determinism.  Heidegger himself seems to be aware of this potential problem and seeks to 
develop a solution that would allow us still to recognize the influence that social factors 
have in our actions, but also open up the possibility that despite this influence, our actions 
can still be free in some meaningful way.  The aim of this project is to use Heidegger’s 
analysis of action to develop a coherent and plausible conception of action that might 
help us to resolve the problem of free will, at least when this problem is generated by the 
worry about social determinism.  This way of approaching Heidegger’s thought can be 
seen as fruitful in two ways.  First of all, this approach is not found in the vast amount of 
secondary literature devoted to Heidegger’s thought, so I hope that my project provides 
something of fresh way of interpreting Heidegger.  Secondly, I hope to show that the 
conception of action we find in Heidegger’s early thought can be useful when trying to 
address the larger problem of freedom and social determinism broadly considered. 
 I would also like to take the time here to acknowledge some of those people 
whose assistance has been invaluable over the course of my work on this project.  The 
comments, questions and suggestions from the members of my dissertation committee 
(Rebecca Kukla, Ofelia Schutte, Stephen Turner and Joanne Waugh) have been 
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immensely valuable in forcing me to clarify and refine my claims and arguments.  It is to 
my advisor, Charles Guignon, that I owe whatever clarity of thought and ability to write 
with lucidity that I possess.  Over the years he has spent enormous amounts of time and 
energy editing, correcting and questioning my work in order to get me to say things as 
clearly and straightforwardly as possible.  My general approach to doing philosophy will 
always be grounded in his tutelage.  Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Faye, for her 
unflagging support through the years in which I have worked on this project and for her 
selfless assistance with the formatting and editing of the final document.
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DISSERTATION INTRODUCTION 
 
Heidegger’s rich description of our practical engagement with the world in his 
early thought (which for our purposes will be considered to be roughly the time period 
from his first post World War I lecture course in 1919 to the publication of Being and 
Time in 1927) has drawn significant attention from scholars over the years.  As is often 
the case with the thought of complicated thinkers, there has been considerable difference 
of opinion among scholars over Heidegger’s understanding of the practical and the 
practical implications of Heidegger’s philosophy.  These scholarly interpretations have 
ranged from more or less positive assessments and appropriations of Heidegger’s thought 
to fairly strong condemnations of Heidegger’s practical philosophy based on perceived 
connections to Nazism.  The current project is an attempt to once again assess the role of 
the practical in Heidegger’s early thought and to determine what aspects of Heidegger’s 
account of our practical activity are worth being appropriated and carried forward. 
The focus here will specifically be the conception of action that can be gleaned 
from Heidegger’s early thought.  While there has been much written dealing with various 
aspects of Heidegger’s practical philosophy, there has been little explicit treatment of 
Heidegger’s conception of action.  The one substantial work on Heidegger’s conception 
of action, Reiner Schürmann’s Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to 
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Anarchy1, focuses primarily on Heidegger’s later works, treating Heidegger’s early 
descriptions of our practical being as still being overly loaded with the metaphysical and 
existentialist concepts that the later Heidegger eschews.
2
 
                                                 
 
1
 Reiner Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy, Christine-Marie Gros, 
trans. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987). 
2
 This might lead one to ask the question of whether I should be focusing on Heidegger’s early thought 
when attempting to develop a Heideggerian conception of action.  Here I will attempt to give a brief 
justification for my preference for the thought of the early Heidegger over that of the later Heidegger, at 
least as far as developing a plausible theory of action is concerned.  The conception of action that we find 
in the later Heidegger, at least on Schürmann’s interpretation, is different from the conception of action we 
find in the early Heidegger in two main ways.  One of these main aspects of the early Heidegger’s account 
of action that Schürmann denies is carried over to that of the later Heidegger is the focus on the individual 
agent (cf. Heidegger on Being and Acting, 239-240).  Schürmann views the earlier account of authentic 
action as an existentialist side-path in Heidegger’s thinking that quickly drops out and is replaced by a 
focus on action as a social, political and/or historical phenomenon.   
 The other main aspect of the early Heidegger’s account of action that Schürmann thinks the later 
Heidegger actively argues against is the teleological nature of action as conceived by the early Heidegger 
(cf. Heidegger on Being and Acting, 254-260).  For Schürmann one of the most important projects for the 
later Heidegger is undermining what he sees as the pervasive influence of the technological paradigm on 
our understanding of being.  This means that Heidegger must abandon and critique his own earlier 
teleological understanding of action because it is derived, like all of Western metaphysics according to the 
later Heidegger, from the Greek understanding of techne.  It is the unfolding of this conception of techne 
that leads to the complete domination of the technological understanding of being.  The activity associated 
with techne is poiesis, or making.  The basic idea here is that in poiesis the craftsman has an idea of what 
she wants to produce and then transforms the raw material so that it corresponds with the initial idea and 
thus reaches its completion, or reaches its end (telos).  It is the goal or telos of the project of production that 
guides it throughout, so poiesis is said to be teleological.  As we will see, it is evident that at least the early 
Heidegger’s account of inauthentic action, in which our activity is guided by the projects and goals which 
we have, very much fits into this poietic framework.  Schürmann, along with the later Heidegger, advocates 
the cultivation of a certain “goallessness” in action.  We undermine the technological understanding of 
being by acting without goals because we then allow the beings which appear in our engagement with the 
world to appear in a way other than that of something to be used in order to accomplish some end. 
 I would argue that the early Heidegger’s account of action is more helpful in making sense of 
human agency than that of the later Heidegger.  The main reason for this is that the two elements that the 
later account of action is concerned with eliminating, a notion of individual action and a teleological 
understanding of action, seem to be necessary to making sense of our actions.  Even if a total focus on the 
individual agent may be a distortion, there does seem to be a non-eliminable sense of the individual agent 
in most concrete actions.  Completely rejecting this element of action seems to run counter to the 
phenomenological tendency that gives the early Heidegger’s thought its grounding in our lived experience.  
The same can be said for the rejection of the teleological understanding of action.  It also is extremely 
difficult to imagine completely goalless action taking place on a regular basis.  Almost all of our actions are 
intelligible because they take place within a context of significance that provides goals worthy of pursuing.  
Finally, it seems that Schürmann and the later Heidegger make goalless action itself a goal, or at least as a 
means by which the technological understanding of being can be undermined, thereby failing to really 
escape the teleological understanding of action. 
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When it comes to giving an account of Heidegger’s early understanding of action, 
there have been two main approaches.  As part of his more general interpretation of 
Heidegger’s thought, Hubert Dreyfus maintains that for Heidegger most of our everyday 
actions are to be understood as skillful coping with our environment.
3
  The claim in 
Dreyfus’s account of skillful coping is that in traditional theories of action, far too much 
emphasis is placed on the role of explicit mental representations.  Dreyfus argues, using 
Heidegger’s analysis of everyday activities in Being and Time, that much of our everyday 
behavior takes place without any explicit mental states associated with it at all.  For 
example, when opening a door or driving a car, we usually do not form explicit mental 
representations that guide our actions.  I do not always have to think to myself something 
like “Turn the wheel now” to make a turn while driving.  Dreyfus thinks proper 
phenomenological analysis (like that provided by Heidegger) of many of our everyday 
actions will reveal explicit mental representations only accompany our actions when 
there is some sort of breakdown in the normally smooth flow of our activities.  When, for 
instance, I try to open a door and find myself unable to do so, I then would have to 
engage in some sort of explicit deliberation about what I should do.   
Drawing on Heidegger’s conception of das Man, or the One as Dreyfus translates 
it, Dreyfus adds to his conception of skillful coping by incorporating Heidegger’s 
analysis of the way in which and the extent to which our absorption in the social practices 
of our time guides our everyday actions.  According to Dreyfus, we can understand many 
                                                 
 
3
 Dreyfus gives this account of Heidegger’s understanding of action in many different articles and books.  
Dreyfus connects his conception of skillful coping most directly to Heidegger’s thought in his Being-in-the-
World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991).  
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of our more sophisticated actions, e.g. giving a lecture or attending a funeral, as ways in 
which we enact various social roles and ways of understanding ourselves.  For example, I 
give lectures several times a week because I understand myself, at least to some extent, as 
an instructor at a university.  Again, Dreyfus argues that there are usually no explicit 
mental states accompanying these everyday sorts of actions.  These self-understandings 
are largely tacit and guide our actions without any explicit reflection on our part. 
There are two ways in which for Dreyfus’s Heideggerian conception of action is 
problematic.  There are several philosophical criticisms that can be brought against 
Dreyfus’s conception of action considered in its own right, and there are questions that 
can be raised about the adequacy of Dreyfus’s account as an interpretation of Heidegger.  
Let us begin by considering the general philosophical objections.  First of all, one might 
find Dreyfus’s claim that explicit mental states accompany our actions only in the case of 
some breakdown to be somewhat implausible.
4
  Even if Dreyfus is right in maintaining 
that most traditional theories of action are too focused on the role of mental states in our 
actions, his claim that mental states explicitly accompany actions only in cases of 
breakdown seems to swing too far in the other direction.  There are plenty of examples of 
everyday actions that involve explicit mental representations that cannot be considered 
breakdown scenarios.  Consider again the example of giving a lecture and the preparation 
that goes into that.  While I may more or less automatically get to work on writing my 
                                                 
 
4
 This problem for Dreyfus’s account of skillful coping is pointed out in essays by John Searle in his “The 
Limits of Phenomenology” in Heidegger, Coping, and Cognitive Science, eds. Mark Wrathall and Jeff 
Malpas, 71-92 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000) and Theodore Schatzki in his “Coping with Others with 
Folk Psychology” in Heidegger, Coping, and Cognitive Science, eds. Mark Wrathall and Jeff Malpas, 29-
52(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000). 
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lecture when I arrive in my office, it is often the case that in the course of writing my 
lecture I explicitly remind myself to mention a certain example or allow time for class 
discussion.  This sort of explicit reflection does not appear to be the product of a 
breakdown in the process of preparing my lecture (as my computer crashing would be).  
Rather, this sort of explicit reflection seems to be an integral part of the action of writing 
the lecture itself. 
The other philosophical problem with Dreyfus’s understanding of action as 
skillful coping is that by de-emphasizing the role of mental states in action, Dreyfus has 
removed one of the main ways of being able to understand what it means to be 
responsible for our actions or to have ownership of our actions.  When we say someone is 
acting, we typically seem to mean that she is doing something or bringing something 
about as opposed to having something happen to her.  As Harry Frankfurt puts it, the 
“problem of action is to explicate the contrast between what an agent does and what 
merely happens to him, or between bodily movements that he makes and those that occur 
without his making them.”
5
 When we call something an action, we usually seem to mean 
that the agent has some control over what she is doing.  Actions are then contrasted with 
mere behavior or mere bodily movement, with the idea being that someone who is 
brainwashed can still be doing things and moving about, but we would not want to say 
she is actually performing actions.  One of the main traditional ways of making sense of 
something being an action as opposed to mere bodily movement, i.e. making sense of 
                                                 
 
5
 Harry Frankfurt, “The Problem of Action” in The Philosophy of Action, ed. Alfred Mele, 42 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997). 
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having responsibility for or ownership of our actions, is to focus on the role of mental 
states in bringing about the movement in question.  For example, we would say that 
someone who has an intention to go swimming and then jumps into the pool is 
performing an action in the proper sense, while someone who is pushed into the pool is 
not.  By maintaining that mental representations are not operative in this way when we 
act (except in breakdown situations), Dreyfus would seem to be obligated to give an 
alternate account of how we can be responsible for our actions or even how our actions 
can be counted as actions.  If he does not provide such an account, it seems that his 
understanding as action as skillful coping ultimately conceives of human action as 
primarily being reduced to the non-reflective living-out of socially prescribed norms and 
habits, with explicit reflection on our actions emerging only in rare instances, leaving no 
way to ascribe ownership of actions to individual agents.  While I do not endorse a return 
to the focus on accompanying mental states when ascribing ownership of an action, I do 
think that Dreyfus’s conception of action fails to give a plausible alternative account of 
how we can be responsible for our actions. 
The philosophical problems for Dreyfus’s conception of action are in fact 
connected with the interpretive problems for his account.  Dreyfus is clear that initially 
his interpretation of Heidegger is based primarily on Heidegger’s analysis of everyday 
existence in Division I of Being and Time and that he avoids substantial discussion of 
Division II of Being and Time because he considers it to be “much less carefully worked 
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out” and “to have some errors so serious as to block any consistent reading”.
6
  It is in 
Division II of Being and Time (among other places as we will see) that Heidegger tries to 
provide a solution to the way in which the structure of our everyday actions seems to 
leave no room for responsibility at the individual level.  To Dreyfus’s credit, he appends 
a section to his Being-in-the-World that addresses Division II of Being and Time, but 
rather quickly abandons the Kierkegaardian interpretation he puts forward there.  Dreyfus 
later attempts to interpret Division II of Being and Time as providing an account of expert 
skillful coping, in which the need for mental representations of intentions and guidelines 
for action has completely disappeared, replaced by an intuitive sense of the exact action 
called for by the given situation.
7
  This interpretation of Division II in terms of expert 
action does not solve the problems for Dreyfus’s account—if anything, it exacerbates 
them as it further marginalizes the role of mental states in our actions while still not 
providing an alternative way of making sense of the individual ownership of actions. 
The second main way of interpreting Heidegger’s early thought on action is the 
decisionist interpretation.  According to this reading, the sort of non-reflective, everyday 
activity that is the central focus of Dreyfus’s conception of action as skillful coping is 
really only half of the story.  In Being and Time, Heidegger clearly states that the first 
division of the work, which is the basis of Dreyfus’s interpretation, is concerned with 
inauthentic existence, while the second division of the work is concerned with what 
                                                 
 
6
 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, viii. 
7
 See Dreyfus’s “What Could Be More Intelligible Than Everyday Intelligibility? Reinterpreting Division I 
of Being and Time in the Light of Division II,” Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society 24, no. 3 
(2004): 265-274. 
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Heidegger calls authentic existence.  On the decisionist reading of Being and Time, this 
distinction between inauthentic existence and authentic existence runs roughly as follows.  
When existing inauthentically, our actions are largely the product of non-reflective 
conformity to social norms, so in a sense Dreyfus’s account of Heidegger’s 
understanding of action is correct as far as it goes.  However, according to the decisionist 
interpretation, when existing authentically, we come to realize that the norms and rules 
that guide our everyday actions are completely contingent.  Authentic action comes to be 
understood as acting with the recognition that all of us, as solitary individuals, are free to 
reject traditional social norms and create for ourselves the guidelines for our actions.  It is 
from this that decisionist interpretation gets its name.  This interpretation reads Heidegger 
as endorsing the view that there are no criteria external to the individual agent that can be 
used to make a choice.  According to the decisionist interpretation of Heidegger, all 
authentic actions stem from the unconstrained decision of the agent herself. 
There have been a string of thinkers that have attributed this conception of 
authentic action to Heidegger and find in it the philosophical roots of Heidegger’s 
association with the Nazi party in the 1930s.
8
  In the words of Richard Wolin, one of the 
most outspoken critics of Heidegger:  
In its [Heidegger’s decisionism’s] rejection of “moral 
convention”—which qua convention, proves inimical to 
acts of heroic bravado—decisionism shows itself to be 
distinctly nihilistic vis-à-vis the totality of inherited ethical 
paradigms.  For this reason, the implicit political theory of 
Being and Time…remains devoid of fundamental “liberal 
                                                 
 
8
 See for example the essays by Richard Wolin, Karl Löwith and Jürgen Habermas in Wolin’s The 
Heidegger Controversy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993). 
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convictions” that might have served as an ethicopolitical 
bulwark against the enticement of fascism.
9
 
 
Aside from the potential negative socio-political implications of this decisionist 
understanding of action, this understanding of action also suffers from the same 
philosophical defect as all other simplistic libertarian conceptions of free action.  The 
most general formulation of the libertarian position is that agents are able to determine 
their own actions entirely through their own will, without the influence of any factors 
external to the control of the agent.  The problem is that there could conceivably be a 
causal line traced from aspects of any decision we come to with regards to action to 
factors that are outside the control of the agent.  For instance, it could be argued that my 
decision to go to the Thai restaurant for dinner instead of the Mexican restaurant can be 
traced back to various factors that are outside my control, e.g. prior bad experiences with 
Mexican food, a catchy advertisement for the Thai restaurant, etc.  If the libertarian wants 
to insist that the decision is made by me without the influence of any factors beyond my 
control, then upon what grounds or reasons can I base my decision?  When all such 
factors are ruled out when making decisions, it seems that our decisions are left to 
arbitrary whims and fleeting desires, resulting in no real sense of control or responsibility 
on the part of the individual agent.  If this is the case, it is hard to see how the authentic, 
non-conformist agent can be anymore responsible for her actions than the inauthentic 
agent who unreflectively enacted traditional social norms. 
                                                 
 
9
 Richard Wolin, The Politics of Being (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 65. 
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The textual problem for the decisionist interpretation is that this interpretation 
generally relies heavily on several select passages from Division II of Being and Time.  
When discussing authentic, resolute action, Heidegger does say: “On what is [Dasein] to 
resolve?  Only the resolution itself can give the answer” (BT 345/298).  This statement 
fits very well with the decisionist interpretation, but it also neglects other passages in 
which Heidegger makes it clear that authentic action cannot be a complete rejection of 
the norms that guide our everyday actions, but rather authentic action must be understood 
as a modification of our everyday ways of acting (BT 312/267).  Furthermore, if 
Heidegger really did advocate a form of decisionism that endorses the wholesale rejection 
of our everyday activities and the social norms that guide them, it seems unlikely that he 
would dedicate so much of Being and Time and his early lectures to the careful analysis 
of this everyday activity. 
The general aim of this current project is to develop an interpretation of 
Heidegger’s conception of action in his early thought that is both more faithful to 
Heidegger’s own works and is a more plausible general theory of action than either the 
Dreyfusian conception of skillful coping or the decisionist conception of authentic action.  
Specifically, the approach that I am advocating here is the development of a 
Heideggerian conception of agency that incorporates aspects of both the Dreyfusian and 
decisionist readings of Heidegger while avoiding the pitfalls associated with both 
interpretations.  What would such a middle path between these two positions look like?  
Heidegger provides in a clue in one of the rare passages in Being and Time in which he 
uses the word action (Handeln) explicitly.  Here Heidegger brings up the term ‘action’ 
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merely to express his reservations about using the term, as he says that action “must be 
taken so broadly that ‘activity’ will also embrace the passivity of resistance” (BT 
347/300).  For Heidegger, the term ‘action’ must be understood so broadly that it includes 
passivity as well.  When considered in light of the preceding discussion of the Dreyfusian 
and decisionist interpretations of Heidegger’s conception of action, this means that a 
properly Heideggerian conception of action will include both the way in which we are 
unreflectively responsive to our practical and social environments (the key feature of 
Dreyfus’s account of skillful coping) and the way in which we can still be seen to be 
agents in the strong sense of term, i.e. how we can be understood to have responsibility 
for or ownership of our actions (the main thrust of the decisionist interpretation of 
authentic action).  
My project is divided into five main chapters.  The first chapter deals with 
developing the general outline of this Heideggerian conception of action, now conceived 
of as including aspects of both activity and passivity.  In this chapter I will mainly draw 
on Heidegger’s careful description and analysis of our everyday practical engagement 
with the world in Division I of Being and Time.  In addition to this, I will draw on 
Heidegger’s interpretation and appropriation of certain aspects of Aristotle’s practical 
philosophy in Heidegger’s early lecture courses of the 1920s in order to further explicate 
and clarify the central features of the Heideggerian conception of action. 
In Being and Time, Heidegger makes an important distinction between authentic 
and inauthentic existence, or, for our purposes, between authentic and inauthentic agency.  
Explaining this distinction is the focus of the second chapter.  Briefly put, there are two 
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main distinctions to be drawn between authentic and inauthentic action.  The first 
distinction is that in authentic agency we come to take over or own our actions in a way 
that we do not when acting inauthentically.  In other words, when acting authentically we 
become responsible for our actions in a way that we are not when acting inauthentically.  
The second distinction between authentic and inauthentic agency is that in authentic 
agency we disclose the structure of our being as agents in the proper way, while in 
inauthentic agency, we do not.  In other words, we achieve a sort of self-knowledge in 
authentic action that is lacking when we act inauthentically.  Understanding this 
distinction between authentic and inauthentic action allows us to see that Heidegger 
recognizes the potential problem for conceptions of action like that of Dreyfus, which 
focus only on our unreflective coping with the situations in which we find ourselves on a 
daily basis, and that Heidegger does propose a solution to this problem in his account of 
authentic action. 
In the third chapter, I will focus on Heidegger’s conception of inauthentic action.  
Heidegger describes inauthentic action as a certain form of movement, which he calls 
falling (Verfallen).  We will begin our discussion of inauthentic action by considering the 
structure of falling and showing how the structure of falling gives rise to the two 
distinguishing characteristics of inauthentic action—the failure to be responsible for our 
actions and the failure to properly understand the structure of our being.  There are 
several ways of acting identified as inauthentic in Division I of Being and Time.  Using 
my own nomenclature to describe these ways of acting, they are productive activity, 
social interaction and “idle,” non-productive activities, e.g. watching television, “hanging 
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out” with friends, gossiping, etc.  After the initial discussion of the structure of falling, 
the rest of the chapter is dedicated to explaining why these activities exhibit the structure 
of falling and how this makes them inauthentic. 
The fourth and fifth chapters focus on developing a conception of authentic 
agency that shows how we can become responsible for our actions, how we can act in 
such a way that we reveal the structure of our being as agents and how these two 
distinguishing features of authentic action are intimately connected.  The fourth chapter 
focuses on developing a conception of responsibility that is compatible with the 
Heideggerian conception of action understood as involving both active and passive 
aspects.  To avoid falling into the empty, solipsistic decisionism of Wolin’s 
interpretation, it must be shown how a plausible account of responsibility can be 
developed that does not involve the complete overcoming of the passive aspect of action.  
If being truly responsible for our actions required such an overcoming, then authentic 
action would be the unconstrained decisionistic action of Wolin’s interpretation.  In order 
to develop this conception of responsibility that is compatible with the Heideggerian 
conception of action developed in the earlier chapters, I analyze Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Kant’s practical philosophy in Heidegger’s 1930 lecture course, The 
Essence of Human Freedom, and then attempt to show how this later, Kantian 
formulation of the conception of responsibility can be translated back into Heidegger’s 
earlier conceptual framework in Being and Time. 
The fifth and final main chapter builds on the work done in the fourth chapter by 
showing how being responsible for our actions in the strongest sense of the term involves 
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acting with a certain sense of self-knowledge.  Heidegger develops his account of how 
we can achieve the appropriate form of self-knowledge through the experience of the 
interconnected phenomena of death, anxiety, conscience and resoluteness, the analysis of 
which makes up a large part of Division II of Being and Time.   
The concluding chapter provides some preliminary consideration of the 
contributions (if any) that the Heideggerian conception of action developed here can 
make to the broader philosophical discussion of agency.  
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CHAPTER 1.  DEVELOPING A HEIDEGGERIAN CONCEPTION OF ACTION 
 
The aim of this chapter is develop a general Heideggerian conception of action.  
By this I mean that the aim is to lay out in very broad terms a characterization of the 
structure of human agency that is grounded in Heidegger's early thought.  Heidegger does 
not explicitly give us a “theory of action,” even though much of his early thought is 
concerned with the description and analysis of our concrete, practical existence as agents.  
This makes it somewhat challenging to develop a Heideggerian conception of action or 
even to figure out where to begin with this task.  The general method employed here to 
develop a Heideggerian conception of action will be to briefly trace the development of 
Heidegger's analysis of the structure human action through his lecture courses of the early 
to mid-1920s to the culmination of his existential analysis of human existence in Being 
and Time.  While the main focus of this chapter will be Being and Time, it has become 
increasingly clear as more and more Heidegger’s early lectures are published that the 
central ideas of Being and Time are developed gradually throughout Heidegger’s lecture 
courses in the 1920s.  In order to fully understand and to sometimes clarify Heidegger’s 
characterization of human action in Being and Time, the conception of action found in 
Being and Time must be understood as an outgrowth of these earlier lectures, particularly, 
as I hope to show, as an outgrowth of Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle.  In the final 
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section of the chapter, we will consider some potential problems for the Heideggerian 
conception of action and the potential responses to these problems.   
 
Heidegger’s Interpretation of the Aristotelian Understanding of Human Life in Basic 
Concepts of Ancient Philosophy 
At the end of the 1926 lecture course Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy, 
Heidegger briefly discusses Aristotle’s conception of life (zoē) in De Anima.10  This 
lecture course provides a good starting place for understanding Heidegger's conception of 
action in his early thought for two main reasons.  The first one is the time period in which 
these lectures were given.  If Being and Time, which was published in 1927, is seen as the 
culmination of Heidegger's early analysis of human agency, then it seems plausible to 
think that many of the ideas and concepts being discussed by Heidegger in his lectures in 
1926 are at least operative in the background of Being and Time.  The second reason for 
starting with this lecture course is the format of the text itself.  The published version of 
this lecture course is composed of Heidegger’s notes from which he gave the lectures and 
students transcripts of the lectures themselves.  This gives the text the feel of a very 
succinct outline of Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle's understanding of life 
(specifically human life) and action.  In some ways this format is detrimental, but I 
believe in this case it is actually helpful, as consideration of the few pages devoted to the 
                                                 
 
10
 It should be noted that the published form of this lecture course consists of very rough notes made by 
Heidegger himself and appendices of student transcriptions of the lectures.  It is assumed that the student 
transcriptions provide a reliable account of Heidegger’s interpretation of the matter under discussion. 
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topic of life in this lecture allow us to very quickly and easily pick out the key aspects of 
Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle on these issues.  We will try to use these key 
aspects of Heidegger’s interpretation as preliminary clues to develop a more detailed 
conception of Heidegger’s understanding of human agency.  In the following sections of 
this chapter, we will then try to show how Heidegger develops and appropriates these 
Aristotelian concepts, resulting finally in the existential analysis of human existence in 
Being and Time. 
In the Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy, Heidegger begins his discussion of 
De Anima and Aristotle's understanding of life with the following general definition of a 
living being: “We say something is living where we find that: it moves in an oriented 
way, i.e., in a way oriented by perception; it moves itself and can stop itself; it was young 
and ages; it takes in nourishment and grows; etc.” (BCA 228).  Heidegger goes on to 
further clarify what is meant by moving in an oriented way as he says that the motion of 
living beings is “different than the change of place to which lifeless things are 
subject…to move oneself toward something which matters to life in one way or another; 
an oriented motion in the respective surrounding world” (BCA 228).  Here the key 
determination of life is oriented motion understood as motion toward something that 
matters. This self-orienting ability possessed by living beings is referred to as krīnein in 
the Greek or as the activity of distinguishing by Heidegger (BCA 228).  The two main 
modes of distinguishing are aīsthesis (perception) and noūs (understanding).  While all 
animals have the ability to perceive in some capacity, humans have perception and 
understanding.   
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Heidegger proceeds to discuss Aristotle’s consideration of the basis of motion 
(archē kinēseos).  For Aristotle, it is the object of desire (orektōn) that brings about the 
motion of a living being.
11
  Aristotle’s conception of the movement of living beings can 
be clarified by way of an example.  Suppose a lion sees a gazelle and then proceeds to 
chase it.  According to Aristotle’s account, this is what happens.  The gazelle is the object 
of desire.  Upon seeing the gazelle, the lion’s desire to eat the gazelle is stirred into 
motion.  The desire in turn causes the lion to start moving in pursuit of the gazelle.  The 
gazelle causes movement, but is itself unmoved.   
What Heidegger chooses to highlight in this seemingly straightforward 
understanding of the movement of living beings is the role of desire (ōrexis).  For 
Heidegger, one of the important and interesting things about Aristotle’s account is that 
the “point of departure for the motion is not the pure and simple observation of a 
desirable object” and that “[i]t is not the case that the living being first observes things 
disinterestedly, merely looks about in a neutral attitude, and then moves toward 
something; on the contrary, ōrexis is fundamental” (BCAP 228).  What this shows is that 
living beings have a fundamental openness to being affected by the world, which allows 
things immediately to appear to them as desirable or undesirable.  There is found in 
ōrexis not only the urge towards the object of desire, but also the capacity to experience 
things in the world as desirable or as mattering in some way.  Heidegger expresses this 
dual aspect of ōrexis when he describes it as “feeling oneself attuned in such and such a 
way, feeling well and ill, and thus also being on the lookout for” (BCAP 156).  
                                                 
 
11
 Cf. Aristotle’s De Anima (433a27 and 433b10) and De Motu Animalium (701b33). 
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Now one may ask why Heidegger emphasizes the importance of distinguishing 
(krīnein) for life, and hence, the motion of living beings.  It is apparent that when a living 
being moves towards an object of desire that the living being has distinguished that 
particular object as something desirable.  The capacity of ōrexis to reveal objects as 
desirable is the capacity to distinguish objects from one another, at least insofar as their 
desirability is concerned.  Remember that for Aristotle the object of desire is the basis of 
motion.  However, living beings can only be moved by the desirable object if they take it 
as something desirable.  Returning to the example of the lion and the gazelle, the gazelle 
does cause desire to move the lion, but the gazelle can only do this in the first place 
because the lion sees the gazelle as something to be eaten.
12
 
For animals, this distinguishing takes place through perception (aīsthesis).  
Perception here is not to be thought of as a straightforward sensing of things in the world 
in terms of their objective qualities, but rather “it exists in a context of pursuit and flight” 
(BCAP 228).  In other words, perception is always already oriented towards seeing things 
as desirable (worthy of pursuit) or detrimental (worthy of being avoided).   
For humans, motion has the same structure, but humans possess the ability to 
make distinctions in more sophisticated ways than animals.  In the case of human beings, 
“krīnein is not limited to aīsthesis but is also found in noūs” (BCAP 229).  Heidegger 
here references the five intellectual virtues discussed by Aristotle in Book VI of the 
icomachean Ethics (tēchne, epistēme, phrōnesis, noūs and sophīa) as being the five 
                                                 
 
12
 Martha Nussbaum argues for this view of Aristotle’s account of the movement of animals in her essay, 
“The Role of Phantasia in Aristotle’s Explanation of Action” in her book Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), 221-269. 
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modes of distinguishing specifically available to human beings.  It might seem strange 
that Heidegger here characterizes the intellectual virtues as modes of distinguishing.  
Heidegger explains this interpretation of the virtues to some extent in his earlier 1924 
lecture course titled Plato’s Sophist.  Despite the title of this lecture course, Heidegger 
begins it with an in-depth interpretation of Book VI of the icomachean Ethics, in which 
Aristotle discusses the intellectual virtues.  Heidegger’s interpretation of the intellectual 
virtues in this lecture begins with and is guided by Aristotle’s characterization of the 
intellectual virtues as “five states in which the soul grasps the truth in its affirmations and 
denials” (NE 1139b15).  In Heidegger’s words, the intellectual virtues are “five ways 
human Dasein discloses beings in affirmation and denial” (PS 15).  What Heidegger 
means by this is that in Aristotle’s description of the intellectual virtues, Aristotle is 
describing the various ways that we as human beings can understand things in the world 
and ourselves.  For example, the Aristotelian virtue of epistēme characterizes our ability 
to understand things in the world as objects of theoretical, scientific inquiry. 
Now we can return to the consideration of the connection between these 
intellectual virtues and the movement of human beings.  According to Heidegger, some 
of the modes of distinguishing (i.e. intellectual virtues) correspond with certain types of 
movement.  For example, the movement of poīesis corresponds with the virtue of tēchne.   
The virtue of tēchne characterizes the way in which we understand things in the world in 
terms of their usefulness for our projects.  Poīesis is the activity (or movement in a broad 
sense) of making or producing something.  We will discuss this productive activity in 
more detail later in this chapter.   Heidegger maintains that the movement of prāxis, or 
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properly human action, corresponds to the virtue of phrōnesis (BCAP 230).    With 
respect to other intellectual virtues, Heidegger claims that no corresponding movement is 
associated with them.  According to Heidegger, there is no movement corresponding to 
epistēme, “since epistēme is theory and simply beholds” (BCAP 229).  The movement 
associated with the virtue of noūs is “not attained by humans; it determines the first 
mover” (BCAP 229).  While Heidegger does not say so, there is presumably no 
movement corresponding to sophīa, since the virtue of sophīa is a combination of 
epistēme and noūs (NE 1141a16).   
What are the more general aspects of human action that can be drawn out of 
Heidegger’s brief interpretation of Aristotle’s conception of life?  First of all, human life 
is to be understood as movement directed towards things which matter in some way or 
another.  That which matters (the object of desire for Aristotle) is to be understood as the 
initial basis for acting.  We always already encounter things in the world as mattering to 
us in some way before any decision on our part.  In this way things in the world can be 
said to affect us or exert a pull on us.  However, things encountered in the world are only 
able to do this on the basis of some articulation of the world that allows certain things to 
appear as desirable.  Human action has the two basic aspects of being affected by things 
in the world (i.e. a passive aspect) and articulating the world in such a way that things are 
able to affect us in this way (i.e. an active aspect).   
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Tracing Heidegger’s Development of His Conception of Action in His Thought Leading 
up to Being and Time 
Before turning to the consideration of how this basic Heideggerian understanding 
of human action as being constituted by active and passive aspects reaches its fullest 
expression in Being and Time, let us first attempt to briefly outline the course of 
Heidegger's development of this conception of action through some of his writings and 
lectures from the early 1920s.  By charting the gradual evolution of this way of 
understanding action in Heidegger's thinking, we can better see the way in which 
Heidegger appropriates the more biologically-oriented Aristotelian discourse and 
translates it into his own more existential way of expressing things.  This will allow us to 
understand more clearly how the often opaque concepts and terminology employed in 
Being and Time stem from a more concrete understanding of human life and action and, 
importantly, how these concepts and terms can once again be employed in a concrete 
analysis of the structure of human agency.   
We can begin with the lecture course given by Heidegger in the winter of 1921-
1922, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle.  Despite the title of the course, there 
are very few explicit discussions of Aristotle within the text itself.  Nevertheless, it seems 
clear that in this lecture course, Heidegger is beginning to try to formulate his 
interpretation of Aristotle in his own terminology.  The focus of Part III of the lecture 
course is “factical life,” i.e. life considered not as an abstract concept but rather in its 
phenomenological concreteness (PIA 61).  There is an obvious parallel with Aristotle’s 
De Anima even though Heidegger does not explicitly make the connection.  Like 
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Aristotle, in this lecture course, Heidegger describes life in terms of movement (PIA 70, 
85, 87).  Instead of talking about the role played by desire in the movement of human 
beings, Heidegger uses the term care [Sorge], a term that will go on to play a prominent 
role in Being and Time.  “Living,” says Heidegger, “in its verbal meaning, is to be 
interpreted according to its relational sense as caring: to care for and about something; to 
live from [on the basis of] something, caring for it” (PIA 68).  As human beings we care 
about all sorts of different things: having food, finding employment, spending time with 
our friends and families, etc.  Where Aristotle characterizes life as movement towards the 
object of the desire (or flight from that which is threatening), Heidegger characterizes life 
as movement guided by the things and people about which we care.  It is from care that 
life gets its sense of directionality as Heidegger says that “caring always exists in a 
determinate or indeterminate, secure or wavering, direction” (PIA 70).   
Heidegger also provides some very vivid descriptions of the passive aspect of life, 
i.e. the way in which things in the world can affect us and draw us towards them.  In this 
lecture course, Heidegger calls this aspect of life inclination (eigung), which “imparts to 
life a peculiar weight, a direction of gravity, a pull toward something” (PIA 75).  He 
describes life as a “being-transported by the world” and says that this being transported is 
“pull-like” (PIA 78).  In other words, part of what it means to be a human being is to be 
pulled towards those things that we care about and to have a tendency to immerse 
ourselves in the activities of the world. 
In Heidegger’s lecture course from the summer of 1925, History of the Concept of 
Time, we can find the next stage of his translation of Aristotle’s concepts and 
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terminology into his own.  Here Heidegger again understands human being as care.  
When analyzing the way in which we are drawn towards the things that we care about, he 
changes his terminology slightly.  Where in the earlier Phenomenological Interpretations 
of Aristotle Heidegger calls this aspect of care inclination, in the History of the Concept 
of Time, he uses the term disposition (Befindlichkeit), a term which he will still use in 
Being and Time.  This terminological transition is interesting and important because in 
the History of the Concept of Time lecture course, Heidegger is still using language closer 
to that of Aristotle to describe human being in conjunction with some of his own 
terminology, the terminology that will become dominant by the time he writes Being and 
Time.  In this lecture course, Heidegger characterizes our caring about things as 
“constantly being solicited by the world itself in this or that way” (HCT 254).  In a way 
that parallels Aristotle’s characterization of the movement of animals being structured 
according to the possibilities of either pursuing something desirable or fleeing something 
threatening, Heidegger says that “being-in-the-world is so to speak constantly being 
summoned by the threatening and non-threatening character of the world” (HCT 254).  
Heidegger then summarizes what he means by saying that disposition is a fundamental 
aspect of our being as humans by stating that “in all of what we do and where we dwell, 
we are in some sense—as we say—‘affected’” (HCT 256).   
We also find another significant progression in the History of the Concept of Time 
course.  In his earlier explication of life in terms of caring about things and being drawn 
towards things in the world, Heidegger does not discuss the sort of active articulation that 
we found in his interpretation of Aristotle from the Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy 
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course.  In the History of the Concept of Time, Heidegger makes it clear that care cannot 
be understood only in terms of disposition.  Our being is also fundamentally 
characterized by what Heidegger calls understanding (Verstehen).  While Heidegger’s 
description of understanding here is somewhat meager (a deficiency which he remedies 
in Being and Time as we will see in the next section), Heidegger makes several important 
points that allow us to see what he means by understanding and how this is connected to 
his interpretation of Aristotle.  As we saw in the previous section, Heidegger connects our 
ability to interpret something as desirable or to articulate the situation of action with 
Aristotle’s concept of noūs (noūs considered in the broad sense of intellectual capacities, 
not in the narrow sense of noūs as a specific intellectual virtue).  In the History of the 
Concept of Time, Heidegger explicitly connects understanding with interpretation, saying 
that the “cultivation of understanding is accomplished in expository interpretation” (HCT 
260).  Furthermore, the “primary form of all interpretation as the cultivation of 
understanding is the consideration of something in term of its ‘as what,’ considering 
something as something” (HCT 261).  According to Heidegger, in interpretation we make 
explicit our understanding of something as something, e.g. as something desirable.   
 
The Culmination of Heidegger’s Early Understanding of Agency in Being and Time 
At this point we have shown how Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's 
conception of life and movement in his Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy lectures 
can serve as the basis for developing a Heideggerian conception of action.  We have also 
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seen how this conception of agency as involving active and passive aspects is developed 
and refined through his earlier lectures.  Now we turn our attention to Being and Time, in 
which we find Heidegger's most detailed analysis of the structure of human action.  The 
aim of this section is to show how Heidegger takes this conception of action as being 
constituted by an active component (a capacity for articulating or distinguishing) and a 
passive aspect (an openness to being affected by things we encounter in the world) and 
develops it further in and through his existential analysis of the structure of human being. 
Description of Our Everyday Activity Found in Heidegger’s Account of Worldhood 
 
In Chapter III of Being and Time, Heidegger lays out his understanding of the 
world and the importance of this concept for his larger ontological project.  Heidegger 
maintains that in order to understand what it means for entities in the world to be, we 
should start by considering the way in which we encounter these entities and understand 
their being in our everyday existence.  To understand the being of entities encountered in 
the world, “we will take as our clue our everyday being-in-the-world, which we also call 
our ‘dealings’ [Umgang] in the world and with entities within-the-world” (BT 95/66).  
Heidegger claims that our everyday interaction with things in the world is a “kind of 
concern which manipulates things and puts them to use” (BT 95/67). 
Entities in the world, at least insofar as they are encountered in our use and 
manipulation of them, are understood as equipment (das Zeug) (BT 97/68).  For 
Heidegger, we can never encounter one isolated piece of equipment.  The term equipment 
always refers to a totality of equipment.  This is because any individual thing encountered 
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in terms of its usefulness is understood as something to be used in order to do something 
else.  In this way any individual piece of equipment refers beyond itself to something that 
it is used to accomplish.  This end product or goal in turn refers to a further goal beyond 
it so that a total system of references is always implied by any single piece of equipment.  
For example, a nail is understood as something to be used in order to hold together pieces 
of wood.  The pieces of wood are understood as things to be used in order to make a 
house secure against the elements.  A hammer is understood as something to be used in 
order to pound the nails into the wood, etc.   
In a parallel way, any of our individual activities involving equipment always take 
place within the totality of the referential framework of these ‘in-order-to’ relations.  For 
example, someone cuts wood in order to have boards for siding.  Someone pounds nail 
into the wood boards in order to make the house secure against the elements, etc.  Our 
actions are generally directed towards some goal or end product.  Heidegger calls these 
goals and products the “towards-which” (das Wozu) of our activities. 
Heidegger maintains that this web of ‘in-order-to’ and ‘towards-which’ relations 
ultimately receives its structure from a ‘towards-which’ that does not refer to any further 
goal.  This ‘towards-which’ is called the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ (das Worumwillen), 
since it is that for the sake of which we ultimately do the things we do (BT 116/84).  Any 
for-the-sake-of-which, according to Heidegger, “always pertains to the Being of Dasein” 
(BT 116-117/84).  The example that he gives here is that of securing a house against bad 
weather.  When we cut boards and use hammers and nails to fix the boards to the side of 
a house, we are doing so for the sake of providing ourselves with shelter.  There is no 
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further aim towards which our activities are directed.  In his commentary on Being and 
Time, Dreyfus interprets for-the-sake-of-whichs as also including various social roles.13  
This is a helpful extension of Heidegger’s thought here (especially since Heidegger 
himself provides only one example).  Dreyfus maintains that we also understand 
ourselves in terms of the roles we play and positions we fill in our social context.  For 
instance, one could understand oneself as a teacher, daughter or politician.  These are all 
possible ways of being and possible ways of taking up the situations in which we find 
ourselves.   
That for the sake of which we are acting in any given case dictates the 
intermediate goals towards which we direct our actions.  We assign ourselves an “in-
order-to”, i.e. we act in order to accomplish something, on the basis of a particular 
understanding of ourselves that serves as that for the sake of which we are acting (BT 
119/86).  When we act in order to accomplish that for the sake of which we are acting, we 
“prescribe” to ourselves intermediate goals towards which our actions must be directed if 
we are to accomplish our ultimate objective (BT 119/86).  For example, I understand 
myself, at least in part, as a philosopher.  This self-understanding serves as something for 
the sake of which I act that does not refer beyond itself to any further goals.  I act in 
certain ways in order to accomplish or continually enact this self-understanding of being 
a philosopher.  In light of acting in order to be a philosopher, certain intermediate goals 
(e.g. obtaining a PhD, writing a dissertation, publishing articles in journals, etc.) are 
prescribed to me. 
                                                 
 
13
Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 94-96. 
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Here we find the need to develop accounts of the two aspects of action discussed 
above—the active articulation that allows certain goals and actions to stand out as 
important or desirable to us and the passive capability of being affected by (i.e. drawn or 
pulled towards) certain actions and projects.  Our self-understanding for the sake of 
which we act articulates the context of relations that is the world.  Heidegger calls this 
aspect of our being as agents understanding (Verstehen).  Based on this articulation, we 
then come to encounter certain things within the world as significant or important to us in 
some way.  Heidegger calls this way in which we are affected by the things encountered 
in the world disposition (Befindlichkeit).  He goes on to develop a more detailed account 
of the structure of human agency through the further development of these two key 
aspects of our being. 
Disposition (Befindlichkeit) 
In Being and Time (as in the History of the Concept of Time), Heidegger calls the 
passive aspect of our being Befindlichkeit, which is translated as “state-of-mind” in the 
Macquarrie and Robinson translation of Being and Time.  Befindlichkeit is in fact not a 
term used in everyday German.  Literally, Befindlichkeit would mean something like 
‘how one finds oneself in the world’.   I will translate Befindlichkeit as disposition in 
order to avoid the overly mental connotation of the ‘state-of-mind’ translation.
14
  
Translating this term as disposition is meant to capture the sense in which we always find 
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 By translating Befindlichkeit in this way, I am following Theodore Kisiel’s practice in his translation of 
the term in Heidegger’s History of the Concept of Time (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992). 
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ourselves disposed towards the world in a certain way that goes beyond mental states and 
is more of an all-encompassing state of being.  While this translation itself is not 
completely satisfactory, I think it more closely captures what Heidegger means by the 
term than ‘state-of-mind’. 
Heidegger makes his approach to analyzing disposition clear at the beginning of 
page 29 of Being and Time when he states: 
What we indicate ontologically by the term “disposition” is 
ontically the most familiar and everyday sort of thing; our 
mood [Stimmung], our Being-attuned [Gestimmtsein].  
Prior to all psychology of moods…it is necessary to see this 
phenomenon as a fundamental existentiale, and to outline 
its structure (BT 172-173/134, translation modified). 
 
In his analysis of Befindlichkeit, Heidegger starts from the ordinary of understanding of 
what it is to be in a mood, or to put it in more colorful language, to be attuned to the 
world.  Mood here is not to be taken merely as a mental state of a subject.  For Heidegger 
moods are much broader than this.  Taking this notion of being-attuned quite literally, we 
can think of moods as the background tones operative in our existence that always 
provide the backdrop for our understanding of the world.  Heidegger wants to push 
beyond our ordinary understanding of moods to the consideration of the underlying 
structures of our existence that are indicated by the fact that we have moods. 
Heidegger picks out three “essential characteristics” of having moods that point to 
important underlying ontological aspects of our existence.  The first essential 
characteristic is thrownness (Geworfenheit) (BT 175/136).  He clarifies what he means by 
thrownness by stating that the “expression ‘thrownness’ is meant to suggest the facticity 
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of [Dasein’s] being delivered over” (BT 174/135).  Heidegger is trying to capture the 
sense in which we have been thrown into a world and a life that we have not chosen and 
to a large extent cannot really control.  In this way, we can be said to be delivered over to 
the world in which we find ourselves.  Moods reveal this aspect of thrownness because 
“[i]n having a mood, Dasein is always disclosed moodwise as that entity to which it has 
been delivered over in its Being; and in this way it has been delivered over to the Being 
which, in existing, it has to be” (BT 173/134).  Heidegger's meaning seems to be that 
when we find ourselves in a particular mood, this is an experience of the fact that we do 
not and cannot completely control the situation in which we find ourselves or even our 
reactions to this situation.  We find corroboration when we consider moods as passions, 
something which comes over us and something which to some extent we cannot control, 
or as emotions, which move us in certain ways.  What this shows, according to 
Heidegger, is that we cannot understand ourselves as perfectly encapsulated, willful 
subjects that are at least initially closed off from being affected by things in the world.  
Heidegger is trying to emphasize that it is a fundamental aspect of our being that we are 
open to being affected by things we encounter in the world.  In other words, moods reveal 
the fundamentally passive aspect of our existence. 
It is not just the fact that we are open to being affected by the world around us that 
Heidegger is pointing out here.  When he says that Dasein “has been delivered over to the 
Being which, in existing, it has to be,” he is also claiming that we always find ourselves 
thrown into a certain way of being that we have to deal with in some way.  To take a 
more biological example, we all find ourselves as creatures that require food.  We have 
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been delivered over to this way of being, and our lives are to some extent conditioned and 
controlled by this fact, even if we choose to reject this aspect of our being as animals by 
refusing to eat.  Similarly, we always find ourselves to have been thrown into certain 
ways of understanding ourselves.  For example, by being born when and where I was, I 
have been thrown into the understanding of myself as an American living in the late 
Twentieth- and early Twenty-First-Centuries.  I can, of course, reject this way of 
understanding myself, but this does not negate the fact that I must start from something 
like this self-understanding.   
The second essential characteristic of disposition is that having a mood always 
discloses the world as a whole and “makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards 
something” (BT 176/137).  Remember that in his discussion of his conception of the 
world Heidegger maintains that we do not create the relations of significance that guide 
our activities and allow us to encounter things in their readiness-to-hand.  Rather, we 
disclose a relational context in which we find ourselves.  Disclosing this relational 
context is what first allows us to orient ourselves in whatever situation we find ourselves 
and to direct ourselves towards something. 
The third essential characteristic of disposition is that it allows things encountered 
in the world to matter to us.  In the course of going about our everyday activities, we are 
affected by things we encounter because they can be “unserviceable, resistant, or 
threatening” (BT 176/137).  In other words, in trying to accomplish certain things, we can 
run into obstacles.  These obstacles affect us by giving rise to moods of frustration, anger, 
fear, etc.  For Heidegger, this signifies a deeper ontological component of our being, 
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namely, being in such a way that entities encountered in the world can matter to us in one 
way or another.  For example, when considered in the context of building a house, a 
broken hammer can affect the builder by giving rise to frustration or anger.  That is to 
say, the hammer matters to us in some way.   
If we again shift these considerations to the level of the goals towards which our 
actions are directed, we can discern a parallel structure.  Depending on that for the sake 
of which we act, certain intermediate goals and actions will affect us because they matter 
to us.  Returning to the example of being a philosopher, we can say that the activity of 
submitting articles to journals matters to me because of my understanding of myself as a 
philosopher.  To say that this activity matters to me is to say that the activity and the goal 
towards which it is directed are able to affect me.  I am drawn towards this activity with 
the aim of accomplishing the goal of publishing something.  It is this basic openness to 
being affected by or drawn towards certain goals and activities that Heidegger here 
locates in his conception of disposition.   
Putting these three essential characteristics together, Heidegger, by way of 
summation, characterizes disposition as follows: “Existentially, disposition 
[Befindlichkeit] implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can 
encounter something that matters to us” (BT 177/137, translation modified).   Disposition 
is disclosive.  This means that it reveals to us the world in which we find ourselves.  This 
disclosure of the world is also a submission to the world.  We find ourselves in an 
already-existent world whose dictates and demands we must accommodate.  It is the 
disclosure of this already-existent world that allows us to encounter something that 
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matters to us.  We find ourselves in a world that is already polarized in such a way that in 
every situation we encounter things, actions or ways of existing that appear important and 
worthwhile. Because we encounter these as already mattering to us and in terms of the 
relational context of the world, we are able to direct ourselves towards those goals and 
activities that matter to us.   
Understanding (Verstehen) 
Let us now turn to the active aspect of agency in Being and Time, which is 
captured in Heidegger’s conception of understanding (Verstehen).  He does not use the 
term ‘understanding’ in the traditional sense, in which it has a cognitive connotation.  In 
fact, in his lecture course, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (which he gave in 
1927, the same year as the publication of Being and Time), Heidegger claims that 
understanding is the “authentic meaning of action” (BPP 277).  In this section, we will 
show how we can make sense of this claim.   
As in his discussion of the existential significance of moods, Heidegger starts 
from a very broad sense of understanding and then seeks to pick out the existential 
structures that underlie this sense of the term.  Heidegger says: 
When we are talking ontically we sometimes use the 
expression ‘understanding something’ with the 
signification of ‘being able to manage something’, ‘being a 
match for it’, ‘being competent to do something’ [etwas 
können] (BT 183/143). 
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It is this last sense of the term that Heidegger emphasizes.  A key component of 
our being as humans is that we are able to enact possible ways of being.  Heidegger 
makes this clearer by stating: 
In understanding, as an existentiale, that which we have 
competence over is not a “what”, but Being as existing.  
The kind of Being which Dasein has, as being able to 
[Seinkönnen], lies existentially in understanding.  Dasein is 
not something present-at-hand which possesses its 
competence for something by way of an extra; it is 
primarily Being-possible (BT 183/143). 
 
The key term here is Seinkönnen, which literally means ‘being able to.’  What 
Heidegger is claiming here is that being human is to be able.  Taken at the level of a 
formal structure of human being (i.e. as an existentiale) that ‘being able to’ does not refer 
to a particular range of tasks, but rather refers to an essential general feature of being 
human.  This is what prompts Heidegger to claim that Dasein is primarily being-possible.  
We can understand better what Heidegger means here by connecting his discussion of 
understanding with the previous discussion of the for-the-sake-of-which.  At the 
beginning of his discussion of understanding, Heidegger reminds us that, “in the ‘for-the-
sake-of-which’, existing Being-in-the-world is disclosed as such, and this disclosedness 
we have called ‘understanding’” (BT 182/143).  He goes on to say that,  
The Being-possible which is essential for Dasein, pertains 
to the ways of its solicitude for Others and of its concern 
with the ‘world’, as we have characterized them; and in all 
these, and always, it pertains to Dasein’s ability for being 
towards itself, for the sake of itself (BT 183/143). 
 
When Heidegger says that we are being possible, he means that we are able to carry out 
and enact the various self-understandings that serve as that for the sake of which we act.  
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For example, we are able to enact various possible ways of being like being a 
philosopher, being a mother, being a creature that needs shelter, etc.   In other words, we 
able to act for the sake of something, and it is this ability to enact these possible ways of 
being that discloses the world in its structure of towards-which/in-order-to relations. 
Heidegger deepens his conception of understanding by analyzing its structure in 
terms of what he calls projection (Entwurf) (BT 185/145).  We can get some clue about 
what he means by this by looking at the word ‘Entwurf’.  The noun ‘Entwurf’ is 
connected to the verb ‘entwerfen’, which means literally to throw (werfen) away or off (a 
directionality signified by the prefix ent-).  Heidegger goes on to say that we project 
ourselves upon a for-the-sake-of-which (BT 185/145).  By this I take him to mean that 
our being is such that we can be said to throw ourselves out towards certain ends.  We are 
able to be in different possible ways by directing ourselves out towards the enactment of 
these possibilities.  If we again return to the example of being a philosopher, we can say 
that by understanding myself as a philosopher, I am projecting myself towards the 
enactment of this particular way of being.  This does not imply that being a philosopher is 
a goal that is currently not actualized and thus must be striven after.  I could very well 
already be a philosopher, but in order to maintain this way of being, I must be continually 
projecting myself towards this self-understanding and performing the intermediate tasks 
and actions that constitute being a philosopher.  Heidegger makes it clear as well that this 
projection need not take place, and in fact does not originally take place, at a cognitive or 
thematic level.  Rather, this projection involves the whole of my being.  Understanding 
myself as a philosopher involves more than a mental decision to do so.  It involves letting 
  
37 
all aspects of my being (thoughts, emotions, social relations, etc.) be directed by this self-
understanding. 
It should be emphasized again that because understanding is the way in which we 
direct ourselves towards some for-the-sake-of-which, it is understanding ourselves in 
terms of these various possible ways of being that is going to disclose the relations of 
significance that constitute the world.  Heidegger will explicitly maintain, as mentioned 
in our discussion of the History of the Concept of Time, that it is understanding that first 
articulates the world and allows us to distinguish something as something useful, 
threatening, detrimental, etc. (BT 190/149).  Here we see Heidegger taking his 
interpretation of Aristotle’s conception of noūs as the ability to distinguish things 
encountered in the world as such and such (krīnein for Aristotle) and re-conceiving it at 
the existential level of this projective self-understanding.  We also find here the 
existential appropriation of Aristotle’s basic understanding of life as self-directed.  When 
Heidegger characterizes understanding as projection, he is once again alluding to his 
conception of human existence as being fundamentally directed out towards something, 
in this case a possible way of being.  When we project ourselves onto a for-the-sake-of-
which, we are taking up a particular directionality.  Our existence becomes oriented 
towards the enactment of the possibility of being we take up.   
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The Interdependence of Disposition and Understanding and the Resulting Conception of 
Action 
At this point we can begin to see how Heidegger conceives of the unity of 
disposition and understanding.  In order for things to matter to us, i.e. to be significant, 
we must already have taken up a certain understanding of our being.  But Heidegger also 
maintains that in order for us to be able to direct ourselves towards something there must 
first be something that matters to us.  There is an interdependent, reciprocal relation 
between understanding and disposition operative in human agency.   
There seems to be a tension here.  On the one hand, Heidegger seems to be saying 
that we find ourselves thrown into a world in which things already matter to us and that 
this is disclosed to us through our moods.  This makes our actions appear to be dictated 
by the situation in which we find ourselves.  In other words, it makes human action seem 
responsive and passive.  On the other hand, Heidegger seems to be saying that we can in 
fact control the relations of significance that dictate what matters to us and how we act 
through our projection towards a possible way of being.  In this sense, it seems Heidegger 
is maintaining that we can willfully determine our actions through the choice of our self-
understandings. 
The way to resolve this tension is to remember the earlier discussion of 
Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle and to mention another aspect of Heidegger 
discussion of worldhood that we have neglected up to now.  Remember that for Aristotle 
it is the object of desire that initiates movement.  There has to be some object or goal that 
is seen as desirable for movement, or more specifically action, to occur. In a similar way, 
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we can say that for Heidegger there must be something that matters to us in order for us 
to act.  Before any cognitive, abstract reflection, we already feel pulled towards certain 
goals or activities because we feel that they matter to us in some way.  Remember also 
that for Aristotle, at least on Heidegger’s interpretation, an object of desire can only be 
desirable, and thus initiate movement, if the object is seen as something desirable.  Some 
distinguishing or articulation must be performed in order for an object to be seen as 
desirable.  Similarly for Heidegger, for something to matter to us, there must be a 
projection upon some for-the-sake-of-which that articulates the situation in which we find 
ourselves and first allows an activity to matter to us insofar as it is something that we 
should do in order to enact the possible way of being that we have taken up.   
Crucially for Heidegger this does not mean that we can willfully and arbitrarily 
fabricate these relations of significance, and thereby choose what should matter to us 
without constraint.  Rather, the articulation that occurs through our projective self-
understandings lets things matter to us in a way that we cannot willfully and arbitrarily 
change.  Heidegger says something similar in regard to entities encountered in the world 
as useful (ready-to-hand).  In our everyday interaction with things in the world, we let 
something that is ready-to-hand “be so-and-so as it is already and in order that it be such” 
(BT 117/84).  This means that “letting something ‘be’ does not mean that we must first 
bring it into its Being and produce it; it means rather that something which is already an 
‘entity’ must be discovered in its readiness-to-hand, and that we must thus let the entity 
which has this Being be encountered” (BT 117/85).  By using wood to build a house or 
put siding on a house, we do not make the wood useful for building a house through our 
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activity.  Rather, it is through our activity that we let the being of the wood as something 
useful for building appear or manifest itself.   
We can find some useful clarification of what Heidegger means when he says that 
we let entities be in John Haugeland’s essay “Letting Be.”
15
  As Haugeland points out, 
the verb ‘let’ (or lassen in German) can be understood in several different ways.  
Haugeland identifies four different ways of understanding what it means to let something 
be.
16
  We can understand letting be as acquiescing or giving up.  For example, when we 
give up in a struggle with someone, we might say that we are letting her win the fight.  
We can also understand letting as granting permission, e.g. “I let my friend borrow my 
car.”  A third way of understanding letting is effecting or causing something.  To 
illustrate this sense of letting Haugeland gives the example of “ball players,” e.g. players 
organizing a game of backyard football, saying something like “Let this sidewalk be the 
goal line.”  Here the players could be thought of as causing the sidewalk to be the goal 
line.  Finally, letting can be understood as enabling in the sense of making possible.  We 
often hear it said of various high-level athletes that their natural athletic ability lets them 
make incredible plays, i.e. their athletic ability makes it possible for them to make 
incredible plays.  Haugeland argues (persuasively in my opinion) that it is the final sense 
of letting as enabling that best captures how Heidegger typically uses the term. 
We can make use of this clarification of what it means to let something be to 
clarify the Heideggerian account of the structure of action put forward here, particularly 
                                                 
 
15
 This essay can be found in Transcendental Heidegger, eds. Steven Crowell and Jeff Malpas, 93-103 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007). 
16
 Haugeland, 94. 
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the way in which understanding and disposition are in fact interdependent.  By projecting 
ourselves towards various possible ways of being, we let certain activities matter to us.  
In so doing, we make it possible for certain things to matter to us on the basis of already 
established relations that we cannot arbitrarily change.  When trying to use wood to build 
a house, our using it for this purpose cannot change the fact of its suitability or 
unsuitability for this project.  In the same way, in my understanding of myself as 
philosopher, I cannot arbitrarily decide which activities are important in order to enact 
this possible way of being.  Enacting the possibility of being a philosopher just entails 
certain activities like finishing my dissertation or teaching Introduction to Philosophy 
courses.  I do not decide which activities are going to be important or are going to matter 
to me, but my understanding of myself as a philosopher lets these things to matter to me 
in a way that they would not for someone who did not understand herself in this way.    
We can now give a preliminary general description of this Heideggerian 
conception of the structure of human action.  We are initially drawn towards some 
activity or goal that matters to us in some way.  This can be seen as the passive or 
responsive side of agency.  However, activities and goals can only matter to us if we let 
them matter to us through the articulation of the situation in which we find ourselves that 
comes from our projection towards a particular possible way of being.  This can be seen 
as the active aspect agency, albeit in a strange way.  According to this Heideggerian 
conception, the active aspect of agency is a letting or allowing. 
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Potential Problem Cases for this Conception of Action 
We can sharpen this conception of action and add more substance to it by 
considering some examples that seem to be potentially problematic for this view.   This is 
not meant to be an exhaustive list of potential counter-examples, nor are the responses to 
these counter-examples exhaustive.  In this section I am aiming for the more modest 
objective of refining and clarifying the Heideggerian conception of action put forth in this 
chapter through some brief consideration of potential problem cases. 
on-Productive Activity 
It could be objected that the preceding conception of action is based solely on an 
analysis of our concrete, productive activity that aims at the accomplishment of specific 
goals, e.g. building a house.  Can a conception of action based on our productive activity 
also help us understand other forms of human activity that do not aim at the production of 
something?  There are two common types of action that could be seen as clear cases of 
non-productive activity, and thus as counter-examples to the conception of action 
developed here.  To begin with, we normally do not consider all of our interaction with 
other people to be productive activity in the same way that building a house or writing an 
article is.  Of course, we can and do interact with people in the course of our actions that 
are aimed at producing something, but we tend to think that performing an action like 
comforting a distraught friend is different from building a house.  Secondly, we can think 
of various activities that we engage in everyday that do not seem to be goal-directed at 
all.  For example, we often spend time surfing the internet or watching television, and 
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when doing so, we often have no specific aim.  Heidegger discusses both of these types 
of actions and analyzes both of them in terms of the preceding conception of the structure 
of action.  In this section, we will consider what he says about our interaction with other 
people.  The discussion of the second type of non-productive action, actions that 
seemingly have no specific aim, will be put off until the third chapter.   
Heidegger maintains that we encounter other people in the course of our everyday 
productive activities and that the way in which we understand other people differs from 
the way in which we understand things encountered in the world.  Returning to 
Heidegger’s earlier interpretation of Aristotle’s intellectual virtues, we could say that 
there are different modes of understanding, i.e. different ways of articulating things we 
encounter in the world, that guide our actions.  Productive activity, as we saw when 
considering the Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy, is guided by the intellectual virtue 
tēchne.  Heidegger calls the mode of understanding that guides our productive activity 
circumspection (Umsicht) (BT 186/146).  He distinguishes this from the mode of 
understanding that guides our interactions with other people—considerateness 
(Rücksicht).  Although considerateness does not appear to be a direct appropriation of one 
of the Aristotelian intellectual virtues, Heidegger still seems to be following the general 
contours of his reading of Aristotle. 
Heidegger calls our interaction with other people solicitude (Fürsorge) (BT 
157/121).  He makes it explicit that solicitude, like our productive activity, must still be 
understood in terms of care (BT 157/121).  This means that our interactions with other 
people can ultimately be understood in terms of the same structure of disposition and 
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understanding that can be found in our productive activities.  Heidegger provides the 
following examples of solicitude: “Being for, against, or without one another, passing 
one another by, not 'mattering' to one another” (BT 158/121).  People and our interactions 
with them matter to us, but not merely in terms of their usefulness in our productive 
activity. Similarly, it is possible for us to understand ourselves as beings that are engaged 
in actions other than purely productive actions.  For example, we understand ourselves as 
members of families or groups of friends.  These self-understandings allow people and 
activities to matter to us in a way that is different than what occurs in productive activity.  
When I meet a friend for coffee to discuss her problems, we could say that it is the 
understanding of myself as a good friend that allows that action to matter to me. 
Actions that Involve Explicit Deliberation 
This conception of action as described up to this point seems to be able to account 
for things that we do with little or no deliberation.  To repeat a prior example, I submit 
articles to journals for publication because I allow this activity to matter to me based on 
the way my understanding of myself as a philosopher articulates the situation of action.  
There is no mention here of deliberation that takes places prior to the activity of 
submitting articles.  The potential problem is that many times when we do something, we 
go through a fairly explicit deliberative process before we act.  With regard to this 
example, we could very easily alter it so that deliberation plays a greater role.  For 
instance, before submitting an article to a specific journal, I could deliberate about 
whether in fact this journal is the best one for my article or whether it is best for me to 
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submit an article at all or if I might be best served by concentrating all of my time and 
energy on my dissertation.  What is potentially problematic about these examples for the 
Heideggerian conception of action outlined above is that when explicit deliberation is 
involved in action, it seems like the action ultimately comes about as a result of the 
deliberative process and that this way of conceiving agency as allowing things to matter 
to us is a tangential, background issue at best.  In other words, the claim could be made 
that the best way to understand action would be to focus on the deliberative process, its 
outcome and the way in which actions follow on from this.  We find that this 
Heideggerian conception of action as it has been construed up to this point still faces one 
of the main problems for the Dreyfusian understanding of action discussed in the 
Introduction.  The challenge for this Heideggerian conception of action would not 
necessarily be to show that deliberation is not important for understanding action, but 
rather that explicitly deliberative action can be accounted for within the more general 
conception of action laid out in the previous sections of this chapter. 
Let me start by stating what I think would be the Heideggerian response to this 
challenge in its general form.  As we have seen, according to this Heideggerian 
conception of action, it is our pre-thematic, pre-cognitive understanding of our existence 
that articulates the world we live in and allows certain activities and goals to matter to us.  
Explicit, cognitive deliberation can be fit into this conception of action if deliberation is 
seen as a more abstract and explicit form of this basic articulation.  We can understand 
deliberation, from a Heideggerian perspective, as a way of refining particular aspects of 
our self-understanding.  When we deliberate, we are engaged in articulating the situation 
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in such a way that a certain action will come to matter to us more than alternatives by the 
end of the deliberative process.  Deliberation will have allowed this action to matter most 
to us.  Seen in this way, explicitly deliberative action does not represent a serious 
counter-example to the Heideggerian conception of action.  Instead, explicitly 
deliberative action can be understood as a special sub-species of action that still can be 
understood within the general framework of the Heideggerian conception.   
In order to understand how this response is grounded in Heidegger’s thought, we 
can begin by considering what Heidegger has to say about the connection between 
understanding and interpretation in Being and Time.  Heidegger characterizes 
interpretation as the possibility of understanding to develop itself (BT 188/148).  By this 
he means that interpretation is the further “working-out of possibilities projected in 
understanding” (BT 189/148).  Understanding is the initial projection of ourselves toward 
some possible way of being that first structures the relations of significance that make up 
the world.  Interpretation is the process of further refining and articulating what is already 
laid out in this initial projection.  In interpretation we understand something as something 
to be used or manipulated in a certain way given the tasks and activities in which we are 
involved.  Heidegger emphasizes the way explicit interpretation is grounded in his basic 
conception of understanding by saying that in an explicit interpretation of something as 
something, the “'as' does not turn up for the first time; it just gets expressed for the first 
time, and this is possible only in that it lies before us as something expressible” (BT 
190/149). 
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Heidegger understands deliberation as a form of interpretation (BT 410/359).  In 
his earlier lecture course Plato's Sophist, Heidegger identifies two different types of 
deliberation (PS 35).  The first type of deliberation is associated with the virtue of tēchne, 
the knowledge that guides our productive activity.  Heidegger characterizes the form of 
this deliberation as follows: “if such and such is to come to be, then this or that must 
happen” (PS 35).  This formulation is very close to the description of the structure of 
deliberation found in Being and Time.  There Heidegger describes deliberation as having 
an 'if—then' structure, which generally takes the form of “if this or that, for instance, is to 
be produced, put to use, or averted, then some ways and means, circumstances, or 
opportunities will be needed” (BT 410/359).  Returning to example of building a house, 
we can see how this would work.  What I want to produce is a house that is secure from 
the elements.  I might deliberate about whether or not wood siding or aluminum siding 
would be best for achieving this desired result.  This deliberation might take the form of 
“if I want to build a house that is secure against the elements, then I need to have siding 
that keeps out wind and rain”.  Now I have provided the framework for understanding 
wood and aluminum as materials that might be useful for this purpose.  In the process of 
deliberating, I let the wood and aluminum appear as useful. 
As we have been doing prior to this point, we can easily find a parallel with the 
structure of our actions themselves.  Within the context of this same example, I could 
deliberate about what specific action I should take.  I could ask myself whether putting up 
wood siding or aluminum siding would be better for keeping out wind and rain.  I could 
weigh the relative merits of each and come to the decision that I should use wood siding.  
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This deliberative process results in the action of putting up wood siding as being more 
desirable than the alternatives.  What this deliberative process does is to allow, through a 
more refined process of articulation, the action of putting up wood siding to have more  
pull on me than the possible alternatives.   
The second type of deliberation that Heidegger discusses in the Plato's Sophist 
lecture is the deliberation associated with the Aristotelian virtue of phrōnesis or practical 
wisdom. Heidegger has a little more difficulty in clarifying the structure of the 
deliberation of phrōnesis.  He says that the deliberation of phrōnesis has the following 
structure: “if such and such is supposed to occur, if I am to behave and be in such and 
such a way, then...” and “if I am to act in such and such a way, then this or that must 
happen” (PS 35).  In order to understand what is meant by this, Heidegger adds that the 
deliberation of phrōnesis is always guided by some for-the-sake-of-which (which is his 
translation of Aristotle's term hoū hēneka).  What is different about the deliberation of 
phrōnesis is that it is concerned not with the proper action required to produce or make 
some external good (e.g. having a house that keeps wind and water out).  The deliberation 
of phrōnesis is concerned with acting in a way that is in line with some possible way of 
being in terms of which the agent understands herself.  The if/then structure of this type 
of deliberation does not have the form of “if I want to do x, then I must first do y”.  
Rather, it has the form of “if I understand myself as a person of type x, then I must do y”.  
Returning to the example of understanding myself as a philosopher, we see that when I 
deliberate about, for instance, whether or not I should devote more time to my 
dissertation or to my class lectures, I am really deliberating about the best way to enact 
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the possible way of being that is being a philosopher.  In this deliberative process, I am 
further refining my basic self-understanding of being a philosopher in such a way that the 
world in which I find myself is articulated in a more fine-grained way.  If I ultimately 
decide that it is more important to devote time to my dissertation, then I have refined and 
clarified my understanding of what it means to be a philosopher in such a way that 
working on my dissertation matters to me more than preparing lectures for class.  In this 
way the process of deliberation allows working on my dissertation to matter to me. 
More would have to be said about how exactly deliberative action would fit into 
this Heideggerian conception of action, but I hope to have shown here the general way in 
which this might be accomplished.  I also would suggest that this manner of dealing with 
deliberative action is more plausible than Dreyfus’s relegation of deliberative action to 
those cases in which we experience a breakdown in the normal flow of our activity. 
Having Different Self-understandings that Give Rise to Allowing Incompatible Things to 
Matter to Us 
The third type of situation that might be problematic for the Heideggerian 
conception of action is similar to the second case considered.  In the section above, we 
discussed cases in which there may be two (or more) different things or two (or more) 
possible ways of acting that matter to us, or in other words, situations which call for 
explicit deliberation.  The Heideggerian response to this sort of problem would be to see 
deliberation as an explicit, abstract form of the basic articulation of the situation that 
happens initially at a pre-thematic level.  In other words, deliberation would be 
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understood as fine-grained articulation taking place within the articulated context of 
significance already established by the possible self-understanding that we have taken up.   
Now suppose we vary the example slightly.  Suppose that I were to receive a 
phone call informing me that a fairly distant relative has died.  I learn that the funeral is 
in several days, but unfortunately, the funeral is scheduled to take place on the same day 
that I am supposed to present a paper at a prestigious conference.  I am faced with a 
situation in which two conflicting actions matter to me.  Attending the funeral matters to 
me insofar as I understand myself as a supportive and dutiful family member.  Presenting 
the paper at the conference matters to me insofar as I understand myself as a philosopher.  
This sort of example differs from the type considered in the last section because here we 
have a case in which different things matter to us on the basis of two different self-
understandings.  The examples considered above dealt with alternative actions that were 
all to be understood in terms of one self-understanding.  
These cases in which we find two different self-understandings that allow two 
conflicting actions to matter to us may very well prompt us to engage in explicit 
deliberation to decide what we should do, but the Heideggerian response to these sorts of 
examples will be different than the one discussed in the previous section.  For Heidegger, 
the self-understanding that is that for the sake of which we act is not a product of 
deliberation, but rather is chosen in a decision (PS 101).  In the Plato's Sophist lecture, 
Heidegger explains Aristotle's claim that a doctor does not deliberate about whether or 
not heal someone (NE 1112b11).  Here Heidegger says that the doctor “does not 
deliberate about whether he is going to heal; on the contrary, that belongs to the meaning 
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of his existence itself, because as a doctor he has already resolved in favor of healing” 
(PS 111).  The self-understanding of being a doctor provides the basic articulation of the 
world that first allows for meaningful deliberation, so this self-understanding cannot itself 
have been the product of a deliberative process.  We ultimately just have to choose 
certain basic possible ways of understanding ourselves without being able to rely on a 
deliberative process to guide our choice.  Heidegger repeats this claim in his discussion 
of resoluteness in Being and Time when he asks: “But on what basis does Dasein disclose 
itself in resoluteness? On what is to resolve?  Only the resolution itself can give the 
answer” (BT 345/298). 
Our initial reaction to this claim by Heidegger might be to think that it is just 
obviously false.  When considering the example given above, it seems clear that I can 
deliberate about whether understanding myself as a philosopher or understanding myself 
as a supportive family member is more important to me.  Heidegger could respond to this 
by saying that as long as deliberation is still possible, the possible self-understandings 
being considered are not for-the-sake-of-whichs in the proper sense of the term.  If we 
reflect on the deliberation that might take place in the above example, we see that this 
deliberation between understanding oneself as a philosopher or as a supportive family 
member really is taking place in light of a more general self-understanding to which both 
of these self-understandings are subordinate.  Remember that for Heidegger, a for-the-
sake-of-which is supposed to be something for the sake of which we act that does not 
refer further to anything else beyond it.  If I can deliberate about whether to understand 
myself as a philosopher or as a member of a family in this case, then I am doing so in 
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light of some more general self-understanding to which both of these ways of 
understanding myself refer.  In this case, we might say that the most general, basic self-
understanding operative here is that of understanding myself as a good person generally.  
I would be deliberating about whether or not going to the funeral or going to the 
conference would be the best way of being a good person.  This understanding of myself 
as a good person is, in this case, a for-the-sake-of-which in the strict sense in that it does 
not refer to anything beyond itself. This type of deliberation then takes much the same 
form as the deliberation discussed in the previous section.  We allow one action to matter 
more to us through the deliberative process by eventually deciding which way of 
understanding myself (as a philosopher or as a family member) is most in line with my 
basic understanding of myself as a good person.   
It might seem that this resolution of the problem provides support for the 
decisionist interpretation of Heidegger’s understanding of action.  There are, however, 
several important differences.  The decisionist interpretation of Heidegger maintains that 
Heidegger endorses a conception of authentic action that actively advocates the 
abandonment of social norms and the deliberation that takes place within their 
parameters.  The type of example in question here merely acknowledges the fact that in 
some (most likely rare) cases, we will simply have to choose one self-understanding over 
another without recourse to a more general deliberative framework.  In addition to this, 
the decision between two possible self-understandings discussed in this section is not an 
abandonment of the social norms that usually guide our actions in favor of a 
determination of the guidelines for our actions at the purely individual level.  Rather, the 
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type of decision being discussed here is the decision between various possible self-
understandings that could serve to guide our actions.  There are norms and expectations 
that go along with my understanding of myself as a philosopher or a family member.  In 
choosing one self-understanding over the other, I am choosing which sets of norms will 
guide my actions, not rejecting all socially-based norms. 
Actions that Do ot Seem to Involve Movement 
Another potential problem for the Heideggerian conception of action is presented 
by cases that we would normally consider to be actions, but that do not involve any overt 
physical movement.  It might seem that since this Heideggerian conception of action is 
grounded in Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's conception of the movement of 
living beings, there would be problems accounting for actions that do not involve 
movement.  For example, suppose that during a presidential election year I am equally 
disgusted with all the candidates on the ballot.  In order to demonstrate my disapproval of 
all of the candidates, I stay home on election day and do not vote.  If someone were to 
ask me what I was doing, I could say that I was protesting against the potential 
candidates.  In other words, I was actively not voting.  This seems to be an action that is 
in fact characterized by a lack of activity or movement. 
In a later paper in which he discusses Aristotle’s conception of nature
17
, 
Heidegger makes it clear that rest, or the lack of movement, is still to be understood in 
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terms of movement.  When discussing Aristotle’s understanding of plants and animals in 
terms of movement, Heidegger maintains that “[r]est is a kind of movement; only that 
which is able to move can rest.”
18
  As Heidegger points out, it is “absurd to speak of the 
number ‘3’ as resting.”
19
  Rest can only be understood as a cessation of movement or as a 
pause in the midst of an ongoing motion.   
What does this tell us about action, specifically action that involves no 
movement?  Suppose we consider the opposite of the above example.  Suppose that 
instead of not voting, I am very enthusiastic about one candidate, and I do in fact go to 
the appropriate polling station and vote.  We could analyze this positive action fairly 
easily using the conception of action developed in this chapter.  We could say that I have 
an understanding of myself as a responsible citizen, which then allows the activities of 
picking a preferred candidate and voting for that candidate to matter to me.  There is 
clearly movement involved with this action, e.g. driving to the polling station, registering 
my vote on the voting machine, etc.  Now let us return to the original example of not 
voting.  Here too we could say that it is my understanding of myself as a responsible 
citizen that lets a certain action matter to me.  The difference in this case is that I am 
drawn towards expressing my dissatisfaction with the available candidates by not voting 
(never mind whether or not this is an appropriate way of expressing the dissatisfaction).  
Instead of my self-understanding allowing for me to be drawn into a particular 
movement, here my self-understanding actually allows me to be drawn towards non-
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movement.  When it is realized that this non-movement can be understood only as a 
deficient sort of movement, we realize that these sorts of actions involving no movement 
can still be understood using the Heideggerian conception of action developed here. 
Conclusion 
Let us now summarize the Heideggerian conception of action that has been 
developed in this chapter. Agency in general is characterized by being pulled by various 
things and activities encountered in the world (the passive aspect) and taking up a 
particular self-understanding that lets these things and activities matter to us in a specific 
way (the active aspect).  In the following chapters, we will examine how this general 
conception of action is carried into Heidegger's distinction between inauthentic and 
authentic ways of acting and the way in which consideration of Heidegger's 
understanding of inauthentic and authentic action can help us to further expand and 
clarify this general conception of action. 
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CHAPTER 2.  UNDERSTANDING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN AUTHENTIC 
AND INAUTHENTIC ACTION 
 
In the previous chapter, I attempted to give a broad outline of a general 
conception of action drawn from Heidegger's early thought. In his early thought, and 
especially in Being and Time, Heidegger makes an important distinction between 
inauthentic existence and authentic existence. In the following chapters, I intend to build 
upon this general conception of action by considering Heidegger's distinction between 
authentic and inauthentic action and what each mode of acting can add to the preceding 
characterization of the general structure of action.  Before turning to the more detailed 
analysis of authentic and inauthentic actions in the following chapters, it is important to 
briefly consider what exactly Heidegger means by the terms ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic,’ 
especially when these terms are used to describe action.  It is this broader consideration 
of how to understand Heidegger’s conceptions of authenticity and inauthenticity and the 
distinction between them that is the focus of this chapter. 
Heidegger's distinction between authentic and inauthentic ways of existing has 
always been somewhat unclear and contentious.  I will not pretend to solve all of the 
difficulties associated with interpreting this distinction here.  In this section I will focus 
on two broad distinctions that can be drawn between authenticity and inauthenticity.  The 
first distinction is that in authentic agency we come to take over or own our actions in a 
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way that we do not when acting inauthentically.  In other words, when acting 
authentically we become responsible for our actions in a way that we are not when acting 
inauthentically.  The second distinction between authentic and inauthentic agency is that 
in authentic agency we disclose the structure of our being as agents in the proper way, 
while in inauthentic agency, we do not.  In other words, we achieve a sort of self-
knowledge in authentic action that is lacking when we act inauthentically. 
The general aim of this chapter is to provide a preliminary outline of what is 
meant by each of these ways of distinguishing authentic and inauthentic action and to 
briefly show that Heidegger does in fact distinguish between authentic action and 
inauthentic action along these lines by considering some relevant passages from his texts 
(specifically Being and Time).  The detailed explanation of why exactly Heidegger thinks 
certain ways of acting are inauthentic or authentic (e.g. why our everyday productive 
activity is inauthentic) will be left to the following chapters.  Similarly, a detailed 
explanation of how Heidegger thinks different modes of acting accomplish what he says 
they do (e.g. how the structure of our being is supposed to be revealed to us in authentic 
action) will be left to the following chapters. Let us now consider both of these two 
distinctions between authenticity and inauthenticity in greater detail. 
The First Distinction between Authentic and Inauthentic Action: Responsibility 
Before proceeding to consider what responsibility would look like within the 
context of Heidegger’s thought, it might be helpful to first discuss what we mean by 
responsibility generally.  Ishtiyaque Haji provides a succinct description of the two main 
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schools of thought about the nature of the responsibility.  According to Haji the 
traditional view of responsibility holds that in order for us to be responsible for our 
actions, there must be the “availability, at various points in our lives, of genuinely 
accessible alternative possibilities.”
20
  We might generally think that for someone to truly 
be responsible for her actions, she had to have had the possibility of acting differently.  A 
second common way of understanding responsibility according to Haji is the view that 
someone is “morally responsible for her behavior only if the antecedent actional 
elements, like her values, desires, or beliefs that cause that behavior, are ‘truly her own’; 
they are not, for example, the product of direct surreptitious implantation.”
21
  In other 
words, we often think that in order for someone to be responsible for her actions, the 
decision to perform that action, the desire to perform that action, etc. must stem from the 
agent herself and cannot be the products of any external force. 
It is something like this second understanding of responsibility that we find in 
Heidegger’s thought.  As we saw in the first chapter, on the Heideggerian conception of 
action, it is the various self-understandings that we take up that articulate the situation of 
action and let things matter to us.  Responsibility on the Heideggerian conception of 
action would then entail that the self-understandings that articulate the situation of action 
are drawn from the agent herself in each case and not from some external source.  This 
very general characterization of what responsibility would be like on the Heideggerian 
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conception of action will suffice for now, but we will have much more to say about it in 
the following chapters.   
This first distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity on the basis of 
having or lacking responsibility comes from the existentialist reading of Heidegger.  
Understanding the difference between Heidegger’s conceptions of authenticity and 
inauthenticity in this way has probably been the most common way of interpreting this 
distinction.  As we saw in the Introduction, Richard Wolin characterizes Heidegger’s 
conception of authentic action as advocating a sort of decisionism.  Wolin describes 
Heidegger’s conception of authentic action as the complete determination of an 
individual’s action purely from the will of the individual agent that rejects all traditional 
social norms as inauthentic.  In Wolin’s words:  
[O]nce the inauthenticity of all traditional social norms has 
been existentially unmasked, the only remaining basis for 
moral orientation is a decision ex nihilo, a radical assertion 
of the will; a will, moreover, that is pure and unconstrained 
by the impediments of social convention.”
22
   
 
On this reading of Heidegger, when acting authentically, our actions are grounded purely 
in our own will, while in inauthentic action we let our actions be determined by the 
prevailing social norms.  According to the criterion established above for responsibility, 
this would mean that we are responsible for our actions when acting authentically, but not 
when acting inauthentically.   
Heidegger does indeed provide ample evidence for this reading of the distinction 
between authenticity and inauthenticity.  In various passages in Being and Time, 
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Heidegger makes it clear that when acting inauthentically, we are not the agents of our 
actions in a strict sense.  He expresses this in several different ways.  “When Dasein is 
absorbed in the world of its concern,” says Heidegger, “it is not itself” (BT 163/125).  In 
our everyday performance of actions in the world, we are, according to Heidegger, not 
really the ones acting.  In fact, he goes on to claim that “in Dasein’s everydayness the 
agency through which most things come about is one of which we must say that ‘it was 
no one’” (BT 165/127), and that in our everyday activities “everyone is the other, and no 
one is himself” (BT 165/128).  This leads Heidegger to claim that since we are not the 
agents of our own actions when acting inauthentically, we are deprived of responsibility 
(Verantwortlichkeit) for our actions (BT 165/127, translation modified).  If we are not 
really the agents of our actions, i.e. if our actions are not really our own, then we cannot 
really be said to be responsible for them. 
Heidegger’s account of authentic action can be understood as his attempt to 
develop a conception of that mode of acting in which we ourselves are the agents of our 
actions and come to be responsible for our actions.  Heidegger describes authentic action 
as a “way of letting one’s ownmost Self take action in itself of its own accord” (BT 
342/295).  For Heidegger, guilt and a certain understanding of what it really means to be 
guilty play a large role in his account of authentic action.   When discussing the meaning 
of being guilty, Heidegger points out that “‘Being-guilty’ also has the signification of 
‘being responsible for’—that is, being the cause or author of something, or even ‘being 
the occasion’ for something” (BT 327/282).  He proceeds to say that generally, “to the 
idea of ‘Guilty!’ belongs what is expressed without further differentiation in the 
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conception of guilt as ‘having responsibility for’—that is, as being the ground 
[Grundsein] for…” (BT 329/283, translation modified).  When Heidegger claims that in 
authentic action we really are the agents of our actions, i.e. that it is our own selves acting 
here, not others, he is saying that in authentic action we are responsible for our actions 
because we are the ground for our actions in a way that we are not when acting 
inauthentically.   
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the consideration of Heidegger’s 
distinction between authentic and inauthentic action is supposed to help refine and 
expand the general Heideggerian conception of action developed in the first chapter.  As 
we will explain more fully in the next chapter, one potential problem for this 
Heideggerian conception of action as formulated up to this point (which Heidegger 
himself clearly recognizes) is that it seems that in most (if not all) of our actions, the self-
understanding that articulates the situation is drawn from the social context in which we 
find ourselves.  In other words, the self-understanding that is the active part of the action 
comes not from the individual agent, but from an external source.  If this is the case, then 
it is difficult to see how we could be responsible for our actions.   
This problem is further exacerbated when one takes into consideration the 
meaning of human action or agency as such.  Remembering Frankfurt’s statement of the 
issue from the Introduction, the “problem of action is to explicate the contrast between 
what an agent does and what merely happens to him, or between the bodily movements 
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that he makes and those that occur without his making them.”
23
  If we are to have a 
meaningful conception of action or agency, we have to be able to explain the difference 
between those movements that are grounded in the agent herself, i.e. the movements that 
the agent herself owns, and those movements whose ground is not in the agent herself.  In 
other words, the problem of action is the problem of explaining how we can have 
responsibility for actions, at least if we have an understanding of responsibility like the 
one outlined above.  If Heidegger thinks that our everyday actions are for the most part 
inauthentic in the sense described above, then the question of whether or not there is 
some way of acting in which we are the agents of our actions, and thus are responsible for 
our actions, becomes rather pressing. 
The potential problem for developing an account of responsibility in the context 
of the Heideggerian conception of action is that although in Being and Time Heidegger 
makes it clear that responsibility for our actions is a concern and is a key distinction 
between authentic and inauthentic action, there is little explicit discussion of 
responsibility in Being and Time, and the limited discussion of the subject found there are 
often rather opaque.  In his 1930 lecture course, The Essence of Human Freedom, 
Heidegger devotes the second half of the course to a detailed interpretation of specific 
aspects of Kant’s practical philosophy, culminating with an account of what it means to 
be truly responsible for our actions.  In the fourth chapter, I will show how the questions 
raised about our responsibility for our actions when Heidegger distinguishes between 
authentic and inauthentic action in Being and Time can be answered by Heidegger’s later, 
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Kantian account of responsibility in The Essence of Human Freedom.  In the course of 
this more detailed consideration of Heidegger’s understanding of responsibility, we will 
see that the existentialist reading of Heidegger as described in this section is not quite 
correct, even though it is a useful starting point. 
The Second Distinction between Authentic and Inauthentic Action: Self-Knowledge 
As stated above, the second distinction that I would like to draw between 
authentic and inauthentic action is that in authentic action the structure of our being is 
properly revealed to us, while in inauthentic action, the structure of our being is not 
revealed to us.  That is, we achieve a certain level of self-knowledge in authentic action 
that is not attained in inauthentic action.  This way of understanding the distinction 
between authenticity and inauthenticity may seem somewhat strange and is admittedly 
more difficult to see in Being and Time when compared to the first distinction between 
authentic and inauthentic action based on whether or not we have responsibility for our 
actions.   
There are, however, a fair number of commentators that hold something like this 
view of the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity.  For example, in his 
commentary on Being and Time, Michael Gelven maintains that “[a]uthentic existence is 
characterized by an explicit awareness of what it means to be,” and “[i]nauthentic 
existence is that mode of existence in which one has hidden or forgotten what it means to 
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be.”
24
  Gelven adds that for Heidegger, “before it is possible to analyze what it means to 
be, the interpretation of Dasein must also yield positively what it means to be authentic 
Dasein,” which implies that authenticity involves self-knowledge.
25
  More recently, 
Taylor Carman has argued that Heidegger’s aim in his development of his conception of 
authenticity is to show that the traditional metaphysical understanding of the self is 
inadequate and that the self is such that it can never be understood through third-person, 
objective accounts of what it is to be a self.
26
  On Carman’s read we achieve a proper 
understanding of the nature of the self in authentic existence insofar as we understand 
that the first person view is irreducible, i.e. second- or third-person accounts of self-hood 
can never adequately capture that first-person relation of the self to itself.   
There is a good deal of textual support in Being and Time for this interpretation of 
the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity.  It is clear that Heidegger thinks 
that we do not properly understand the structure of our being in our everyday existence.  
According to Heidegger, in our everyday existence, we tend to cover over, distort or 
generally misunderstand the structure of our being.  Heidegger explicitly expresses this in 
multiple passages like the following: 
If Dasein discovers the world in its own way and brings it 
close, if it discloses to itself its own authentic Being, then 
this discovery of the ‘world’ and this disclosure of Dasein 
are always accomplished as a clearing-away of 
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concealments and obscurities, as a breaking up of the 
disguises with which Dasein bars its own way (BT 
167/129). 
 
Here he characterizes our disclosing of our own being as clearing away “concealments 
and obscurities.” He also frequently makes it clear that these distortions of our 
understanding of our being stem from the everyday way in which we exist.  According to 
Heidegger, “our everyday environmental experiencing, which remains directed both 
ontically and ontologically towards entities within-the-world, is not the sort of thing 
which can present Dasein in an ontically primordial manner for ontological analysis” (BT 
226/181).  In other words, in our everyday existence we are directed towards the things in 
the world with which we are concerned.  This preoccupation with our worldly concerns 
and projects does not allow for a proper understanding of our own existence.  The 
explanation of why exactly Heidegger thinks that our everyday activities do not allow us 
to properly understand our being will come in the next chapter.  For now, I just want to 
make the point that one distinguishing characteristic of inauthentic action for Heidegger 
is that when acting inauthentically, we fail to properly understand the structure of our 
being. 
There are also several passages in Being and Time in which Heidegger is fairly 
clear that authentic existence is supposed to be that way of existing in which we reveal 
the structure of our being to ourselves.  We can find a first indication of this possibility of 
disclosing the structure of our own being by considering Heidegger’s discussion of 
understanding.  When explaining what he means by understanding in Division I of Being 
of Time, Heidegger says that we can think of understanding as a sort of sight (BT 
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186/146).  He lists three main types of sight: circumspection, which is the sight that 
guides our productive activity, considerateness, which is the sight that guides our 
interaction with other people and a type of sight that is “directed upon Being as such” 
(BT 186/146).  It is worth quoting Heidegger’s further description of this third type of 
sight at length.  Heidegger describes this third type of sight as follows: 
The sight which is related primarily and on the whole to 
existence we call ‘transparency’ [Durchsichtigkeit].  We 
choose this term to designate ‘knowledge of the Self’ in a 
sense which is well understood, so as to indicate that here it 
is not a matter or perceptually tracking down and 
inspecting a point called the ‘Self’, but rather one of seizing 
upon the full disclosedness of Being-in-the-World 
throughout all the constitutive items which are essential to 
it (BT 186-187/146). 
 
In this passage, Heidegger clearly indicates that there is a way of understanding ourselves 
that makes our own being clear (i.e. transparent) to us.   
He is also careful to say that this self-knowledge does not take the form of 
traditional reflection on an ego or point of consciousness.  Rather, the type of self-
knowledge Heidegger is talking about here takes into consideration the fact that, as we 
saw in the last chapter, our being is such that we are always pushing forward towards 
possible ways of being and are simultaneously open to being affected by things in the 
world.  Heidegger goes on to make it clear that it is in authentic existence that we are able 
to clearly and properly understand the structure of our being.  Heidegger claims that in 
authenticity, “Dasein is revealed to itself in its current factical potentiality-for-Being, and 
in such a way that Dasein itself is this revealing and Being-revealed” (BT 355/307), and 
that “we have reached a way of Being of Dasein in which it brings itself to itself and face 
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to face with itself” (BT 357/309).  I will leave the detailed explanation of how we are 
supposed to reveal the structure of our being to ourselves in authentic existence until the 
fifth chapter.  It is enough here to establish that Heidegger thinks that one of the 
distinctive aspects of authentic existence is that it is that way of existing in which our 
being is revealed to us.   
At this point it could very well be asked what this second distinction between 
authenticity and inauthenticity has to do with action and what it could add to the 
development of a Heideggerian conception of action.  These questions can be answered 
in two stages.  First of all, we can show that there are reasons internal to the development 
of Heidegger’s thought that lead him to conceive of authentic action as mode of acting in 
which we achieve a proper knowledge of ourselves as agents.  When Heidegger develops 
an account of authenticity in Division II of Being and Time, he focuses on concepts that 
are typically associated with action (e.g. guilt, conscience and resoluteness).  Heidegger 
focuses on the way in which the structure of our being is revealed to us in the experience 
of these phenomena.  His focus on the sort of self-knowledge that can be drawn from 
these experiences stems from his rejection of the traditional philosophical method for 
attaining knowledge of ourselves.   
The traditional philosophical method for understanding our own being is to 
cognitively reflect on the structures of consciousness that are typically taken to be 
definitive for human beings.  For our purposes, the most relevant instance of this method 
is found in Husserl’s phenomenological methodology, which of course greatly influenced 
Heidegger.  Husserl’s main objective, at least in his early years at Freiburg when he 
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worked closely with Heidegger, is to develop a philosophy that is a rigorous science.
27
  
For Husserl, the way to make philosophy into a rigorous science is to focus on our 
immanent experience of the structures of our consciousness as opposed to our 
transcendent experience of things in the world.  This understanding of the structures of 
our consciousness is not something easily attained for Husserl.  Rather, Husserl spends a 
great deal of time trying to develop the proper way of focusing on the structures of our 
consciousness and purifying our awareness of any focus on external objects.  Husserl 
calls the process of properly becoming aware of the structures of our consciousness the 
phenomenological reduction.  Husserl describes the reduction as follows: 
The so-called phenomenological reduction can be effected 
by modifying Descartes’s method, by carrying it through 
purely and consequentially while disregarding all Cartesian 
aims; phenomenological reduction is the method for 
effecting radical purification of the phenomenological field 
of consciousness from all obtrusions from Objective 
actualities and keeping it pure of them.
28
 
 
The Cartesian method to which Husserl is here referring is, of course, the radical 
doubt of the existence of objects in the external world.  Husserl modifies Descartes’s 
radical skepticism by claiming that the phenomenologist is not doubting the existence of 
objects in the world in any radical sense, but rather the phenomenologist is “bracketing” 
or “putting out of action” her convictions concerning the objective existence of things in 
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the world.
29
  When the objective existence of objects is bracketed, we are left with 
“consciousness in itself” as a “residuum”.
30
  When we have performed this act of 
bracketing, we can then focus on the structures of consciousness itself and the 
phenomena as they present themselves to consciousness.  We are no longer directed 
outwardly towards objects in the external world, but rather we are brought back to the 
structure and processes of our consciousness itself.   
We can understand Heidegger’s opposition to this traditional philosophical 
method, especially in the form of Husserl’s phenomenological methodology, and his 
motivation for developing an alternative way of coming to understand our being by 
briefly considering the objections to Husserlian phenomenology raised by Paul Natorp.
31
 
Natorp’s two objections to phenomenology are that 1) by reflecting on our experience 
and our cognitive acts, we necessarily hypostatize and still something that is 
fundamentally dynamic, thereby distorting it and precluding any direct access to the 
dynamic nature of our experience and 2) by using concepts to describe our immediate 
experience, we are already objectifying it and interpreting it in terms of the mediation of 
abstract concepts, thereby losing the immediate access to our experience that is supposed 
to be the bedrock of phenomenological reflection.  In order to develop a version of 
phenomenology that avoids Natorp’s objections, Heidegger seeks to develop a mode of 
understanding our own being that is itself fundamentally dynamic and pre-theoretical so 
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Heidegger’s early thought, which can be found in The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time (Berkeley: 
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that it can adequately capture the dynamic nature of our being without recourse to 
abstract, theoretical concepts.   
In Heidegger’s early lecture courses leading up to Being and Time, we can see 
him beginning to develop this alternative way of coming to understand our being that 
overcomes Natorp’s objection to Husserl’s phenomenology.  In his 1921-1922 lecture 
course, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, Heidegger describes philosophical 
inquiry not as a static, conceptual and cognitive procedure, but rather as a sort of 
movement arising out of life itself that counters our normal tendency to be absorbed in 
the world of our practical concerns and to not endeavor to understand our own being.  
Heidegger describes this countermovement as a “genuine questioning” that “consists in 
living in the answer itself in a searching way” (PIA 114).  Heidegger provides a more 
detailed conception of his understanding of this way of acting in the 1924 lecture course, 
Plato’s Sophist, when discussing Book VI of the icomachean Ethics and Aristotle’s 
conception of the intellectual virtues.  Heidegger considers the intellectual virtues to be 
ways in which we disclose the world and our own being, paying particular attention to 
phrōnesis.  Heidegger maintains that phrōnesis is a “disposition of human Dasein such 
that in it I have at my disposal my own transparency” and that phrōnesis “lives in action” 
(PS 37).   He notes pointedly that “understanding does not primarily mean just gazing at a 
meaning, but rather understanding oneself in that potentiality-for-Being which reveals 
itself in projection” (BT 307/263).  In other words, Heidegger does not want to rely on 
the sort of abstract theoretical reflection that is characteristic of philosophy.  He does not 
want to merely posit that human existence is constituted by disposition and 
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understanding.  Rather, he is seeking to develop a mode of existing in which we clearly 
experience this constitution of our being in our lived existence as agents immersed in our 
world of practical concerns.   
If this then provides some explanation of why Heidegger connects the attainment 
of the proper sort of self-knowledge with authentic action, we can move on to the second 
question posed above—the question of what the consideration of this second distinction 
between authenticity and inauthenticity can add to the development of a Heideggerian 
conception of action.  To answer this question, we will attempt to show how this second 
distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity in terms of self-knowledge can be 
connected to the first distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity in terms of 
responsibility.  We showed above why being able to explain when and how we can be 
responsible for our actions is essential to the development of a conception of human 
action.  Now the aim is to show that acting with a certain degree of self-knowledge is 
required in order to be truly responsible for our actions.  Once again, the more detailed 
consideration of this connection in Heidegger’s thought will have to wait until the later 
chapters, but here we can at least try to show the plausibility of this connection through 
some very general considerations. 
In the previous section, we gave the very general characterization of responsibility 
as acting in such a way that the action can be said to somehow be grounded in the agent 
herself.  That is, being responsible for an action means that the antecedent decision, 
desire, belief, etc. (or self-understanding of the Heideggerian conception of action) that 
brings about the action is the agent’s own, not the product of some external force.  At a 
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very general level, we can see how a certain self-knowledge could be important here.  For 
example, if while driving I were to hit a pedestrian crossing the street, the degree to 
which I am held to be responsible for this action would depend at least in part on whether 
I had knowingly made the decision to run over the unfortunate pedestrian or not.  We 
typically think that people are more responsible for those actions that stem from decisions 
that they explicitly and knowingly make.  The degree of self-knowledge people have 
when acting does make a difference when it comes to determining to what degree they 
are responsible for their actions. 
This is not quite the connection that we want to make between self-knowledge 
and responsibility on the Heideggerian conception of action.  As we have seen, 
Heidegger does not emphasize the role of mental states like desires and beliefs in his 
conception of action, and he makes it clear that his conception of authentic self-
knowledge is not an internal inspection of these mental states.  Is there a way of finding a 
connection between authentic self-knowledge in Heidegger’s sense and responsibility?  
In other words, can we find a way of connecting acting with an understanding of the 
structure of our being with being responsible for our actions?  We can use the general 
existentialist conception of freedom and action to see how this might work, even though 
we will see that this connection cannot quite be made in the same way for Heidegger.  At 
least according to the superficial, pop-culture understanding of existentialism, we act 
authentically and become fully responsible for our actions when we realize that the 
social, religious and/or historical norms that typically guide our actions are completely 
baseless and arbitrary and that we must create for ourselves the standards according to 
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which we should live.  When we recognize that we as human beings are “condemned to 
freedom,” to use Sartre’s expression, then we become truly responsible for our actions.  
The sort of self-knowledge involved here is knowledge of the essential nature of human 
beings, not merely a sort of internal awareness of the mental states that we typically 
associate with taking action.   
Once again, these considerations are only used to show the general plausibility of 
the connection between responsibility and self-knowledge.  We are not here concerned 
with the details of this connection within the context of the Heideggerian conception of 
action being developed here.  In the fifth chapter, I will show in more detail how 
Heidegger finds the template for this dynamic, pre-conceptual mode of self-knowledge in 
Aristotle’s conception of phrōnesis and how Heidegger uses his interpretation of 
phrōnesis to develop his conception of authenticity as a way of acting in and through 
which we reveal the structure of our being to ourselves, thereby becoming responsible for 
our actions. 
Conclusion 
Let us summarize the most important results of this chapter.  There are two main 
distinctions between authentic action and inauthentic action for Heidegger.  The first 
distinction is that when acting authentically, we are responsible for our actions in a way 
that we are not when acting inauthentically.  We are responsible for our actions when 
those actions stem from ourselves, when they are not determined by something else.  The 
second distinction between authentic and inauthentic action is that when acting 
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authentically, we reveal the structure of our being to ourselves in the proper way, i.e. that 
we achieve a particular form of self-knowledge.    
As mentioned above, the more detailed discussion of authentic action will take 
place in chapters four and five.  In chapter four, we will show how we are able to become 
responsible for our actions when acting authentically.  The fifth chapter will then focus 
on how Heidegger thinks that the structure of our being is revealed to us in authentic 
action. The next chapter, chapter three, will discuss Heidegger’s understanding of 
inauthentic action, specifically in terms of how inauthentic action prevents us from 
understanding the structure of our being and taking responsibility for our actions. 
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CHAPTER 3.   INAUTHENTIC ACTION 
 
Now that we have said something about how to understand the distinction 
between authentic and inauthentic action generally, we can turn our attention to the main 
focus of this chapter, Heidegger's analysis of inauthentic action.  While Heidegger does 
discuss this topic in his early lecture courses, it is again in Being and Time that we find 
the fullest analysis of inauthentic action.  Accordingly, most of our analysis here will 
focus on Being and Time.   
In the first chapter, we developed a general Heideggerian conception of action 
using as a basis Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s understanding of the movement 
of living things.  Fittingly, Heidegger describes inauthentic action in terms of a certain 
form of movement, which he calls falling (Verfallen).  We will begin our discussion of 
inauthentic action by considering the structure of falling and showing how the structure 
of falling gives rise to the two distinguishing characteristics of inauthentic action 
established in the last chapter—the failure to be responsible for our actions and the failure 
to properly understand the structure of our being.  From there we can move on to 
consider the different general types of inauthentic action discussed by Heidegger in Being 
and Time and show how these general types of inauthentic action exhibit the structure of 
falling and the two distinguishing characteristics of inauthentic action. 
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The Movement of Inauthentic Action—Falling 
To begin with, it is important to point out that despite our inclination to do so, 
Heidegger claims that we are not to understand his use of the term ‘falling’ as conveying 
a “negative evaluation” of the type of action that has this structure (BT 220/175).  Rather, 
falling is meant to describe the way in which we are drawn or pulled into the world of our 
concern.  As we saw in the first chapter, Heidegger maintains that as human beings, we 
are naturally drawn towards certain things and activities that matter to us.  Most of the 
time, we have a tendency to be drawn towards those activities that constitute our 
everyday life in the world, e.g. doing the dishes, teaching classes, buying groceries, etc.  
Additionally, the term ‘falling’ is meant to describe our tendency to become absorbed in 
“Being-with-one-another” (BT 220/175), i.e. being drawn towards social interaction with 
other people, having an interest in “public affairs”, etc.   
One might then think that falling is just another term for disposition, the way in 
which we characterized our general tendency to be pulled towards things that matter to us 
in the first chapter.  The difference between disposition and falling is that disposition is 
an essential feature of all human movement or action, while falling is restricted to our 
tendency to become completely absorbed in our worldly concerns.  As we will see when 
we consider the possibility of authentic action, Heidegger maintains that we can be drawn 
towards a way of existing and acting that is not drawn from the world of our concerns or 
our social world but rather stems from our own being. 
Heidegger proposes to further elucidate the structure of the movement of falling 
by considering four phenomena that are characteristic of this movement.  The first of 
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these phenomena is temptation (BT 221/177).  With this term, Heidegger is again 
describing the way in which the world of our everyday concerns and social interactions 
always seems to beckon us or draw us towards it.  Most of us have some sense of what 
Heidegger is trying to get at here.  We often find ourselves caught up in and in fact drawn 
towards our various everyday activities like meeting friends for dinner, picking out a new 
painting for the living room wall, etc. 
The second phenomenon that Heidegger uses to characterize the movement of 
falling is tranquility (BT 222/177).  With the term tranquility, Heidegger is pointing to 
the way that even (or perhaps especially) when we are caught up in the hectic flow of our 
everyday activities, we have a sort of tranquility insofar as we do not have time to 
question why it is that we do what we do and what it really means to be a human being.  
When immersed in our everyday actions, we operate with an assurance that we are 
“leading and sustaining a full and genuine ‘life’,” which “brings [us] a tranquility” (BT 
222/177). 
The third phenomenon characteristic of falling is alienation (BT 222/178).  To 
fully understand why Heidegger maintains that alienation is involved in the movement of 
falling, we need to understand his conception of das Man (the “they” or the “One”).  In 
the first chapter, we discussed Heidegger’s analysis of solicitous activity, i.e. our 
interaction with other people.  We also saw how Heidegger comes to see being with other 
people, i.e. being part of a social context, as a fundamental aspect of our being.  Being a 
part of a social context is essential for our being as agents, since it is from the social 
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context in which we find ourselves that we draw the self-understandings that allow things 
to matter to us.   
Now Heidegger is going say that “When Dasein is absorbed in the world of its 
concern—that is, at the same time, in its Being-with towards Others—it is not itself” (BT 
163/125).  In other words, when we are engaged in our everyday activity (i.e. absorbed in 
the world of our concern), we are not really ourselves.  Why is this?  We can begin to see 
why Heidegger would say that we are not ourselves when engaged in our everyday 
actions when we consider the following passage: 
[P]roximally and for the most part everyday Dasein 
understands itself in terms of that with which it is 
customarily concerned. ‘One is’ what one does…Here one 
Dasein can and must, within certain limits, ‘be’ another 
Dasein” (BT 283-284/239-240). 
 
How does this passage help?  If we return to the general conception of action 
developed in the first chapter, we can say that when we act, we are drawn towards things 
that matter to us on the basis of the self-understanding(s) towards which we direct 
ourselves.  Another way of formulating this is to say that when we are acting, we are 
doing what is prescribed by the self-understanding(s) that we have taken up.  We might 
then ask where these self-understandings come from, or from where do we draw these 
self-understandings.  As we discussed briefly in the first chapter, these self-
understandings are drawn from the social and historical context in which we find 
ourselves.  When I understand myself as a philosopher and let things matter to me on the 
basis of this self-understanding, I do not have complete control over everything that 
matters to me as a philosopher.  Rather, I have a general sense of what is required to be a 
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philosopher in our current social/historical context.  If we want to know more precisely 
where this understanding of what is required of a philosopher comes from (i.e. who 
exactly defines or has defined what it is to be a philosopher), the most we can say is that 
if one wants to be a philosopher in our current historical situation, there are just certain 
things that one must do.  For example, it is understood that to be a philosopher today 
more or less requires that one be affiliated with some sort of institution of higher 
learning, publish papers in academic journals, attend academic conferences, etc.  The 
origin of these requirements is vague and ultimately cannot be pinned on one person or 
even group of people.   
This leads to Heidegger’s conception of das Man (the one, or “the they” in the 
Macquarrie and Robinson translation of Being and Time).  When answering the question 
of who is really acting in our everyday actions, Heidegger says that, the “‘who’ is not this 
one, not that one, not oneself, not some people, and not the sum of them all.  The ‘who’ is 
the neuter, the ‘one’ [das Man]” (BT 164/126, translation modified).  We can understand 
our everyday actions on this view not as the actions of discrete, autonomous agents, but 
rather as the enactment of various social roles and behavioral norms.  When understood 
in this way, it can be said that in our “everydayness the agency through which most 
things come about is one of which we must say that ‘it was no one’” (BT 165/127).  In 
our everyday actions, there is no real agent for Heidegger since we are “for the sake of 
the ‘one’ in an everyday manner, and the ‘one’ itself Articulates the referential context of 
significance” (BT 167/129).   
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This makes sense when considered in light of the conception of action developed 
in the previous chapter.  Action is to be understood as letting things and activities have a 
pull on us on the basis of our self-understandings (for the sake of which we act).  These 
self-understandings come from the social context in which we find ourselves. 
Furthermore, we see that ultimately the particular actions required to enact these possible 
self-understandings are determined by no one in particular, or put another way, they are 
determined by das Man.  Following the connections being made here, we can conclude 
that ultimately, the active aspect of agency (i.e. letting things matter to us) is performed 
by das Man, i.e. no one in particular.  In this way we can be said to not really be 
ourselves when engaged in our everyday activities.  That is, our everyday actions exhibit 
a movement of alienation in which we are drawn out towards various activities through 
the articulation of the situation provided not by ourselves but rather by the social context 
in which we find ourselves.  Alienation is a movement away from ourselves that is not 
even guided by ourselves. 
Heidegger calls the fourth and final characteristic of falling entanglement (BT 
223/178).  By characterizing the movement of falling as entanglement, Heidegger seems 
to be making sure that we do not misunderstand what he means by alienation.  He says 
that: 
It [alienation] does not, however, surrender Dasein to an 
entity which Dasein itself is not, but forces it into its 
inauthenticity—into a possible kind of Being of itself.  The 
alienation of falling—at once tempting and tranquilizing—
leads by its own movement to Dasein’s getting entangled in 
itself (BT 222-223/178). 
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Here Heidegger is saying that alienation is indeed part of our being as humans.  In a 
sense, we are ourselves in our very tendency to become alienated from ourselves.  The 
term ‘entanglement’ is meant to capture the seemingly paradoxical nature of falling. 
Now that we have seen how Heidegger describes the movement of inauthentic 
action, we can show why action exhibiting this structure is considered to be inauthentic 
based on the two distinguishing characteristics of inauthenticity discussed in the last 
chapter.  The first distinguishing characteristic of inauthentic action is that when acting 
inauthentically, we are not responsible for our actions.  We stated that at a general level, 
an agent is not responsible for her actions when the actions do not stem from the agent 
herself.  According to the Heideggerian conception of action developed in the first 
chapter, for an agent not to be responsible for her actions, the articulation of the situation 
that allows things to matter to her would not really be performed by her.  As we have 
seen here, this is exactly what happens in the movement of falling.  We have a tendency 
to be absorbed in the world of our everyday concerns and social interactions.  The 
determination of which everyday activities matter to us is performed not by us as 
individual agents but rather by the impersonal social norms that make up the various 
possible ways of understanding ourselves.   
The second distinguishing characteristic of inauthentic action is that when acting 
inauthentically, we fail to properly understand the structure of our own being.  When our 
actions have the structure of falling, we are drawn out into and absorbed by the world of 
our concerns.  We are concerned with the tasks we are to accomplish, not the structure of 
our being as agents.  We also become tranquilized insofar as we are content with being 
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absorbed in our everyday activities, leaving little time or energy to attempt to cultivate 
the proper understanding of the structure of our being. 
The Three General Types of Inauthentic Action 
Let us now look at the various types of inauthentic action found in Being and 
Time.  By looking at these types of inauthentic action, we can gain a more concrete 
understanding of the movement of falling and can better understand why Heidegger 
considers most of our everyday activities to be inauthentic.  There are three basic types of 
everyday activities discussed in Being and Time.  Two of these types of everyday action 
have been discussed in the first chapter in the course of the development of the general 
Heideggerian conception of action.  In that first chapter, we saw that Heidegger draws 
most of his examples from what can be called productive activity, i.e. actions directed 
toward the accomplishment of some specific goal or task.  We also showed how the 
general analysis of action drawn from productive activity also can be applied to our 
interactions with other people, a type of action that is not aimed at producing anything.  
Productive activity and interaction with other people will be considered in the first and 
second sections of this chapter, respectively.   
There was also a third type of activity at which we hinted in the first chapter, but 
whose discussion was postponed until this chapter.  In addition to productive activity and 
interactions with other people, we might also want to say that we perform actions that are 
directed neither towards any specific goal (as is the case in productive activity) nor 
towards the enactment of any specific self-understanding (as may be the case in our non-
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productive interactions with others).  Here I am thinking of activities like surfing the 
internet, watching television, chatting with friends, etc.  We will consider this third type 
of activity in the third section of this chapter. 
Productive Activity 
As we have already seen, the first sort of activity discussed by Heidegger in Being 
and Time is productive activity.  The question to be considered here is why this type of 
activity would be considered inauthentic.  In other words, we must show how productive 
activity exhibits the movement that is characteristic of falling and how, when engaged in 
productive activity, we fail to properly understand our own being and to be responsible 
for our actions. 
We already have shown how this type of activity can be understood in terms of 
the general conception of action developed in the first chapter.  Productive action 
involves a passive aspect through which we encounter things and actions as mattering to 
us in some way and an active aspect through which we let these things matter to us by 
taking up various ways of understanding ourselves.  For example, my understanding of 
myself as a philosopher lets the action of writing my dissertation matter to me in such a 
way that I am drawn towards this action.   
How does productive activity exhibit the movement of falling?  We can say that 
in general we are drawn towards various productive activities, even if they are as 
mundane as mowing the lawn or making the bed.  We typically have a feeling that there 
are many “thing to be done”.  It seems to be a bit of stretch to say that mowing the lawn 
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is “tempting”, but it makes sense when we consider Heidegger’s characterization of 
temptation as the tendency to get caught up in all the various everyday activities that we 
feel need to be done.   
For this reason productive activity is also tranquilizing in the sense discussed 
above.  When someone undergoes a traumatic emotional experience in her life, e.g. the 
death of a close friend or the end of a long relationship, the advice often given is to get 
back to work, to get involved in some sort of activity.  When we are engaged in 
productive activity, we tend to get absorbed in the activity, and concern for our own 
being fades into the background.   Heidegger makes this point by analyzing Aristotle’s 
account of poīesis (productive activity) and tēchne (the knowledge that guides productive 
activity).  “In tēchne,” says Heidegger, “the know-how is directed toward the poieton, 
toward what is to be first produced” (PS 28).  In productive activity we are directed 
toward what is to be produced, something which is external (parā) to the process of 
acting itself.  Heidegger contrasts productive activity and tēchne with genuine action 
(prāxis), which is guided by phrōnesis.  Heidegger maintains that phrōnesis is directed 
towards the being of the agent herself, since phrōnesis is concerned with “what is 
conducive to the right mode of Being of Dasein as such” (PS 34).  However, “in the case 
of poīesis, the tēlos is something other, a worldly being over and against Dasein” (PS 36).   
We can also see why productive activity would be alienating.  When engaged in 
productive activity, our movement is out into the world of our concern and away from the 
consideration of ourselves.  In addition to this, most of the self-understandings that we 
take up that let things matter to us are drawn from the social context in which we find 
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ourselves.  Because of this, our productive activity cannot even be seen as an expression 
of ourselves in our actions, but rather is to be understood as our enactment of the 
impersonal social norms that guide our activities.  For instance, we can say that it matters 
to me that I mow my lawn because I understand myself at least in part as a responsible 
homeowner, and part of what it means to be a responsible homeowner is to have a well-
maintained lawn.  This requirement has not been determined by me or any other specific 
individual, but instead is one of those social norms that is just understood and accepted. 
Given these considerations, it is easy to see why productive activity is inauthentic 
according to the criteria established in the last chapter.  When engaged in productive 
activities, we are not responsible for our actions because the articulation of the situation 
that lets us be drawn towards certain activities stems not from us as individual agents but 
rather from the impersonal norms of the socially derived self-understandings that we take 
up.  In this type of activity, we also fail to properly understand the structure of our own 
being.  This is not because we engage in any willful distortion or inadequate reflective 
technique.  Rather, as we have seen, when we are busy doing all the things that we do on 
a daily basis, the structure of our own being is just not an issue for us at all.  We are 
directed out towards the accomplishment of various tasks and not towards achieving a 
proper understanding of what it means to be human.   
Interaction with Other People 
Our consideration of this type of action can be fairly brief.  In the first chapter, we 
showed how our interactions with other people can be understood in terms of the general 
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conception of agency worked out there.  The difference between productive activity and 
our interaction with other people is that when interacting with other people, we are not 
necessarily directed towards completing a specific task like writing a dissertation.  
Rather, when interacting with others, our actions can often be better described as being 
directed towards the enactment of an understanding of ourselves that we hold.  For 
example, if I am traveling and call periodically to check in with my wife, my action can 
be understood not as an action merely aimed at producing in my wife a sense of ease and 
assurance.  We can perhaps better understand this action as mattering to me insofar as I 
understand myself as a good husband and try continually to enact this possible way of 
being. 
Why does Heidegger consider this form of action to be inauthentic for the most 
part, and how does our social interaction with other people exhibit the movement of 
falling?  The answers to these questions are fairly clear given the discussion of the 
preceding section.  Instead of characterizing the world of our everyday tasks and 
activities as tempting, here we can characterize social interaction with other people as 
tempting.  We have a tendency to get caught up in various forms of social interaction.  
We feel that we need to stay in touch with friends and family, meet friends for dinner, 
post comments on internet message boards, etc.  Our social interaction is also 
tranquilizing in much the same way that productive activity is.  When involved in our 
many social activities, the structure of our own being is simply not an issue for us, and 
when engaged in these activities, we usually have a sense of assurance that this is what 
life is all about.  For example, we often hear the opinion, repeated until it becomes 
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unquestionable, that spending time with one’s family is the most important thing in life.  
We typically accept and repeat this view and others like it without really reflecting on 
what it is about being human that might make this statement true.  Finally, we can see 
why interaction with other people is alienating in the same way that productive activity 
is.  When interacting with other people, we are directed out towards the people with 
whom we are interacting and out towards the enactment of a certain self-understanding 
that is drawn from the social context.   
We can also easily see why Heidegger would think that we are not really 
responsible for our actions when interacting with others based on our prior discussion of 
productive activity.  When interacting with others, the self-understandings that allow 
certain activities to matter to us are drawn from the social context in which we find 
ourselves.  For example, when I meet my friend at a bar to discuss his problems, I am 
letting this action matter to me on the basis of my understanding of what it is to be a 
friend.  My understanding of myself as his friend prescribes this action to me.  Who has 
decided that being someone’s friend involves comforting him when he is distraught?  
Heidegger, as we saw when considering productive activity, can again answer that it is 
impossible to really pin this understanding of friendship on any single person or group of 
people.  We can merely say something like “That’s what friends do,” or to phrase it in a 
way more in keeping with Heidegger’s terminology, that is what one does when one is 
someone’s friend.  The articulation of the situation that allows the action of comforting 
my friend to matter to me is really performed by the vague general understanding of 
friendship.  This articulation is not performed by me.  Once again, we can see that, given 
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the conception of action worked out in the first chapter, this means that we are not really 
performing the active part of agency.  This in turn means that we are not really 
responsible for our everyday interactions with others. 
We can also see why we fail to properly understand the structure of our own 
being when interacting with other people.  As in the case of productive active, when 
engaged in social activity, we do not usually engage in willful neglect of proper reflection 
on what it means to be human, but rather we are so immersed in our activity that the 
structure of our being is simply not an issue for us. 
on-Goal-Directed Action 
In the first chapter, we briefly discussed the potential problem for the 
Heideggerian conception of action that it seems to be based exclusively on Heidegger’s 
analysis of productive activity.  If this is the case, one might ask whether this conception 
of action can be applied to different types of action.  In the first chapter, we discussed 
how social interaction can be understood according to the same conception of action.  
Both productive activity and social interaction share the characteristic of being directed 
towards something, either the accomplishment of a specific task (e.g. writing a 
dissertation) or the enactment of a particular self-understanding (e.g. being a good 
friend).  At that time we postponed the consideration of any actions that might not share 
this characteristic of being directed towards something.   
Now we are in a position to consider actions that do not seem to be directed 
towards any clear goal or enactment of some self-understanding.  These actions do not 
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comfortably fit into the categories of productive actions or interactions with others.  
Suppose that after coming home from class, I spend an hour surfing the internet, visiting 
various news and sports websites.  How are we to analyze this sort of action given what 
has been said so far concerning the general structure of action?  We could say that I 
understand myself as a sports fan or someone concerned with current events, and it is this 
self-understanding that allows the action of reading these websites to matter to me.  Or 
perhaps we could say that these activities matter to me insofar as I understand myself as 
someone who works hard and therefore requires some relaxing activities, which are not 
aimed at accomplishing anything in particular.  These analyses, however, seem somewhat 
inadequate.   
We can see how to analyze activities of this sort according to the Heideggerian 
conception of action by further considering Heidegger’s characterization of das Man and 
our tendency to be absorbed into the world of our everyday concerns and social 
interactions, specifically his discussions of curiosity, idle talk and ambiguity.  There is a 
potential problem with limiting the scope of the phenomena of curiosity, idle talk and 
ambiguity to non-goal directed activity.  Heidegger seems to want to say that these 
phenomena are characteristic of all inauthentic activity, not just what we are calling non-
goal directed activity.  For instance, Heidegger maintains that the structure of the 
movement of falling is revealed by the consideration of the interconnections between 
curiosity, idle talk and ambiguity (BT 219/175).  If the movement of falling is 
characteristic of all inauthentic action (as we have attempted to demonstrate here), then 
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this implies that curiosity, idle talk and ambiguity are characteristic of all inauthentic 
action.   
However, as we have also seen, Heidegger maintains that in our everyday 
activities, different types of understanding are operative.  He seems to want to make a 
distinction between the types of understanding that guide productive activity and social 
interaction and curiosity.  As we have seen, our productive activity is guided by a 
practical understanding of things and actions in terms of tasks to be accomplished and 
goals to be met.  Heidegger calls this type of understanding circumspection (Umsicht).  
Our interaction with other people is guided by a type of understanding that Heidegger 
calls considerateness (Rücksicht).  At times, making use of the German stem -sicht, 
Heidegger describes these different types of understanding as types of sight.  Heidegger 
also considers what sort of sight is operative when we are not engaged in productive 
activity or interaction with others (although Heidegger does not explicitly mention the 
latter type of action).  He states that “[i]n rest, concern does not disappear; 
circumspection, however, becomes free and is no longer bound to the world of work” 
(BT 216/172).  It is this form of sight that is operative when we are not engaged in 
productive activity that Heidegger calls curiosity (BT 214/170).  Heidegger further 
describes curiosity as follows: 
When curiosity has become free, however, it concerns itself 
with seeing, not in order to understand what is seen…but 
just in order to see.  It seeks novelty only in order to leap 
from it anew to another novelty.  In this kind of seeing, that 
which is an issue for care does not lie in grasping 
something and being knowingly in truth; it lies rather in its 
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possibilities of abandoning itself to the world (BT 
216/172). 
 
It seems that curiosity as described here is something quite different than the type 
of sight or understanding operative in productive activity and social interaction.  
Describing the carpenter’s understanding of a nail in light of its usability for his projects 
in terms of curiosity does not seem quite right.  For this reason, we will treat the 
phenomena of curiosity, idle talk and ambiguity as being characteristic of non-goal 
directed activity but not productive activity or social interaction with others.   
With this in mind, we can now move on to consider how non-goal directed 
activity can be understood in terms of the Heideggerian conception of action developed 
in the first chapter and in terms of the movement of falling.  We can begin by further 
considering curiosity.  As we have said above, when we are no longer concerned with our 
productive activities, we shift to looking at things and activities not in terms of their 
usefulness for reaching some further end, but rather we look just to look.  This tendency 
we have to want to experience and see new things can help explain activities like 
aimlessly surfing the internet or flipping through television channels.  Heidegger 
maintains that we are just drawn towards these sorts of activities because we have a 
tendency to always want to know the latest news and to be abreast of the latest trends.  If 
we reflect on the general conception of action developed in the first chapter, we can see 
that this tendency to be curious accounts for the passive aspect of these sorts of non-goal-
directed activities.  These activities matter because as human beings we have a tendency 
to be curious.   
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We can expect to find some way of articulating the situation in which we find 
ourselves that allows these activities to matter to us.  The articulation that guides our 
tendency to be curious is what Heidegger calls idle talk (Gerede).  “Idle talk,” says 
Heidegger, “controls even the ways in which one may be curious” (BT 217/173).  It is 
idle talk that “says what one ‘must’ have read and seen” (BT 217/173).  Heidegger 
maintains that we necessarily, due to the very nature of our being as creatures that are 
fundamentally social and open to being affected by our social context, understand 
ourselves and the world in terms of the public ways of interpreting things that are 
deposited like sediments in language itself (BT 211/168).  When Heidegger says that idle 
talk controls the ways in which we are curious, he means that our curiosity is aroused and 
guided by what is currently held to be interesting and important in the court of public 
opinion.  If I am aimlessly surfing the internet, I find myself looking at things that are 
deemed currently to be important by public opinion.  For instance, I might end up looking 
at election results or the latest sports scores not because I have any real interest in these 
topics, but rather because they are simply what one talks about and what public opinion 
deems to be interesting.  In this way idle talk articulates our situation and lets us be drawn 
towards seeing what is going on with regards to the latest news and trends.   
We can then characterize non-goal-directed actions as having the same general 
structure as the other types of action discussed.  The way in which things matter to us in 
these non-goal-directed activities is explained by Heidegger’s conception of curiosity, 
which is understood in the sense of the desire to seek out and see new things.  The 
articulation of the world around that guides curiosity and lets it be directed towards 
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specific things is performed by idle talk, which can be understood as our immersion in 
the public opinions about what is currently important and interesting. 
We can see easily enough how non-goal directed activity exhibits the movement 
of falling.  The tendency to get caught in up whatever is new and interesting, captured in 
the phenomenon of curiosity, exhibits the movement of temptation that is characteristic 
of falling.  We often find ourselves tempted to check up on the latest news and be up on 
the latest gossip.  Non-goal directed activity also exhibits the movement of alienation.  
When engaged in this sort of activity, we are drawn away from ourselves and become 
immersed in whatever is determined to be interesting and important by the general public. 
Following our program for this chapter, the next task is to show how this non-
goal-directed type of action is inauthentic on the basis of the two distinctive 
characteristics of inauthentic action.  This distinctive characteristic of inauthentic action 
is, again, that when acting inauthentically, we are not responsible for our actions.  We 
have already seen why Heidegger thinks that we are not responsible for our actions when 
we are engaged in productive activity or when we are interacting with other people.  In 
the cases of productive activity or social interaction, the self-understandings that 
articulate the situation in which we find ourselves and allow things to matter to us are 
drawn from the social context in which we are immersed, so that Heidegger thinks we 
must ultimately conclude that the One (das Man) ultimately is responsible for allowing 
things to matter to us.  In other words, the real agent in these forms of everyday action is 
no one in particular.   
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Based on this it is easy enough to see why Heidegger would also maintain that 
when engaged in non-goal-directed activities like surfing the internet or gossiping with 
friends, we are not responsible for our actions.  Remember that when we are engaged in 
these non-goal-directed activities, we are drawn by curiosity towards seeing and 
experiencing new things that are commonly considered to be interesting and worthwhile.  
As individual agents, we do not determine what is interesting and worthwhile.  Rather, 
we are drawn towards those things that public opinion, or idle talk in Heidegger’s 
terminology, has deemed to be interesting and important.  In this case the articulation that 
guides the activity and allows certain things to arouse our curiosity comes directly from 
the vague, non-descript zeitgeist and is not located in any single individual or group of 
individuals.  For Heidegger, this means that we are not responsible for actions when 
engaged in non-goal-directed activities. 
Again, the second distinctive feature of inauthentic action is that when acting 
inauthentically we fail to properly understand the structure of our own being.  How is 
non-goal-directed action inauthentic in this way?  For Heidegger, this sort of action by its 
very nature tends to constantly move from one subject to another, never dwelling on one 
issue long to gain anything more than a superficial understanding of it.  Curiosity has the 
character of “never dwelling anywhere” (BT 217/173) and is “concerned with the 
constant possibility of distraction” (BT 216/172), so that curiosity “concerns itself with 
knowing, but just in order to have known” (BT 217/172).  Similarly, idle talk by its very 
nature is superficial and fails to provide any deeper understanding of the subject being 
discussed.  Idle talk takes the form of “gossiping and passing the word along”, which 
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“spreads in wider circles and takes on an authoritative character” (BT 212/168).  This 
leads Heidegger to maintain that curiosity and idle talk are always accompanied by 
ambiguity.  “Everything,” says Heidegger, “looks as if it were genuinely understood, 
genuinely taken hold of, genuinely spoken, though at bottom it is not; or else it does not 
look so, and yet at bottom it is” (BT 217/173).  When we constantly move from one 
subject to another, relying primarily on what is said about that subject for our 
understanding of it, we lose the ability to discern the difference between a genuine 
understanding of something and a superficial understanding of something.   
With regards to our understanding of our own being, this means that we are drawn 
by our curiosity towards currently interesting, yet superficial ways of understanding of 
our own being.  For instance, we find in the “metaphysics” section of any large bookstore 
a variety of books that expound on the nature of the human soul and our “higher selves” 
without engaging in any sort of rigorous reflection on the subject.  Worse still, we tend to 
lose the ability to understand the difference between these vague, superficial accounts of 
what it is to be human and more rigorous attempts to grasp the structure of our being.  
This is again reflected in the common absence of a distinction between popular 
“metaphysics” and rigorous philosophical reflection on the same topics.  When we are 
engaged in these non-goal-directed activities like watching television or chatting with 
friends in a café, to the extent that we do concern ourselves with the structure of our own 
being, we are drawn toward superficial understandings of our being and furthermore, fail 
to differentiate between superficial and genuine attempts to understand what it is to be 
human. 
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Conclusion 
Now we have shown how productive activity, social interaction and non-goal-
directed activity exhibit the movement of falling that is characteristic of all inauthentic 
action.  We have also shown how non-goal-directed activities can be understood in terms 
of the general conception of action developed in the first chapter and why Heidegger 
considers these three types of action to be inauthentic based on the two distinctions 
between authentic and inauthentic action that were discussed in the second chapter.  In 
addition to this, our analysis of non-goal-directed activities has expanded the number of 
different types of action that can be understood in terms of the general conception of 
action from the first chapter and has shown why non-goal-directed activities are not 
counter-examples to this general way of understanding action.  The challenge for the next 
two chapters has now been made clear.  In those two chapters, we will attempt to show 
how Heidegger develops an account of authentic agency in which we transform our 
action in such a way that we not only become responsible for our actions, but also reveal 
the structure of our being. 
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CHAPTER 4.   THE POSSIBILITY OF BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR OUR ACTIONS 
 
Perhaps the main problem for the Heideggerian conception of action that we have 
been developing here is that it seems to leave no way in which we can be responsible for 
our actions.  It is the task of this chapter is to show how it is possible to be responsible for 
our actions on the Heideggerian conception of action developed in the preceding 
chapters. 
To begin with we should review the reasons for not thinking that we are 
responsible for our actions when acting inauthentically.  Remember that on the general 
conception of action developed in the first chapter, human action can be understood as 
having interdependent passive and active aspects.  The passive aspect of action is that we 
are drawn to certain goals and activities available to us in the situation in which we find 
ourselves.  The active aspect of action is that we take up certain ways of understanding 
ourselves that articulate the situation and allow things to matter to us.  These ways of 
understanding ourselves are drawn from the social context in which we find ourselves 
(e.g. understanding oneself as a philosopher).  The problem then is that in either case it 
seems that the self-understandings that articulate the situation of action do not stem from 
the person acting.  If this is the case, it seems that the so-called active aspect of action is 
not actually performed by the agent herself.  This calls into question the possibility of 
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being responsible for our actions, or even the possibility of acting in the true sense of the 
term.   
The structure of the problem for the Heideggerian conception of action is similar 
to that of the traditional conception of the problem of free will.  On the traditional 
formulation of the problem of free will, the threat to free will comes from the possibility 
of a physicalistic or naturalistic determinism.  The problem then becomes how to 
incorporate freely determined actions into what seems like a causally-closed physical 
system.  A common solution to the free will problem (compatibilism) is to maintain that 
determinism is true, but that there is also a meaningful sense of freedom that is 
compatible with determinism. For Heidegger, the problem is not naturalistic determinism, 
but rather the possibility that all of our actions are ultimately determined by the norms 
and practices of the social context in which we find ourselves.  The Heideggerian 
solution to the problem is similar to that of compatibilism in that Heidegger would want 
to show how we can have a meaningful sense of responsibility for our actions that is 
compatible with Heidegger’s view that all possible ways of articulating the situation of 
action are drawn for the impersonal norms and practices of das Man. 
In order to see how a Heideggerian response to this problem can be developed, we 
will turn to Heidegger’s 1930 lecture course, The Essence of Human Freedom, in which 
he gives a lengthy interpretation of Kant’s practical philosophy, culminating in an 
analysis of responsibility.
32
  There are two objectives to be achieved by the consideration 
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 This strategy of turning to Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant to develop a way to account for 
responsibility on the Heideggerian conception of action involves its own difficulties.  In the beginning of 
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of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant in this lecture course.  The first, as mentioned 
above, is to give an account of how we can be understood as responsible for our actions 
while still maintaining that are actions are determined by the fundamentally social self-
understandings that guide our actions.  We will develop this account of a Heideggerian 
“compatibilism” through discussion of some of the central aspects of Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Kant’s treatment of the third antinomy in the Critique of Pure Reason.  
The second objective is show how the Heidegger seeks to go beyond merely establishing 
how we can be responsible for our everyday actions to develop an account of authentic 
action in which we are responsible for our actions in a stronger sense.  We will develop 
this Heideggerian conception of what I will call the strong sense of responsibility by 
considering the second part of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant from The Essence of 
Human Freedom, which focuses on Kant’s discussion of practical freedom in the 
Critique of Practical Reason and The Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals.  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
our development of a Heideggerian conception of action, we endeavored to show how Heidegger’s 
understanding of action comes about through his early interpretation and appropriation of certain 
Aristotelian concepts.  These Aristotelian concepts are transformed into Heidegger’s distinctive 
terminology in Being and Time and in the lecture courses leading up to its publication.  In this 
terminological transformation, Heidegger is explicitly trying to distance himself from the traditional ways 
in which philosophers have understood and described human existence.  When giving an interpretation of 
Kant’s practical philosophy in The Essence of Human Freedom, Heidegger employs many of the Kantian 
terms and concepts that are paradigmatic examples of the sort of traditional philosophical discourse that 
Heidegger eschews in Being and Time.  The danger here for us is that in relying on Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Kant for an understanding of Heidegger conception of responsibility, we will be misled 
into transforming the Heideggerian conception of action developed here into a conception of action that is 
based on the exact way of understanding human agency that Heidegger is trying to avoid.  To avoid this 
potential problem, we will attempt to show (in this chapter and the following chapter) how the conceptual 
moves made by Heidegger within his interpretation of Kant can be translated back into the concepts and 
terminology of the Heideggerian conception of action that stems from his early interpretation of Aristotle 
and Being and Time. 
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Specifically, we will focus on Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s conception of 
autonomy, i.e. the way in which we are subject to and authors of the moral law. 
Developing a Heideggerian Version of Compatibilism 
Before beginning to discuss the details of Kant’s conception of freedom as it is 
developed in Kant’s analysis of the third antinomy, Heidegger provides some background 
information that helps to set up and clarify the antinomies in general and the third 
antinomy in particular.  Heidegger reminds us that all of Kant’s antinomies are discussed 
in the section of the first Critique dedicated to the consideration of the cosmological ideas 
(EHF 144).  According to Kant, our faculty of reason is such that we always are 
compelled to attempt to intellectually unify our experience of the world as whole.  In 
attempting to bring about this unification of experience, we are compelled to employ 
concepts beyond the realm of experience, which is their proper domain.  This compulsion 
of our faculty of reason gives rise to four antinomies, i.e. four ways in which our 
compulsion to unify our experience leads to us to hold two antithetical positions. 
The third antinomy, which is the one that interests Heidegger, deals with the way 
we experience the world in terms of causality.  What exactly is meant here by world?  
Heidegger begins with Kant’s definition of nature as the totality of appearances and uses 
the term ‘world’ synonymously with Kant’s term ‘nature’ (EHF 144). To be more 
precise, Heidegger adds to this definition by saying that the world is the totality of 
appearances in their temporal succession (EHF 145).  In other words, the world is the 
totality of things as they come to appear to us, change into other things or disappear.  
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What does it mean to say that we experience the world in terms of causality?  When we 
say that we experience the world in terms of causality, this means that we experience 
every present appearance as having been determined by some prior thing or event.  If we 
experience every appearance in the world as having some prior thing or event as its 
cause, we are forced to think of an infinite string of cause and effects.  In order to put a 
stop to this infinite regress, we are compelled to think of there being something or some 
event that has no prior condition as its cause.  Our faculty of reason is forced to think of 
there being some unconditioned cause that is the beginning of the whole string of 
appearances of things.   
It is from this idea of an unconditioned cause that we first begin to develop a 
conception of freedom.  Heidegger is able to explain Kant’s point here by reminding us 
of Kant’s general definition of action.  For Kant action is first understood in the very 
broad sense of bringing about an effect in general (EHF 137).  An action that brings 
about an effect but is not itself caused, i.e. an action that originates a causal sequence, 
would be a free action (EHF 147).  Freedom comes to be thought of as a special type of 
causality—an ability to originate a causal sequence.  Kant refers to freedom understood 
in this way as transcendental freedom.  Our idea of freedom as an uncaused cause is 
transcendental because it makes it possible for us to intellectually unify our experience of 
the world (EHF 147).  From this point on, we can distinguish natural causality, i.e. the 
causality operative in our experience of the temporal succession of appearances, from the 
causality of freedom, i.e. the idea of an uncaused cause that makes it possible for us to 
unify our experience of the world.  Heidegger is careful to point out that up to this point, 
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Kant has not proven that there are beings in the world that have freedom (EHF 151).  
Rather, Kant has proven that it is necessary for us to think of there being some being or 
beings that have freedom.  This means that Kant has only established the possibility that 
human beings have freedom and has shown in a general, theoretical way the structure of 
this possible freedom. 
This, in brief, is the argument for the thesis of the third antinomy, i.e. the 
argument for why we must think that freedom is possible.  The problem is that it is 
equally necessary for us to think that it is impossible for freedom to be operative in the 
natural world.  To see why this is so, let us begin by assuming that the causality of 
freedom is operative in the natural world.  The causality of freedom is the ability to bring 
about an effect without any prior cause.  The world is the totality of things as they appear 
in accordance with causal laws.  If something is brought about through the causality of 
freedom, there is no cause prior to this originating cause.  That means that this originating 
causation is not itself governed by the laws of causality.  Therefore, this sort of causality 
can never be part of the natural world. (EHF 152, CPR A 445, B 473) 
Kant tries to resolve this problem in what Heidegger terms a negative way (EHF 
156).  What Heidegger means by this is that Kant’s solution is to show how and why we 
get caught in this antinomy rather than showing how we can in fact think of the two types 
of causality being operative simultaneously.  Heidegger wants to go beyond Kant here 
and show that a positive solution to the third antinomy is possible.  That is, Heidegger 
wants to show how both types of causality can be thought of as operating simultaneously.  
In order to provide a positive solution, we have to consider the possibility that an event in 
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the natural world can be determined by both natural and transcendental causality (EHF 
164).   
At this point we should pause to point out that the way in which Heidegger tries to 
extend Kant’s conception of transcendental causality seems to contradict what Kant 
explicitly says in the development of the third antinomy.  It is precisely Kant’s point in 
the explanation of the antithesis of the third antinomy that transcendental causality can 
never be operative in the phenomenal realm.  In order for it to be possible to unify our 
experience of the phenomenal world, we must think of there being some a cause that 
itself has no prior cause.  It seems that Heidegger wants to collapse the Kantian 
distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal by attempting to show that the 
causality of freedom, which according to Kant is strictly noumenal in the sense that it can 
only be thought and not experienced at the phenomenal, is somehow operative at the 
phenomenal level.  However, it is this separation of the phenomenal and noumenal that 
allows Kant to satisfactorily solve the problem posed by naturalistic determinism.  
Heidegger would appear to lose the justification for using the concept of transcendental 
causality if he seeks to employ this concept in such a clear perversion of its role in Kant’s 
thought.   
Is there anything to be said in defense of Heidegger’s reading of Kant here?  
While it seems clear in this case that Heidegger violates Kant’s basic intention and gets 
something fundamental about Kant’s thought wrong, it should be pointed out that 
Heidegger is never particularly concerned with getting philosophers “right” in his 
interpretations of them.  Instead, Heidegger seems to employ figures from the history of 
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philosophy as interlocutors whose thought he selectively uses as a springboard to the 
development of his own ideas.  In this case, Heidegger is interested in exploring the 
possibility of there being a mode of causality other than the traditional understanding of 
efficient causality that is also operative in our experience of the world.  While Kant’s 
discussion of causality in the first Critique does not give Heidegger the solution he wants, 
Kant’s thought does provide the impetus and background for Heidegger’s attempt to say 
something about what this other type of causality might be, even if Heidegger distorts 
Kant’s thought in the process. 
With this caveat in mind, we can move to the consideration of how we can 
understand that an event in the world can be determined by a natural cause and a 
transcendental cause.  Heidegger maintains that the answer can be found in Kant’s 
thought, even if Kant himself does not proceed towards a solution in this way.  According 
to Heidegger, if we accept Kant’s separation of the phenomenal and noumenal, we see 
that two types of causality are at work in all appearances of things in the natural world.  
All events in the world are conditioned by prior events.  This is natural causality.  
However, events in the natural world are not things in themselves, but rather appearances.  
We have to think of there being some noumenal object or thing-in-itself that is the ground 
for the appearance of things in the natural world.  This is intelligible or transcendental 
causality.  This is the sort of unconditioned causality that we are looking for.  Since the 
thing-in-itself is outside the succession of appearances that is the natural world, we are 
not forced to think of there being some prior state that is the cause of it.  If this is the 
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case, then we see how we can think of there being two types of causality operative in the 
world, at least within the context of Kant’s thought. 
Although there is no evidence to suggest that Heidegger himself was particularly 
concerned with showing how it might still be possible to have a weak sense of 
responsibility for our everyday actions (he seems only to have been interested in what I 
am calling the strong sense of responsibility achieved in authentic action), we can provide 
an account of how we can be seen to have responsibility for our everyday actions by 
using some of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant.  The use of the qualifier ‘weak’ is 
simply meant to distinguish this sort of everyday responsibility from the stronger sense of 
responsibility developed in the next section. 
To see how we can find a weak sense of responsibility in our everyday actions, 
we can begin by considering the way in which Heidegger tries to show how two types of 
causality are operative in the occurrence of events in the world.  Remember that for Kant, 
the problem is to show how freedom is possible even though we have to experience 
events in the world as being determined by prior events, i.e. as subject to natural 
causality.  According to Heidegger, Kant provides us with an outline of what the 
causality of freedom would have to look like, but Kant does not do enough to show how 
the causality of freedom could actually be operative in the natural world.  Heidegger tries 
to resolve this issue in a more satisfactory way by using Kant’s conception of the thing-
in-itself as the ground for all appearances to show how we can think of a transcendental 
causality being operative at the same time as natural causality.   
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We can use Heidegger’s illustration of the operation of these two types of 
causality in human action to further clarify the Heideggerian conception of action 
developed in the first chapter and to develop a Heideggerian version of compatibilism.  
There are also two types of causality operative in the Heideggerian conception of action, 
or to use a more neutral term, there are two components that determine our actions.  As 
we have seen, on the Heideggerian conception of action, our actions can be understood as 
involving a passive aspect (being drawn towards things and activities that matter to us) 
and an active aspect (the articulation of the situation of action that makes it possible for 
these things to matter to us).  Here we find a parallel to the Kantian distinction between 
natural causality and transcendental causality and the connection between the two types 
of causality.  On the Heideggerian conception of action, we are affected by things and 
people that we encounter in our environment.  This is similar to the way in which Kant 
maintains that we are subject to natural causality insofar as we are beings that appear in 
the realm of nature.  The active aspect of the Heideggerian conception of action can be 
understood as similar to transcendental causality.  The articulation of the situation of 
action through taking up various possible self-understandings makes it possible for things 
in the environment to affect us.
33
  Our actions are always co-determined by these two 
aspects of our being. 
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 It is instructive here to remember our discussion of Haugeland’s interpretation of Heidegger’s use of the 
verb ‘lassen’ in the first chapter.  Haugeland argues that the best way to understand Heidegger’s use of 
lassen (or the English ‘to let’) is as enabling or making possible.  When we say that our self-understandings 
let things matter to us, we mean that these self-understanding make it possible for things to matter to us. 
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As is obvious from our prior discussions of inauthentic action, simply showing 
how transcendental and natural causality can be operative simultaneously is not enough 
to show how we can be responsible for our actions on the Heideggerian conception of 
action.  Heidegger maintains that the self-understandings that articulate the situations in 
which we find ourselves in our everyday activities are all drawn from the social context 
in which we are immersed.  This means that for any given action, the situation of action 
has been articulated not by the individual agent, but rather by nebulous and impersonal 
social norms.  Because of this, it still appears that we as individuals cannot be responsible 
for our actions.  What is supposed to be the active part of action, the articulation that 
makes it possible for things to matter to us, still is not grounded in the individual agent. 
To solve this problem for the Heideggerian conception of action, we would need 
to show that the possibility of articulating any situation, i.e. the possibility of taking up 
any self-understanding whatsoever, is grounded in the individual agent.  In effect, we 
would be moving our consideration back to a second transcendental level by asking what 
it is that in general makes possible the articulation of the particular situation of action by 
das Man that makes it possible for certain things, people and activities to matter to us.  In 
order for us to be responsible for our inauthentic actions, this second-order transcendental 
causality must be shown to be grounded in the individual agent.  We find the solution we 
are seeking in Heidegger’s discussion of death in Division II of Being and Time.  The 
analysis of death reveals to us that our being is such that we always transcend any 
particular, concrete way of understanding ourselves and that our being is fundamentally 
constituted by projecting out towards possible ways of existing right up to the very 
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instant of death. Moreover, for Heidegger death is that one possible way of being that 
completely individualizes us and pulls us out of all the possible self-understandings 
available in our social context.  
Before saying more about the features of Heidegger’s analysis of death that are 
especially relevant to our concerns here, it is important to discuss how Heidegger’s 
conception of death differs from our normal ways of understanding death.  The initial 
problem that confronts Heidegger is the difficulty associated with actually experiencing 
death.  At the individual level, we can never experience our own death.  At the very 
moment of death, we cease to exist and thereby lose the ability to really experience what 
death is.  In Heidegger’s words: “When Dasein reaches its wholeness in death, it 
simultaneously loses the Being of its ‘there’.  By its transition to no-longer-Dasein, it gets 
lifted right out of the possibility of experiencing this transition and of understanding it as 
something experienced” (BT 281/237).  Heidegger’s subsequent analysis of death is 
initially oriented by the need to overcome this seeming impossibility of truly grasping 
what death is. 
The first potential solution considered by Heidegger is that we can come to 
understand death by experiencing the death of other people (BT 281/237-285/241).  
However, experiencing the death of others does not allow us to really grasp what it is like 
to make the transition from life to death.  Heidegger states: 
Death does indeed reveal itself as a loss, but a loss such as 
is experienced by those who remain.  In suffering this loss, 
however, we have no way of access to the loss-of-Being as 
such which the dying man ‘suffers’.  The dying of Others is 
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not something which we experience in a genuine sense; at 
most we are always just ‘there alongside’ (BT 282/239). 
 
If we cannot experience our own death and we cannot truly experience the death 
of others, what possibilities of understanding death remain open to us?  Because of the 
above considerations, Heidegger determines that we cannot think of death as our lives 
being at an end if we are ever to really understand it.  Rather, death must be thought of as 
being towards the end (BT 289/245).  “Death,” according to Heidegger, “is a way to be, 
which Dasein takes over as soon as it is” (BT 289/245).  Being-towards-death means that 
we are being-towards the possibility of death.  As we saw in the first chapter, Heidegger 
makes it clear that we are always projecting ourselves towards some possible way of 
existing.  We always understand ourselves in terms of one or more possible ways of 
being that we are enacting at any moment.  As we have also seen, these possible ways of 
being can be rooted in our biological existence.  For example, when Heidegger discusses 
the activity of hammering in order to make a dwelling secure against inclement weather, 
he claims this activity is guided by our possible understanding of ourselves as beings that 
require shelter.  Being-towards-death as a possibility can be thought of as understanding 
our existence in terms of the fact that we are mortal beings who will die.  In other words, 
being-towards-death is Heidegger’s expression used to signify that way in which we 
understand ourselves as mortal beings as opposed to the other possible self-
understandings that we have discussed earlier, e.g. being a philosopher, being a husband, 
etc. 
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Now that we have some understanding of why Heidegger talks about death in 
terms of being-towards-death and what this might mean, we can return to the 
consideration of the two most important aspects of being-towards-death for our 
discussion of responsibility.  First we must consider how being-towards-death as a 
possible way of understanding ourselves is supposed to show that our existence is such 
that we always transcend any particular, concrete way of understanding ourselves.  This 
would show that it is our fundamental ability to project ourselves towards possible ways 
of existing that makes possible the articulation of any situation of action whatsoever, and 
indeed, makes possible the anonymous, impersonal articulation of das Man.   
Heidegger characterizes death as a possibility.  In fact, Heidegger maintains that 
dying is a unique possible way of existing.  Unlike all other possible ways of existing that 
we might take up, the possibility of dying gives us nothing to actualize.  Heidegger says 
that normally “‘Being towards’ a possibility—that is to say, towards something 
possible—may signify ‘Being out for’ something possible, as in concerning ourselves 
with its actualization” (BT 305/261).  In our everyday existence we are constantly 
directed towards the actualization of the projects in which we are engaged.  We are also 
directed towards actualizing or enacting the various self-understandings that we take up, 
e.g. one might be directed toward being a student, which would mean doing all those 
things that serve to actualize or enact this possible way of being.  When we are directed 
towards the actualization of possibilities, we are directed towards concrete actions in the 
world and come to understand entities and ourselves in terms of our worldly projects.  
However, Heidegger states that the possibility of dying gives us nothing to actualize.  He 
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says, “[d]eath, as possibility, gives Dasein nothing to be ‘actualized’, nothing which 
Dasein, as actual, could itself be” (BT 307/262).  Death is the complete annihilation of 
our existence.  There is no positive state of existence associated with it that we can expect 
to be actualized.   
This leads Heidegger to make a distinction between our normal mode of 
comportment towards our possibilities that is focused upon their actualization and the 
mode of comportment we take up in authentic being-towards-death that is focused not on 
the actualization of possibilities, but rather on our pushing forward into possibilities as 
such.  He calls the first mode of comportment expecting (Erwarten) and the second mode 
of comportment running ahead (Vorlaufen).  Expecting is not “just an occasional looking-
away from the possible to its possible actualization, but is essentially a waiting for that 
actualization” (BT 306/262).  With the term Vorlaufen, Heidegger seeks to capture the 
sense in which, in authentic being-towards-death, we concretely experience how it is 
constitutive for our being that we are always existing out beyond ourselves (i.e. running 
ahead of ourselves), a fact that is obscured by our normal focus on actualization.  The 
possibility of death “offers no support for becoming intent on something, ‘picturing’ to 
oneself the actuality which is possible, and so forgetting its possibility” (BT 307/262). 
In authentic being-towards-death, we experience the projective aspect of our 
existence in its pure form.  We realize that even when all other possibilities have become 
unavailable to us, we still project towards the possibility of death.  It is this projective 
aspect of our existence that makes possible any self-understanding whatsoever.  The 
articulation of the situation of action is made possible in each particular case by our 
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essential ontological characteristic of projecting ourselves towards some possibility.  
Because our ability to project ourselves towards possibilities is always what makes any 
particular action possible, we are responsible for all of our actions, even the inauthentic 
actions.  Even in the most irresolute actions in which we merely do what one does and 
avoid making any decisions on our own, we are still responsible for our actions in the 
weak sense because it is the projective aspect of our existence that makes that articulation 
of the situation by das Man possible.  Our ability to project ourselves out towards 
possibilities always transcends any particular possibility.   
Furthermore, it is from the fact that we are finite beings who will die that we get a 
sense that we are unified, individual selves, engaged in action.  Heidegger refers to death 
as our ownmost possibility and as non-relational (BT 307/263-308/264). These two 
characteristics of death are connected insofar as they both stem from Heidegger’s 
discussion of our ability to be represented (vertretet werden) by others in our everyday 
existence. As discussed in the previous chapters, Heidegger maintains that in our 
everyday existence, we primarily understand ourselves in terms of our projects and the 
social roles and responsibilities that we fulfill.  In our everyday existence, “Dasein 
understands itself in terms of that with which it is customarily concerned. ‘One is’ what 
one does” (BT 283/239).  From this it follows, according to Heidegger, that 
“representability [Vertretbarkeit] is not only quite possible but is even constitutive for our 
being with one another.  Here one Dasein can and must, within certain limits, ‘be’ 
another Dasein” (BT 283/239-284/240).  
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It is easy enough to follow Heidegger’s line of thought here.  If, in our everyday 
existence, I am what I do, e.g. I can teach, drive, cook, etc., which makes me a teacher, 
driver, cook, etc., then anyone who performs the same activities I perform can, in a sense, 
be me.  That is, anyone who performs the same role as me and does the same things as 
me can effectively represent me or stand in for me.  When we understand our being in 
terms of what we do, we do not really understand our own being.  Rather, we always 
understand our being insofar as we can represented by another person.  Death, however, 
is that one possibility in which we cannot be represented by another person.  Death is 
always individualized—no one can stand in for us when we are about to die.  Being-
towards-death authentically then forces us to understand our being without recourse to 
our everyday understanding of ourselves in terms of our roles and activities, i.e. it makes 
our own being the issue, not our being in which we can be another person.  We can also 
see why Heidegger would characterize being-towards-death as a possible way of being 
that is non-relational.  When we grasp that in dying we cannot be represented by someone 
else, we are individualized.  That is, I experience acutely my existence as an individual 
when I understand that when I die, it is I alone who am dying.  No one can take my place, 
and no one can accompany me.  When dying, one’s career and worldly ambitions are no 
longer of any import—death comes all the same.   
We can consider an example here to show how we can understand ourselves as 
being responsible in a weak sense for everyday, inauthentic actions.  Consider your 
average undergraduate student.  She probably is only marginally interested in the material 
presented in her courses and puts forward the minimum effort required to earn 
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respectable (but not outstanding) grades. She probably never spent much time 
considering whether or not to go to college.  It was just understood that if one is an 
American high school student from a certain socio-economic bracket, one goes to college 
after high school in order to earn a degree, which is in turn supposed to secure 
respectable future employment.  The student’s actions are guided by her understanding of 
herself as a certain sort of person.  This self-understanding allows certain things like 
going to college and earning a degree to matter to her.  We might claim that her actions 
are determined by the social norms that prescribe to her what a person of a certain sort 
ought to be doing.  However, what we have attempted to show in this section is that in 
order for these social norms to hold any sway with her, the student must, if even at a 
completely tacit level, understand herself as a person of a particular section of society.  
That is, the student must be projecting herself towards the enactment of this particular 
way of being.  It is this individualized projective capacity that makes it possible for any 
social norms to have any influence on her at all.  In this way, we can see her actions as 
socially determined, and yet maintain that the student, as an individual agent, is still 
responsible for her actions, at least in a weak sense. 
Achieving Responsibility in the Strong Sense in Authentic Action 
Now we can consider what it would be like to be responsible for our actions in the 
strong sense.  If the student in the previous example, who goes about doing what a 
college student does without any explicit commitment to the enactment of this self-
understanding, is responsible for her actions in the weak sense, we can ask what it would 
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look like for a student to be responsible for her actions in the strong sense.  One option 
would be to claim that she would be responsible for her actions in the strong sense if she 
were to reject the social norms guiding her actions and base her actions completely on her 
own decisions and preferences.  This would be something like the decisionistic 
interpretation of Heidegger’s account of authentic action.  As we discussed in the 
Introduction, this interpretation is neither philosophically viable nor textually supported.  
The other option would be to imagine a student who makes an explicit commitment to 
understanding herself as a college student.  In this case the student is not rejecting the 
social norms that prescribe her actions as a student to her.  Rather, she is actively taking 
on or owning these norms.  In other words, she is actively giving herself over to being 
bound by certain social norms rather than passively letting her life be dictated by these 
norms while avoiding any explicit personal commitment. 
We can flesh out this rather intuitive portrayal of responsibility in the strong sense 
by considering Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s practical philosophy in The Essence 
of Human Freedom.  Specifically, we want to focus on Heidegger’s discussion of Kant’s 
conception of autonomy.  On Heidegger’s reading of Kant, it is in the performative act of 
putting oneself under the legislation of the moral law that we achieve true self-
responsibility (EHF 201).  By considering Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant on this 
point, we can see how responsibility in the strong sense for Heidegger can be understood 
as the performative act of explicitly committing oneself to a certain self-understanding, 
which entails committing oneself to be bound by certain social norms. 
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We can begin by considering Heidegger’s brief outline of the structure of human 
action as found in Kant’s second Critique and the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of 
Morals.  Heidegger begins by examining Kant’s conception of will-governed action.  He 
reminds us that action in the general sense for Kant is the “relation of a subject of 
causality to the effect” (EHF 189).  When we are talking about specifically human action, 
we call this praxis. Praxis is the “particular kind of action made possible by a will, i.e. 
such that the relation of the subject of the causation, the determining instance, to the 
effect, occurs through will” (EHF 189).  In other words, praxis, i.e. human action, is 
distinguished by the fact that the will determines the action.  Heidegger then proceeds to 
Kant’s definition of the will as a “power to act according to concepts” (EHF 189).  What 
is meant by acting according to concepts here?   “A concept,” says Heidegger, “is the 
representation of something, being able and willing to act according to what is thus 
represented” (EHF 189-190).  Will-governed action is action that is determined by a 
representation of something.  Heidegger gives us a somewhat unhelpful example of will-
governed action (EHF 190).  He says that we could have a representation of the 
“scientific education of humans [des Mensches]” (translation modified), and this 
representation can determine an action.  What Heidegger seems to mean by this is that we 
could have an idea of how to educate people in a “scientific” manner (or alternatively, an 
idea of how to teach people science).  When our actions are determined by this idea, we 
act in such a way that our actions are aimed at educating people in a scientific way. 
Heidegger goes on to explain what Kant means by practical reason and how 
Kant’s concept of practical reason is connected to will-governed action.  Reason is 
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involved in will-governed action because, whenever our representations are the 
“determining instance” of an action, reason is involved.  In will-governed action, our 
action is determined by a conceptual representation.  Since a conceptual representation is 
involved in will-governed action, the faculty of reason must be involved in some way.  
For Kant, practical reason just is the will because practical reason provides the principles 
that are the determining grounds for human action, which is exactly the function 
performed by the will.   
As Heidegger points out, on this Kantian conception of action, our actions are 
often determined by conceptual representations that are drawn from the realm of our 
empirical experience (EHF 190).  For instance, we could say that when I am teaching a 
class, my action is determined by my representation of what it means to be an instructor.  
However, it is also possible for our actions to be determined by representations drawn 
purely from practical reason itself.  On Heidegger’s reading of Kant, the only 
representation that can be drawn from pure practical reason is the representation of the 
moral law, which, as we know, is the categorical imperative (EHF 193).  When our 
actions are determined by the categorical imperative, we understand our actions to be 
determined (by the moral law), but we also understand this determining ground for our 
actions to be the essence of practical reason itself.   
This performative act of letting one’s actions be determined by the moral law, 
while simultaneously understanding that the moral law is grounded in the structure of 
one’s own faculty of reason is, for Heidegger, the essence of being responsible for one’s 
actions in the strong sense.  In his words, “self-responsibility” is “to bind oneself to 
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oneself” (EHF 201).  Acting with self-responsibility is binding oneself to act according to 
the moral law.  It is this act of representing to oneself the moral law and placing oneself 
under the moral law that is a free action, or the action that is determined purely from the 
agent herself.  The achievement of responsibility in the strong sense for Heidegger is not 
about overcoming or rejecting normative constraints, but rather it is about explicitly 
placing oneself under normative constraints.   
We must exercise some caution when applying these aspects of Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Kant to the Heideggerian conception of action we have been developing 
here.  The role of conceptual representations in the Kantian and Heideggerian 
conceptions of action is very different.  On the Kantian conception of human action, 
conceptual representations provide the determining grounds for actions. That is, on 
Kant’s view we form conceptual representations that provide us with the goal of our 
action or the desired effect to be brought about.  On the Heideggerian conception of 
human action, we take up various ways of understanding ourselves that allow goals and 
activities to matter to us.  This need not take place at the conceptual level.  In fact, as we 
have seen, Heidegger claims that these self-understandings are operative at a pre-
conceptual level more often than not.  When compared to Kant, Heidegger downplays the 
explicit operation of reason in human action.  It is also important to note that Heidegger 
is fairly dismissive of Kant’s first formulation of the categorical imperative
34
, 
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 “So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same as the principle of universal 
legislation” (EHF 196, Critique of Practical Reason  V, 31). 
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maintaining that this specific formulation as a relic of the thinking of the Enlightenment 
(EHF 197). 
Even while bearing these important differences in mind, we can, at this point, 
draw a parallel between the initial intuitive conception of what responsibility in the 
strong sense would be like on the Heideggerian conception of action and Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Kant.  The student considered in the example at the beginning of this 
section who actively commits herself to the self-understanding of being a student is 
binding herself to certain public norms.  Insofar as she performs the performative act of 
binding herself in this way, she can be seen as being responsible for her actions in the 
strong sense.  In effect, Heidegger substitutes the normative constraints of the moral law 
under which one places oneself on the Kantian conception of action with the normative 
constraints placed on one’s actions by the situation in which one finds oneself. 
It is important to point out that the particulars of the actions of the student who is 
weakly responsible for her actions might be very similar or even identical to the actions 
of the student who is strongly responsible for her actions.  One way of explicating the 
difference between the weak and strong senses of responsibility might be to say that the 
first-order choices of the student who is weakly responsible for her actions might be the 
same as the first-order choices of the student who is strongly responsible, but the student 
who is strongly responsible for her actions has made a second-order choice, while the 
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student who is weakly responsible has not.
35
  Both the student who is weakly responsible 
and the student who is strongly responsible might make the choice to go to class or study 
for a test, but the student who is strongly responsible has also made the second-order 
choice to commit to this understanding of herself as a student.  The student who is 
weakly responsible has not made any second-order choice whatsoever.  It is perhaps 
something like this that Heidegger has in mind when he characterizes authentic action as 
“choosing to choose” (BT 313/268).  In other words, for Heidegger, the important choice 
is not the first-order choice of which particular action one should undertake, but rather it 
is the second-order choice of choosing to take ownership of one’s actions. 
Another important point should be considered here.  We mentioned in the Second 
Chapter that, for Heidegger, the existence of viable alternative courses of action is not a 
requirement for responsibility.  Now we are in a position to clarify and further explain 
this claim.  We can do this by considering the example of Martin Luther, particularly his 
famous proclamation at the Diet of Worms, “Here I stand.  I can do no other.”  Various 
philosophers have made use of this example to show that we can be responsible for our 
actions even when there are no viable alternatives, which is presumably the case with 
Luther if we take him at his word.
36
  We can analyze Luther’s situation using the 
Heideggerian conception of action as follows.  We could say that Luther understands 
himself as a Christian of a certain sort.  This self-understanding articulates the situation in 
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 Here I am drawing on Harry Frankfurt’s distinction between first-order and second-order volitions in his 
“Freedom of the will and the concept of a person” in The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), 11-25.    
36
 For example, see Frankfurt’s “The Importance of What We Care About” in The Importance of What We 
Care About, 80-94. 
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which he finds himself in such a way that he sees no other choice but to stand firm at the 
Diet of Worms.  In this way the combination of the situation of action and Luther’s 
particular self-understanding demand a certain action from Luther.  On the Heideggerian 
conception of action, there could very well be cases like that of Luther in which there 
really are no viable alternative actions.  This would mean that there is really no first-order 
choice, i.e. the choice of which course of action to take, to be made.  However, on the 
Heideggerian conception of action we could maintain that Luther can still be responsible 
for his actions in the strong sense if he makes the second-order choice of explicitly 
committing himself to this understanding of himself as a Christian of a certain sort.  In 
making this choice, Luther binds himself to have his actions determined by the demands 
of the situation.   
We can now add a further consideration concerning what is required for 
responsibility in the strong sense, a consideration which also serves as a connection to the 
following chapter.  The focus of the following chapter will be the explanation of how we 
achieve a certain sort of self-knowledge when acting authentically.  From our 
consideration of strong responsibility in this chapter, we can see that acting in such a way 
that one is responsible for one’s actions in the strong sense requires the agent to act with 
a certain sort of knowledge. 
To see why this is, we can begin by returning to Heidegger’s interpretation of 
Kant.  At the very end of his interpretation of Kant, Heidegger suggests that for Kant the 
self-consciousness of practical reason is identical with acting with responsibility (EHF 
203).  Without going into too much detail, we can provide some general explanation of 
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Heidegger’s claim.  From what we have already discussed, it seems clear that action in 
the strong sense requires some degree of self-awareness on the part of the agent.  On 
Heidegger’s interpretation of the Kantian conception of action, we are responsible in the 
strong sense when we bind ourselves to ourselves, i.e. when we place ourselves under the 
legislation of the moral law of which we ourselves are the authors.  There are several 
things of which we must be aware for this self-binding to take place.  We must have some 
knowledge of what the moral law actually is if we are to place ourselves under its 
legislation.  We must also have some understanding of the structure of our being as 
rational agents in order to understand that we are the type of beings that can (and should) 
determine their actions through reason.  Additionally, we must have some knowledge of 
how the moral law is in fact grounded in our own faculty of reason so that placing 
ourselves under the moral law is truly understood an autonomous action. 
We can again find some parallels in the Heideggerian conception of actions.  The 
previously mentioned points of difference between the two conceptions of action of 
course still apply.  Most importantly in this case, Heidegger will insist that there is non-
theoretical form of knowledge operative in action itself.  Heidegger maintains that willing 
itself is a form of knowing.  He states: 
Knowledge of the determining ground of action belongs to 
willing as effecting through representation of what is 
willed.  Actual willing is always clear about its determining 
grounds.  Actual willing is a specific kind of actual 
knowing and understanding.  It is a kind of knowing that 
cannot be replaced by anything else, least of all through 
(e.g. psychological) knowledge of human beings (EHF 
198).   
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 We can see what Heidegger means by this and why he might make this claim by 
returning to the example of Luther.  In order for Luther to be responsible for his actions 
in the strong sense, he has to act with knowledge of certain things.  Luther must have 
some knowledge of the self-understanding, e.g. being a Christian of certain sort, to which 
he is committing himself.  He must also have knowledge of the situation in which he 
finds himself, particularly knowledge of the situation as articulated by Luther’s 
understanding of himself as a Christian of a certain sort.  That is, in order for Luther to 
understand the demands placed on him by his situation, he must understand what is 
required of a Christian of a certain sort who finds himself in this situation.  Finally, 
Luther must act with some understanding of what it means to be a human agent.  This last 
point is perhaps a little more difficult to see.  Luther could see himself as being helplessly 
determined in his actions by larger social and historical forces.  In this case he could not 
ever be responsible for his actions in the strong sense, since it would never occur to him 
that he could make the second-order choice to take ownership of his actions.  In other 
words, Luther would have to have some understanding of the way in which our ability to 
understand ourselves in certain ways allows for the demands of the situation to hold any 
sway with us. 
 It is admittedly rather implausible to suppose that Luther acted with any explicit 
knowledge of any these of things, especially explicit knowledge of the Heideggerian 
conception of action.  Heidegger, however, is going to maintain that we all act with this 
sort of knowledge.  He is going to maintain that a careful examination of our experience 
of familiar phenomena like death, conscience and guilt will reveal that in these 
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phenomena there is a pre-conceptual knowledge of the structure of human agency, the 
situation of action and the self-understanding that guides one’s action.  In the course of 
our everyday (or inauthentic) actions, this knowledge remains at the tacit level.  It is in 
authentic action that we come to achieve the clear and explicit level of self-knowledge 
required for being strongly responsible for our actions.  It is to the consideration of 
Heidegger’s account of how we achieve this self-knowledge in authentic action that we 
now turn. 
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CHAPTER 5.   BECOMING RESPONSIBLE IN THE STRONG SENSE—
REVEALING OUR BEING IN AUTHENTIC ACTION 
 
In the last chapter, we showed how Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s practical 
philosophy can lead to an understanding of how we can be responsible for our actions 
achieved when acting authentically.  We saw that according to Heidegger’s reading of 
Kant, self-responsibility in the sense of pure willing can be understood as acting with the 
proper sort of self-knowledge, specifically knowledge of being bound by the moral law 
and the fact that one is also the author of this law.  In the second chapter, there were two 
main distinctions drawn between authentic and inauthentic action.  It was maintained that 
when acting authentically, we are responsible for our actions and we reveal the structure 
of our being to ourselves.   
In this chapter we will be in a position to see the interconnection of these two 
distinctions between authentic and inauthentic action.  We will see that on the 
Heideggerian conception of action, in order to achieve responsibility for our actions, we 
need to act with the proper knowledge of our own being.  In the last chapter, we 
established that responsibility is achieved when the self-understanding taken up by the 
agent that articulates the situation of action is drawn from the agent’s own being as 
opposed to the social context.  At least according to Heidegger, the only possibility that is 
drawn purely from our being as individual agents is the possibility of death.  We become 
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responsible for our actions in the strong sense when we authentically take up the 
possibility of understanding ourselves as being-towards-death.  In this chapter we will 
endeavor to show that authentic being-towards-death is a way of existing in which we 
properly reveal the structure of our being to ourselves.  Our “ownmost” possibility, i.e. 
death, comes to be understood as the possibility of achieving a clear and ontologically 
appropriate understanding of our own being. 
We can orient ourselves with respect to this analysis of authentic action by first 
briefly reminding ourselves of the ways in which we fail to properly understand our being 
when acting inauthentically.  When engaged in productive activity or when interacting 
with other people, we are directed out towards the completion of the tasks with which we 
are engaged or the people with whom we are interacting.  In these types of activities, our 
own being does not become an issue for us at all because our actions have this direction 
out towards things and people in the world.  When engaged in non-goal-directed 
activities, we are drawn towards whatever is new and interesting and do not develop 
anything more than superficial understandings of ourselves and things in the world, 
merely relying on what is commonly said about things.   
We might then think that we should extricate ourselves from all of these types of 
activity and attempt to engage in pure theoretical reflection on the structure of our being.  
However, as we have shown in the second chapter, Heidegger, taking seriously Natorp’s 
critiques of Husserlian phenomenology, maintains that theoretical reflection will 
inevitably distort our understanding of our being by attempting to grasp our being as 
something static and present-at-hand and by attempting to describe the structure of our 
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being through the use of concepts (e.g. soul, mind, consciousness, etc.) that inevitably 
carry with them unfounded presuppositions. 
If we are able to reveal the structure of our being to ourselves when acting 
authentically, i.e. when authentically being-towards-death, authentic action must 
overcome all of these obstacles to properly understanding our being.  This means that 
authentic action must have the following characteristics: 
1.  When engaged in authentic action, our being itself must be the focus of our 
actions.  Authentic action cannot be directed solely towards things that are external to the 
acting itself as is the case with productive activity and interaction with others. 
2.  When engaged in authentic action, our understanding of our being cannot be 
drawn from the superficial ways of understanding our being as is the case in our non-
goal-directed activity, which is directed by idle talk. 
3.  Authentic action must provide with a way of understanding our being that 
adequately captures the essentially dynamic and temporal structure of our being and does 
so without the use of conceptual description. 
At this point it is not at all clear how we reveal our being to ourselves in this way 
in authentic being-towards-death, nor is it at all clear how authentic being-towards-death 
has anything to do with action.  In the first section of this chapter, we will consider how 
Heidegger thinks we come to properly understand the structure of our own being in 
authentic being-towards-death.  Heidegger himself is aware that his account of authentic 
being-towards-death might seem overly abstract and disconnected from our concrete, 
phenomenological experience, as he asks, “What can death and the ‘concrete Situation' of 
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taking action have in common” (BT 349/302)?  That is why, in the sections of Being and 
Time immediately following his account of being-towards-death, Heidegger attempts to 
show how his account of being-towards-death can be concretized in the experience of the 
conscience when engaged in resolute action.  Accordingly, the second section of this 
chapter will be dedicated to an interpretation of Heidegger’s conceptions of conscience 
and resoluteness.  In the third section of this chapter, we will show how Heidegger’s 
understanding of authentic being-towards-death and the experience of conscience in 
resolute action can be combined to give an account of how we achieve the self-
knowledge of our own being in action that makes us responsible for our actions in the 
strong sense. 
Revealing the Structure of Our Being in Authentic Being-Towards-Death 
When discussing Heidegger’s analysis of death in the last chapter, we did so for 
the reason that death is the one possibility that is grounded completely in the being and 
individual agent and thus provided us with the possibility of understanding how we could 
be responsible for our actions. In other words, death was approached from the standpoint 
of responsibility.  The approach in this chapter is different.  Here we are considering 
Heidegger’s analysis of death to see how he thinks it is possible for us to come to 
properly grasp our own being in authentic action.  This means that the first question to be 
considered here is the general question of why Heidegger thinks death is at all relevant 
when it comes to grasping the structure of our being.  We can answer this question by 
remembering some of our considerations from earlier chapters.  As we discussed in the 
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first chapter, one of the essential aspects of our being is that we always are projecting 
ourselves out towards the completion of some project or the enactment of some 
possibility more generally.  In the third chapter, we discussed how our being directed out 
towards possible goals and possible ways of being makes us fail to focus on the structure 
of our own being when acting inauthentically. 
When first discussing death, Heidegger brings up the same problem in slightly 
different terms.  If we really are to understand our being, we need to be able to grasp our 
being in its totality (BT 275/232).  However, if one aspect of our being is that we are 
always directed out towards something, it seems difficult, if not impossible, to really 
grasp our being in its totality because we are always on the way to doing something or 
being something.  In Heidegger’s words:  
“[I]f existence is definitive for Dasein’s Being and if its 
essence is constituted in part by potentiality-for-Being, 
then, as long as Dasein exists, it must in each case, as such 
a potentiality, not yet be something.  Any entity whose 
Essence is made up of existence, is essentially opposed to 
the possibility of our getting it in our grasp as an entity 
which is whole” (BT 276/233). 
 
We typically understand the end of our existence to be death.  By understanding 
what it means to come to an end and what it means to die, we can come to grasp our 
being in its totality.  As we saw in the last chapter, when it comes to grasping what death 
really means, we face the problem of the seeming impossibility of ever experiencing 
death.  To overcome this problem, Heidegger proposes that we understand death as a 
possible way of being, which he calls being-towards-death.   
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For Heidegger, we can take up being-towards-death as a possible way of existing 
authentically or inauthentically.  Based on our previous discussion of the differences 
between authenticity and inauthenticity and the character of inauthentic action, we can 
already see what inauthentic being-towards-death would be like for Heidegger.  When 
being-towards-death in an inauthentic way, we have a tendency to understand death and 
the fact that we are mortal in terms of the prevailing public ways of interpreting death, 
e.g. by acknowledging the certainty of death, but not ever believing that death is 
imminent or by maintaining that thinking about death is pointless and perhaps even 
cowardly.  These inauthentic ways of being-towards-death serve to distort our 
understanding of the phenomenon of death and divert our attention from it.     
Here we are interested in how the structure of our being is revealed to us in 
authentic being-towards-death.  In the previous chapter, we mentioned Heidegger’s 
characterization of authentic being-towards-death as a running ahead (Vorlaufen), in 
which we understand that our projective capacity transcends the actualization of any 
particular possibility.  This is Heidegger’s general conception of authentic being-towards-
death—existing in such a way that we are given nothing to actualize.  Heidegger then 
proceeds, in ¶ 53 of Being and Time, to lay out the “concrete structure” of authentic 
being-towards-death. In other words, he sets out to more fully describe the different 
aspects of this more general conception of authentic being-towards-death and attempts to 
ground it in our normal understanding of death (BT 307/263-310/266).  This further 
analysis of authentic being-towards-death also shows how we are able to disclose our 
own being in this mode of existence.  Let us first list these different aspects or ways of 
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characterizing death and then proceed to analyze the way in which each of them 
contributes to the disclosing of our being in authentic being-towards-death.  The list is as 
follows: 
1.) Death as Dasein’s ownmost (eigenste) possibility  
2.) Death as non-relational (unbezüglich)  
3.) Death as the possibility that cannot be overtaken (unüberholbar)  
4.) Death as certain (gewiss) 
5.) Death as indefinite (unbestimmt) 
We discussed the first two characteristics, death as our ownmost possibility and 
death as non-relational, in the last chapter, specifically with regard to how we can get an 
understanding of a unified self that makes it possible to be responsible for our everyday 
actions.  Now we can say a little more about these two characteristics of authentic being-
towards-death with respect to the way in which they contribute to our attaining a proper 
understanding of the structure of our being.  Heidegger says that authentic being-towards-
death “discloses to Dasein its ownmost ability-to-be [Seinkönnen], in which its very 
Being is the issue” (BT 307/263).  The key point here is that in authentic being-towards-
death, our own being becomes an issue for us.  It is tempting to understand Heidegger as 
advocating the cultivation of a reflection on one’s life and achievements in light of the 
fact that everyone will at some point die, thus motivating ourselves to seize the moment 
and live life to the fullest.  This, however, is not Heidegger’s intention here.  As we have 
seen in the previous chapters, Heidegger maintains that in our everyday existence, we 
primarily understand ourselves in terms of our projects and the social roles and 
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responsibilities that we fulfill.  When we understand our being in terms of what we do, 
we do not really understand our own being.  Rather, we always understand our being 
insofar as we can be represented by another person.  Death, however, is that one 
possibility in which we cannot be represented by another person.  Death is always 
individualized—no one can stand in for us when we are about to die.  Being-towards-
death authentically then forces us to understand our being without recourse to our 
everyday understanding of ourselves in terms of our roles and activities, i.e. it makes our 
own being the issue, not our being in which we can be another person. 
When we grasp that in dying we cannot be represented by someone else, we are 
individualized.  That is, I experience acutely my existence as an individual when I 
understand that when I die, it is I alone who am dying.  No one can take my place, and no 
one can accompany me.  When dying, one’s career and worldly ambitions are no longer 
of any import—death comes all the same.  As morbid and common as this consideration 
might be, Heidegger tries to emphasize the positive methodological aspect of this 
experience.  He maintains that death “makes manifest that all Being-alongside the things 
with which we concern ourselves, and all Being-with Others, will fail us when our 
ownmost ability-to-be [Seinkönnen] is the issue” (BT 308/263).  By understanding 
ourselves in terms of this non-relational possibility, we see that our everyday 
understanding of ourselves in terms of our activities, projects and the idle talk of das Man 
is ultimately of no help when it comes to understanding our own being. 
The next characteristic of death that Heidegger considers is that death is the one 
possibility that cannot be overtaken or outrun, i.e. death is unüberholbar.  Heidegger here 
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is making use of the common understanding of death as something that no one can 
escape.  There are two methodological consequences to be drawn from this characteristic.  
The first consequence is that in authentic being-towards-death we are able to grasp the 
whole being of Dasein.  As mentioned above, this is a problem for Heidegger because he 
has already established that a central feature of Dasein’s being is that it always is ahead-
of-itself (sichvorweg).  As we have discussed above, in our everyday existence, we are 
directed out towards the accomplishment of projects and the achievement of goals.  In 
other words, in our present state we are always directed out towards bringing about some 
future actualization.  This is problematic because it seems to make it impossible for us to 
ever grasp our whole being, since our being is fundamentally constituted by always being 
beyond itself.  In authentic being-towards-death, Heidegger finds his solution to this 
problem.  It is precisely because death gives us nothing to actualize that being-towards-
death allows us to grasp our being in its entirety.  Death is of course something that is still 
impending as long as we are alive, but by understanding ourselves in terms of this 
possibility, our tendency to always be directed towards the eventual actualization of our 
possibilities, and thus not be able to completely grasp our being, is thwarted.  This does 
not mean that in authentic being-towards-death our being loses that quality of being-
ahead-of-itself and becomes something completely present before us.  Rather, in 
authentic being-towards-death, the pure pushing forward into possibilities that is 
constitutive of our being is experienced, not the directedness towards the actualization of 
these possibilities, which always leaves something beyond our grasp.  In authentic being-
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towards-death, there is literally nothing beyond this possibility into which we can thrust 
ourselves. 
The second consequence of our inability to outrun death is that in authentic being-
towards-death, we come to realize that our existence ultimately leads to us surrendering 
ourselves to the fact of our own mortality.  Again, Heidegger takes a fairly common and 
morbid consideration and seeks to bring out what is methodologically beneficial.  He 
states that “running ahead [Vorlaufen] discloses to existence that its uttermost possibility 
lies in giving itself up, and thus it shatters all one’s tenaciousness to whatever existence 
one has reached” (BT 308/264, translation modified).   
To see the importance of this idea for Heidegger, we must recall his earlier 
interest in the concept of Hingabe in the work of Emil Lask.37  The idea, insofar as 
Heidegger appropriates it from Lask, is that phenomenological research must be guided 
by a giving of oneself to the subject matter under investigation.  In other words, we must 
attempt to cultivate a “pure and undivided dedication to the subject matter.”
38
  In 
authentic being-towards-death, we disclose to ourselves the arbitrary and unfounded 
nature of our ordinary ways of understanding ourselves and open up the possibility of 
completely giving ourselves over to the subject matter under investigation, which is in 
this case our own being.  In this way, we allow the being of the subject matter itself to 
guide our inquiry rather than attempting to force our experience of the subject matter into 
preconceived and/or inappropriate modes of disclosure.  Heidegger comes close to saying 
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this when discussing the next characteristic of death, namely, certainty, when he says: 
“One mode of certainty is conviction [Überzeugung].  In conviction, Dasein lets the 
testimony [Zeugnis] of the thing itself which has been uncovered (the true thing itself) be 
the sole determinant for its Being towards that thing understandingly” (BT 300/256). 
This brings us to Heidegger’s consideration of death as certain.  Of course, 
everyone will die at some point.  In this sense death is certain.  However, Heidegger finds 
a different sort of certainty in authentic being-towards-death.  He defines the sort of 
certainty he is talking about as follows: 
To be certain of an entity means to hold it for true as 
something true.  But ‘truth’ signifies the uncoveredness 
[Entdecktheit] of some entity, and all uncoveredness is 
grounded ontologically in the most primordial truth, the 
disclosedness [Erschlossenheit] of Dasein...The expression 
‘certainty’ like the term ‘truth’ has a double signification.  
Primordially ‘truth’ means the same as ‘Being-disclosive’, 
as a way in which Dasein behaves.  From this comes the 
derivative signification: ‘the uncoveredness of entities’.  
Correspondingly, ‘certainty’, in its primordial 
[ursprünglich] signification, is tantamount to ‘Being-
certain’, as a kind of Being which belongs to Dasein.  
However, in a derivative signification, any entity of which 
Dasein can be certain will also get called something 
‘certain’ (BT 300/256). 
 
Heidegger goes on to say that the certainty associated with death “will in the end 
present us with a distinctive certainty of Dasein” (BT 300/256).  These passages, 
combined with Heidegger’s conception of conviction as cited above, provide us with the 
necessary clues for understanding the type of certainty Heidegger finds in authentic 
being-towards-death.  Certainty in the basic sense refers to a mode of our being in which 
we hold an entity as true.  Holding an entity as true means to hold it in its uncoveredness.  
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When this is done in conviction, we let the being of the entity under investigation 
determine the way in which we understand it.  The entity under investigation here is 
Dasein, so in authentic being-towards-death, Heidegger is saying that we achieve a mode 
of disclosing that is particularly suited to disclosing our own being, insofar as we let our 
being itself determine how we understand it.  This means that we do not employ 
inappropriate ways of understanding of our being, e.g. understanding our being through 
conceptual, theoretical reflection or the prevailing superficial ideas of what it is to be 
human. 
To show more precisely what this means, Heidegger compares the certainty 
achieved in authentic being-towards-death with the traditional paradigm for certainty, 
namely, the kind of certainty that is attained when we reflect on our own consciousness.  
He states: 
[T]he evidential character which belongs to the immediate 
givenness of Experiences, of the “I”, or of consciousness, 
must necessarily lag behind the certainty which running 
ahead [Vorlaufen] includes.  Yet this is not because the way 
in which these are grasped would not be a rigorous one, but 
because in principle such a way of grasping them cannot 
hold for true (disclosed) something which at bottom it 
insists upon ‘having there’ as true: namely, Dasein itself, 
which I myself am, and which, as a potentiality-for-Being, I 
can be authentically only by running ahead [Vorlaufen] (BT 
310/265, translation modified). 
 
Remember that Heidegger earlier demonstrates the inadequacy of the traditional 
philosophical method of reflection upon the subject or consciousness for understanding 
our being.  This mode of reflection and its supposed certainty cannot yield certainty in the 
sense in which Heidegger is now using the term since this reflection presupposes that our 
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being is already completely laid out and completely present for our inspection.  It is only 
in authentic being-towards-death that we can grasp our being in its wholeness, and thus it 
is only in authentic being-towards-death that we achieve a mode of disclosure that is 
appropriate for our being.  We achieve our grasp on the whole of our being not through 
positing it as something present before us, but rather by existing in and running ahead 
into the possibility of death.  It is this appropriateness of the disclosure of our being in 
authentic being-towards-death that yields certainty with respect to our own being. 
The final characteristic of death is its indefiniteness.  Death is often thought of as 
an indefinite possibility because one can die at any time.  Death is indefinite in regards to 
when it can happen.  This aspect of aspect of death reveals to us that our very existence 
contains within itself the threat of its own extinction.  In Heidegger’s words, in “running 
ahead of the indefinite certainty of death, Dasein opens itself to a constant threat arising 
out of its own ‘there’” (BT 310/265).  We can understand the import of this more clearly 
through Heidegger’s connection of this aspect of death with anxiety (Angst).  Heidegger 
distinguishes anxiety from fear (Furcht) on the basis of the object towards which each 
mood is directed (BT 228/184-235/191).  Fear is always directed towards some definite 
entity or state-of-affairs encountered (or potentially to be encountered) in the world.  
Anxiety, on the other hand, has nothing definite towards which it is directed.  That which 
is threatening in anxiety is being-in-the-world as such.  What this reveals to us about our 
being is that we are essentially and constantly open to being affected by the world in 
which we find ourselves.  It is not only occasionally or contingently that we happen to be 
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open to being affected by the world, rather our being essentially involved this openness to 
the world, which is experienced most acutely in anxiety and being-towards-death.   
Let us then summarize and clarify the results of the preceding interpretation of 
being-towards-death.  For Heidegger, in our everyday existence, we are directed out 
towards the completion of various projects and the fulfillment of certain ends.  In being-
towards-death, we are given nothing to actualize, and thus we are brought back to our 
own being and are able to reveal to ourselves the structures of our being in an 
ontologically appropriate (i.e. certain) way.   
How is the structure of our being as agents revealed in authentic being-towards-
death?  As discussed in previous chapters, Heidegger analyzes our being in terms of the 
tri-partite structure of disposition (Befindlichkeit), understanding (Verstehen) and falling 
(Verfallen).  In the first chapter, we established that action for Heidegger is to be 
understood as essentially containing an active and a passive aspect, which developed 
from his discussion of understanding and disposition, respectively.  In the third chapter, 
we saw how our everyday, inauthentic action contains within it a tendency to fall into the 
prevalent ways of acting and various non-goal-directed activities.  In his analysis of 
death, Heidegger is seeking to ground this prior conception of our being and the structure 
of human agency in our phenomenological experience.  He notes pointedly that 
“understanding does not primarily mean just gazing at a meaning, but rather 
understanding oneself in that potentiality-for-Being which reveals itself in projection” 
(BT 307/263).  In other words, Heidegger does not want to rely on the sort of abstract 
theoretical reflection that is characteristic of philosophy.  He does not want to merely 
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posit that human existence is constituted by disposition, understanding and falling.  
Rather, he is seeking to develop a mode of existing in which we clearly experience this 
tri-partite constitution of our being in our lived existence.  In being-towards-death, we 
experience our existence as fundamentally and constantly pressing on ahead of itself, a 
fact that is normally obscured by our focus on the actualization of the possibilities that we 
take up, rather than the nature of our existence as being possible.  Heidegger states that 
“[t]his item in the structure of care [Dasein’s being-ahead-of-itself] has its most basic 
concretion in Being-towards-death” (BT 294/251).  Similarly, in our everyday existence, 
the fact that we are fundamentally and constantly open to being affected by the world, i.e. 
that our being is partially constituted by disposition is covered up.  This too is 
experienced concretely in anxiety and being-towards-death through the experience of the 
threatening character of being-in-the-world as such.  Finally, Heidegger maintains that 
our tendency to fall into the ways of understanding ourselves and the world provided by 
das Man is also revealed in being-towards-death.  When we realize the individualizing 
and non-relational nature of death, our everyday absorption in das Man is revealed. 
Now we can make some connections between the way in which we reveal the 
structure of our being to ourselves in being-towards-death and being responsible for our 
actions in the strong sense discussed in the last chapter.  Remember that in the last 
chapter, we developed an understanding of what it would mean to be responsible for our 
actions in the strong sense on the Heideggerian conception of action based on 
Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s practical philosophy.  Specifically, responsibility in 
the strong sense (in Kantian terms) is achieved in the act of representing the moral law to 
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oneself and placing oneself under this law.  We can find some parallels to this conception 
of responsibility in Heidegger’s understanding of authentic being-towards-death.  As we 
have seen, authentic being-towards-death is a form of self-knowledge, even if Heidegger 
maintains that it is a different form of self-knowledge than the traditional paradigm of 
mental self-reflection.  In authentic being-towards-death, in a way that parallels the 
consciousness of being bound by the moral law, the extent to which we are subject to 
world in which we find ourselves is revealed to us, whether this subjection is understood 
as a subjection to the biological and physiological constraints on our being or as a 
subjection to the larger social and historical forces under whose sway we live.  In this 
state of existence, we come to understand the essentially limited nature of our being.  One 
might think that this understanding, when applied to our conception of ourselves as 
agents, would lead us to accepting a thorough-going determinism in which responsibility 
for our actions is ultimately impossible.  However, in authentic being-towards-death, we 
also reveal to ourselves that it is an equally essential aspect of our existence that we 
project out towards some possible way of existing, even when all possibilities other than 
death have become unavailable.  When connected to the Heideggerian conception of 
action, this means that no matter the circumstances in which we find ourselves and 
regardless of the impossibility of alternative ways of acting, we must always understand 
ourselves as being responsible for our actions as individual agents, since it is this 
fundamental, individualized projective capacity that allows anything at all to matter to us.  
When acting, we are giving ourselves over to situation in which we find ourselves and 
letting our actions be constrained by what the situation itself demands from us.  This is 
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what is meant by the expression “taking responsibility” on the Heideggerian conception 
of action—acting with the clear understanding that even the situation in which we find 
ourselves places constraints upon our actions, it is we ourselves as individual agents that 
allows these factors to constrain us. 
Conscience and Resoluteness 
The problem for Heidegger is that it is still hard to conceive of how we could ever 
exist in such a way that we are authentically being-towards-death.  That is, it is still hard 
to conceive of what authentic being-towards-death would look like in an actual situation 
of action.  Heidegger has argued that ordinary ways of thinking of death and possible 
ways of experiencing death are not adequate when it comes to truly grasping and 
understanding our being.  What sort of concrete way of existing can authentic being-
towards-death be?  How can we actually practice or enact authentic being-towards-death?  
As discussed above, we cannot experience our own death, and we cannot really 
experience the death of others.  Authentic being-towards-death cannot be our dying or 
witnessing the death of others.  Heidegger also makes it clear that authentic being-
towards-death is not a morbid brooding over one’s own mortality (BT 305/261).  As 
Heidegger himself admits, authentic being-towards-death as initially described seems to 
be too abstract and to have no ground in our phenomenological experience.  In 
Heidegger’s words: 
[T]his existentially ‘possible’ Being-towards-death 
remains, from the existentiell point of view, a fantastical 
exaction.  The fact that an authentic potentiality-for-Being-
a-whole is ontologically possible for Dasein, signifies 
  
142 
nothing, so long as a corresponding ontical potentiality-for-
Being has not been demonstrated in Dasein itself.  Does 
Dasein ever factically throw itself into such a Being-
towards-death (BT 311/266)? 
 
Here is Heidegger is pointing out the need for finding some concrete experience 
or way of existing in which we see something like authentic being-towards-death as he 
describes it in its abstract sense.   
At the end of his analysis of death, Heidegger states:  
[W]e must investigate whether to any extent and in any 
way Dasein gives testimony, from its ownmost potentiality-
for-Being, as to a possible authenticity of its existence, so 
that it not only makes known that in an existentiell manner 
such authenticity is possible, but demands this of itself (BT 
311/267). 
 
In the beginning of the next chapter in Being and Time, he makes it clear that we 
come to the concrete experience of authentic being-towards-death, i.e. our ownmost 
potentiality-for-being, in the experience of conscience (BT 313/268).  The aim of the 
present section will be to explain how the experience of conscience is supposed to reveal 
the structure of our being to ourselves in the way laid out by Heidegger in the 
development of his account of authentic being-towards-death.   
We will use as our clue the somewhat strange claim that phrōnesis is the 
conscience made by Heidegger in his winter semester lecture course in 1924-1925, 
Plato’s Sophist, in which he dedicates the first part of the course to an in-depth 
interpretation of Book VI of Aristotle’s icomachean Ethics (PS 39).  He does not 
provide much justification or explanation of this claim in either this lecture course or any 
of his other works.  However, Heidegger’s conception of conscience in Being and Time 
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bears some striking and important similarities to the understanding of phrōnesis that 
Heidegger lays out in the Plato’s Sophist lecture.  The general strategy in this section will 
be to examine Heidegger’s interpretation of phrōnesis in the Plato’s Sophist lecture 
course and see how it can be connected to our ordinary conception of conscience and 
then proceed to consider how Heidegger transforms this ordinary conception of 
conscience/phrōnesis into his own distinctive conceptions of conscience and resoluteness 
that are found in Being and Time.   
Heidegger’s Discussion of Phrōnesis in the Plato’s Sophist Lectures 
Before turning to Heidegger’s examination of phrōnesis in the Plato’s Sophist 
lecture course, let us first consider the broader context of Heidegger’s discussion of Book 
VI of Aristotle’s icomachean Ethics and what are traditionally referred to as the 
intellectual virtues (epistēme, tēchne, phrōnesis, sophīa and noūs).  As we briefly 
discussed in the Introduction, the central theme of Heidegger’s interpretation of these 
virtues is to understand them all as modes of disclosing or revealing (aletheūein) 
something (PS 15).  Heidegger, following Aristotle, proposes to distinguish between the 
different modes of disclosing on the basis of the type of thing that is disclosed in each.  
The main distinction to be made is between those modes of disclosing that disclose things 
that cannot be otherwise (epistēme, sophīa and noūs), i.e. those modes of disclosing 
concerned with necessary truths and beings, and those modes of disclosing that disclose 
things that can be otherwise (tēchne and phrōnesis), i.e. those modes of disclosing 
concerned with things that are contingent and in flux.   
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Heidegger’s interpretation of phrōnesis is then oriented by the consideration of 
phrōnesis as a mode of disclosing that discloses something that can be otherwise.  What 
is it that is disclosed by phrōnesis?  Heidegger maintains that, “phrōnesis aims at and 
makes transparent [durchsichtig] precisely…the Being of human Dasein” (PS 43).  This 
is because the “being disclosed by phrōnesis is prāxis”, and “[i]n this [prāxis] resides 
human Dasein” (PS 100).  In other words, phrōnesis discloses the structure of prāxis 
(action), and the being of humans is prāxis, i.e. to be human is to be an agent, to be 
engaged in action.   Phrōnesis can be said then, on Heidegger’s interpretation, to disclose 
what it is to be human, specifically what it means to be a human agent. 
There are, according to Heidegger, three main aspects of action disclosed by 
phrōnesis: (1) the agathōn, the good toward which the action is directed, (2) the concrete 
situation of the action and (3) the interconnection of the agathōn and the situation of 
action, i.e. the manner in which we, as agents, articulate and disclose the situation of 
action through our choice of the good towards which the action is directed.
39
  We will  
consider how phrōnesis discloses these aspects of action one by one and consider, at each 
step, how we can find a similar disclosure operative in our ordinary conception of 
conscience. 
There are two different, but connected, senses of the agathōn that are disclosed in 
phrōnesis.  At the more general level, phrōnesis discloses what the agent takes to be the 
best way to live as a whole.  At the more concrete level, phrōnesis discloses the particular 
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good that is aimed at in any given action.  Heidegger finds the disclosure of what it is to 
live well in general in Aristotle’s initial discussion of phrōnesis in Book VI of the 
icomachean Ethics (NE 1140a25-b25) and the disclosure of the particular good in what 
Heidegger calls the “more radical conception of phrōnesis” (PS 95) in Aristotle’s later 
discussion of phrōnesis in Book VI.  These two different senses of the agathōn of action 
disclosed by phrōnesis are, of course, connected on Aristotle’s view, since all particular 
goods aimed at in action ultimately refer back to a highest good (NE 1094a17) that turns 
out to be living well in general, i.e. to live in such a way that one is eudaīmon. 
Heidegger begins by discussing Aristotle’s initial characterization of someone 
who possesses the virtue of phrōnesis as someone who “deliberates in the right way poīa 
prōs tō eū zēn hōlos, regarding ‘what is conducive to the right mode of Being of Dasein 
as such and as a whole’” (PS 34). A standard English translation of this Greek phrase is 
“what promotes living well in general” (NE 1140a25).  Traditional interpretations of 
phrōnesis see this aspect of virtue as the ability to deliberate correctly concerning which 
course of action in any given situation are in accord with the agent’s understanding of 
what it is to lead a good life in general.  For instance, Richard Sorabji describes the role 
of phrōnesis in the following way: “It enables a man, in light of his conception of the 
good life in general, to perceive what generosity requires of him, or more generally what 
virtue and to kalon require of him, in the particular case, and it instructs him to act 
accordingly.”
40
  David Wiggins offers the following similar characterization of the person 
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who possesses phrōnesis: “It is the mark of the man of practical wisdom on this account 
to be able to select from an infinite number of features of a situation those features that 
bear upon the notion or ideal of existence which it is his standing aim to make real.”
41
  
This implies that if the deliberation of phrōnesis is concerned with those actions that are 
required to realize the good life, then in phrōnesis there is always some understanding of 
what it means to live a good life.   
To see how phrōnesis discloses the particular good aimed at in a given action, we 
must consider in more detail how the structure of action is disclosed by phrōnesis.  
Phrōnesis reveals the full being of any given action from its archē (beginning, basis) to 
its tēlos (end) (PS 101-102).  The archē of action is the “hoū hēneka, the ‘for the sake of 
which’” (PS 101).  Every action begins from and continually takes its direction from the 
end at which it aims.  It is important to keep this equivalence of terms in mind.  The good 
aimed at by an action is the archē of the action, which in turn can be thought of as the 
hoū hēneka of the action, that for the sake of which the agent acts. Heidegger, and 
perhaps Aristotle, has a very specific understanding of the archē of an action as the “for 
the sake of which” of action.  As we have already seen in the first chapter, that for the 
sake of which we act is in each case always a “possibility of Dasein’s Being”, or in other 
words, a possible way of understanding ourselves (BT 116/84).  What Heidegger means 
by this is made apparent by his discussion of Aristotle’s example of the actions of the 
doctor and the orator (NE 1112b12).  Here Aristotle claims that, “[w]e deliberate not 
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about ends, but about what promotes ends.”  For example, the doctor does not deliberate 
about whether or not to heal a patient.  Instead, the doctor deliberates about how best to 
heal a patient.  According to Heidegger, this is because the practice of healing is 
constitutive for being a doctor, which means that healing “belongs to the meaning of his 
[the doctor’s] existence itself” (PS 111).  Again, as we have already seen, the “for the 
sake of which” of an action is the enactment or the realization of the self-understanding 
of the agent as being a person of a particular sort or embodying a particular role.  The 
ultimate basis of the actions of the doctor is her understanding of herself as a doctor and 
her understanding of the actions that are entailed by that conception of herself.    
How does phrōnesis disclose the archē of action?  Heidegger (and Aristotle) 
maintain throughout that phrōnesis is carried out in deliberation (bouleūesthai).  
However, as mentioned above, the archē of an action (thought of as that possibility of 
being for which the agent acts) is not subject to deliberation.  The archē or the “for the 
sake of which” is always chosen in a decision (prohaīresis) or resolution (boulē) (PS 101, 
103, 109).  The self-understanding that guides any particular action is always already in 
place prior to deliberation and provides the framework out of which any deliberation can 
orient itself.  Since phrōnesis is always essentially euboulīa (deliberating well), it 
constantly operates with a grasp or view of the archē of the action.  The question is how 
phrōnesis has this view of the archē if not through deliberation.  To answer this, 
Heidegger turns to Aristotle’s conception of noūs, which, “in the proper sense, aims at 
the archaī and discloses them” (PS 98).  oūs in general is an “apprehension pure and 
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simple” of the archaī.42  In phrōnesis, this means that noūs is a pure and simple 
apprehending of that for the sake of which the agent acts in any given case.  This pure 
and simple apprehension of the archē of the action always guides and informs the 
deliberation of phrōnesis.   
Before moving on to consider the further elements of action and how phrōnesis 
reveals them, let us pause and make some preliminary connections between Heidegger’s 
interpretation of phrōnesis and conscience.  When we think of having a conscience, we 
normally think of having a bad conscience.  This expression typically means that 
someone has done something that she now feels she perhaps should not have done.  
Having a bad conscience is feeling guilty about having done something wrong.  Feeling 
guilty is generally associated with having done something that breaks a rule or law, or 
something that signifies a failure to do a duty, or perhaps just something that fails to live 
up to one’s ideals.  There does not seem to be any explicit revealing of the proper way to 
live in general.  In other words, there does not seem to be any immediate connection 
between conscience and the agathōn in the general sense.  However, it does seem to be 
the case that all ethical rules or moral guidelines, at least in principle, are there to guide 
our actions so that we do live the best life possible in ethical terms, i.e. live in the way 
that is most proper for humans.  A certain conception of what it means to live well lies 
behind any system of rules to live by.  A bad conscience then would tell us that our 
                                                 
 
42
Martin Heidegger, “Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle: Indication of the 
Hermeneutical Situation,” trans. Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan, in Becoming Heidegger: On the 
Trail of His Early Occasional Writings, 1910-1927, eds. Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan (Evanston, 
IL: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 177. 
  
149 
actions were not in line with living a good life in general.  When acting in such a way that 
we “feel the pangs of conscience”, conscience not only reveals to us that the particular 
action in question is wrong, but also, at least implicitly, conscience discloses to us what 
we take to be the right action in this case, and by extension, conscience reveals to us what 
we take to be the proper way of being human. 
Furthermore, when we pay attention to the phenomenological experience of 
conscience, we see that the disclosure of our understanding of living well does not take 
place (at least initially) at a theoretical level.  Rather, we have an experiential or lived 
understanding of the fact that our actions are not in line with what we take to be the right 
way to live.  This initial pre-theoretical understanding can of course be analyzed after the 
fact, and we can attempt to articulate it at the theoretical level, but the initial 
understanding is akin to the pure and simple grasping that Heidegger finds in noūs as it 
operates in phrōnesis. 
Perhaps we can better see how this would work by way of a concrete example.  
Consider the following scenario.  Suppose a married man is having a few drinks at a bar 
after work.  He begins talking to a female colleague.  At first the conversation is innocent 
and collegial.  At some point, the man realizes that their conversation has become more 
suggestive and flirtatious in nature, and he begins to feel guilty.  In this feeling of guilt, a 
certain “for the sake of which” is revealed here.  When he feels guilty, the man’s 
understanding of himself as a devoted, considerate husband is revealed to him.  This does 
not primarily take place at a theoretical level.  Rather, this feeling of guilt and the 
inappropriateness (or impending inappropriateness) of his actions in light of his 
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understanding of himself as a good husband are first felt at an experiential or even bodily 
level (perhaps as weight in the pit of his stomach).  In this sense, it is a simple grasping of 
the good aimed at in his actions that transcend words.  Assuming the man pays attention 
to this “pang of conscience,” he lets himself be guided by his conscience into acting in 
such a way that he brings his actions into line with that particular good that is relevant 
here, namely, being a good husband.  This would lead him to perhaps break off the 
conversation, steer it back towards more innocent territory, leave the bar, etc. 
We can also see how the particular good under consideration here (being a good 
husband) in turn refers even further to the man’s conception of what it means to live well 
in general.  In letting himself be guided in his action by his understanding of himself as a 
good husband, he is also revealing that being a good husband is more important to him 
than other possible roles that he could choose (e.g. that of a dashing, care-free 
womanizer).  In effect, his conscience is revealing to him what he takes to be living well 
in general, something that is at least partly constituted by being a good husband. 
Now we can turn our attention to the other end of action, the tēlos of the action.  
The tēlos of action (here thought of specifically as prāxis) is the “action itself, namely the 
carried out”, specifically eupraxīa, acting well (PS 102).  The goal of action here is not 
the accomplishment of some concrete task or the completion of a specific product as it is 
in poīesis.  Rather, the goal of action (prāxis) is acting well, acting in a way that is in line 
with and guided by the archē of the action.  Acting well is only possible when the agent 
has a clear grasp of that for the sake of which she is acting.  This grasp of the archē of the 
action, however, is not sufficient to bring about eupraxīa by itself.  Heidegger makes this 
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clear through his consideration of Aristotle’s practical syllogism (PS 109).  The first 
premise of the syllogism is the good at which the action aims.  The second premise is that 
the “circumstances and the situation of the action are such and such” (PS 109). The 
conclusion is acting, specifically acting in such a way that, given the particular situation 
in which the agent finds herself, the action is in line with the agent’s self-understanding 
that serves as the archē of the action.  In other words, in order to act well, the agent must 
not only have a clear grasp of the good towards which the action is directed, but she must 
also have a clear understanding of the situation in which she acting.   
We must now ask how phrōnesis discloses the situation of acting.  Again we find 
that the situation of acting is not disclosed through deliberation.  Heidegger identifies 
disclosing the situation of acting with finding the ēschaton, which is the “outermost limit 
of the deliberation and in that way is the presentifying of the state of affairs with which 
the action begins” (PS 108).  When acting, we always reach a point at which deliberation 
can shed no more light on things, and we must simply act based on a grasping of the 
situation in which we find ourselves that, once again, transcends words.  Heidegger again 
maintains that noūs is operative here is this direct disclosure of the ēschaton.  “All 
deliberating,” Heidegger says, “ends in an aīsthesis [perceiving].  This straightforward 
perceiving within phrōnesis is noūs” (PS 110).  The aīsthesis operative here is not 
directed towards some particular object, but rather, it perceives the situation as a whole in 
its particularity and transience (PS 110).  In Heidegger’s words, aīsthesis in phrōnesis is 
the “inspection of the this here now, the inspection of the concrete momentariness of the 
transient situation” (PS 112). 
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We can again attempt to see how something like the disclosure of the concrete 
situation of action is operative in our normal conception of conscience.  Consider again 
the previously described scenario of the man in the bar.  In addition to his understanding 
of himself as a devoted husband, his feeling of guilt also reveals the inappropriateness of 
his action with regards to the particular situation in which he finds himself.  What makes 
his behavior inappropriate is the specific way he is acting with a specific person in a 
specific setting.  If the woman to whom he is talking were his wife, he would not feel 
guilty, or if his conversation had not taken on flirtatious overtones, he would not feel 
guilty.  Feeling guilty reveals something about his relation to the woman to whom he is 
talking and the sort of conversation they are having.  More generally, the feeling of guilt 
reveals something about the tone of the situation as a whole—a situation that has 
suddenly changed from innocuous collegiality to something different.  Again, this 
grasping of the change in tone of the situation is not primarily at the linguistic or 
theoretical level.  This change is first encountered and grasped at an experiential level. 
Now we have examined two aspects of action and how they are disclosed by 
phrōnesis.  We have seen that both the archē of the action (that for the sake of which the 
agent acts or the good towards which the action is aimed) and the concrete situation of 
action (the ēschaton) are disclosed in phrōnesis by the direct and simple apprehension of 
noūs.  It seems difficult then to see why and how Heidegger maintains Aristotle’s 
emphasis on the importance of deliberation in phrōnesis.  I would like to suggest that the 
function of deliberation in Heidegger’s interpretation of phrōnesis is to provide and 
maintain the connection between the archē of the action and the perception of the 
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situation of action that will allow the agent to act well, i.e. to act in a way that is 
consistent with her conception of the good.  Putting this in Aristotelian terms, the 
deliberation of phrōnesis would take the form of the practical syllogism.43   
In order for deliberation to perform this role, deliberation must involve an 
understanding of the connection between the archē of the action and the situation of 
action.    According to Heidegger, what is revealed in phrōnesis is that the disclosure of 
the situation of action is always performed in light of some specific for the sake of which 
that has been chosen in a prohaīresis.  Heidegger is clear in maintaining that the aīsthesis 
involved with phrōnesis is not a “mere inspection”, but rather a “circumspection,” which 
grasps objects in terms of their usefulness (i.e. insofar as the objects encountered are 
sumphēron) (PS 112).  This means that objects and other aspects of the situation are not 
observed disinterestedly, but rather always in terms of the ultimate aim of the agent in 
any situation of acting.  “Precisely out of the constant regard toward that which I have 
resolved,” says Heidegger, “the situation should become transparent” (PS 102).  It is the 
role of good deliberation to maintain that “constant regard” toward the archē of the action 
and make sure that the situation is disclosed on the basis of that.  This allows Heidegger 
to interpret Aristotle’s emphasis on orthōs lōgos as deliberation that is always guided by 
the archē of the action and is always directed towards acting in the particular situation in 
a way that is consistent with the archē.   
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This conception of deliberation still does not seem to resemble any normal 
conception of deliberation.  We can understand why this is by briefly considering 
Heidegger’s conception of lōgos (speech, discussion) as it appears in the context of his 
interpretation of phrōnesis.  Deliberation is ultimately to be understood as a form of 
lōgos.  Lōgos here, says Heidegger, is “to be grasped as the asserting of something about 
something” (PS 99).  To assert something about something is to “articulate what is 
spoken about” (PS 99). This asserting is done with an “intention to disclose it [the object 
of the assertion] in this asserting” (PS 99).  Lōgos in this very basic, minimal sense is to 
make an assertion that discloses and articulates the object of the assertion.  This is exactly 
what happens in the lōgos of the practical syllogism.  The situation of action is disclosed 
and articulated on the basis of the for the sake of which of the action.  This very 
connection between the hoū hēneka and the situation is a form of lōgos.  A more common 
understanding of the deliberation associated with action, i.e. deliberation as a 
consideration and discussion of what is to be done, is a more sophisticated and abstract 
form of this basic sense of lōgos.  Heidegger characterizes the deliberation of phrōnesis 
in this normal sense as a “certain drawing of conclusions” that takes the form “if I am to 
behave in such and such a way, then...” (PS 35).  In this form of deliberation, what is 
discussed is whether or not the action or way of behaving under consideration is in line 
with the hoū hēneka.  This discussion is a way of letting the situation be disclosed and 
articulated in terms of the hoū hēneka. 
We can return to our example of the man in the bar to see how this might work.  
In order for him to act correctly, i.e. in order for him to act in accord with his conception 
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of the good life, he must not only have a grasp of what it means to live well and a grasp 
of the situation.  He must also be able to disclose the situation on the basis of his 
understanding of himself as a good husband, not on the basis of some other 
understanding of himself.  His feeling guilty is a result of his particular understanding of 
himself as a good husband being brought to bear on the situation at hand and letting the 
situation be understood from this basis.  The man could conceivably fail to understand 
himself as a good husband in this situation, which would not result in his feeling guilty 
and would (at least potentially) not lead to his acting correctly.  All of this can occur at an 
intuitive, pre-theoretical level and still be a form of lōgos in the minimal sense outlined 
above.  Alternatively, we could imagine the man engaging in deliberation in a more 
normal sense and saying to himself something like, “If I continue talking to this woman 
in this way, then I am not acting in accord with my understanding of myself as a good 
husband.”  This can be understood as a way of making the pre-linguistic articulation and 
disclosure in the basic sense of lōgos explicit. 
Conscience and Resoluteness in Being and Time 
Let us now turn to Heidegger’s discussion of conscience and resoluteness in 
Being and Time.  We have shown above how Heidegger’s interpretation of phrōnesis and 
its connection with conscience can be seen as providing a pre-theoretical understanding 
of the structure of any given action and how this understanding of action takes place in 
action itself without having to still the movement of action (thereby providing an 
alternative to distorting theoretical reflection on our being) .  Furthermore, we have seen 
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that when engaged in genuine action, praxis, as opposed to productive activity, poīesis, 
the aim of acting is the action itself, not something external to the action.  This way of 
acting also then provides an alternative to the inauthentic ways of acting of productive 
activity and interaction with other people, as both of these modes of action are directed 
towards something beyond the action itself.   
The aim of this section will be to show how Heidegger uses his interpretation of 
phrōnesis as conscience to develop his account of conscience and resoluteness in Being 
and Time as a way of dynamically and pre-conceptually revealing not only the structure 
of a given particular action, but also the formal structure of human existence and agency 
as such.  In addition, we need to show how Heidegger’s account of conscience and 
resoluteness overcomes the obstacles to properly revealing our being—our direction out 
towards things external to our actions and our tendency to fall into the superficial ways of 
understanding our being found in the public realm in a way that parallels the disclosure of 
our being in authentic being-towards-death. 
We find that Heidegger’s development of his conceptions of conscience and 
resoluteness proceeds in a manner similar to that of his interpretation of phrōnesis in the 
Plato’s Sophist course.  He begins by stating that, like phrōnesis, “[c]onscience gives us 
‘something’ to understand; it discloses” (BT 314/269).  Like phrōnesis, conscience 
discloses through a mode of lōgos or discourse (Rede).  Alluding to the common way of 
talking about the “voice of conscience” or the “call of conscience,” Heidegger maintains 
that conscience is experienced as a call (BT 314/269).  Instead of deliberation as the form 
  
157 
of lōgos that characterizes the disclosure of phrōnesis, Heidegger focuses on the call of 
conscience as the mode of discourse that characterizes the disclosure of the conscience. 
Again in a way that parallels his interpretation of phrōnesis, Heidegger begins by 
considering the phenomenon of conscience at a more general level (BT 312/267-325/280) 
and then proceeds to consider in greater detail what exactly is disclosed by the conscience 
and how exactly the conscience brings about this disclosure (BT 325/280-348/301).  At 
the general level, conscience discloses what Heidegger calls our “ownmost potentiality-
for-Being [eigenstes Seinkönnen]” (BT 318/273, 322/277, 324/279).   He then proceeds 
to work out in greater detail what exactly this ownmost potentiality-for-Being is and how 
it is disclosed by conscience through his analysis of guilt and resoluteness.  Our first task 
is try to come to a better understanding of what Heidegger means by “ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being” as it comes up in his more general discussion of conscience.  
There seem to be two main senses in which Heidegger uses the term ‘own’ (eigen) or 
‘ownmost’ (eigenste) here.  Eigen can mean ‘proper’ in the sense of being appropriate or 
it can mean ‘own’ in the sense of “I would like to sleep in my own bed”.   
Let us start by considering the first meaning of eigen as what is proper.  In 
Heidegger’s consideration of the general conception of phrōnesis, we see the term 
employed in this way, as Heidegger states that the deliberation of phrōnesis is concerned 
with the “right and proper way to be Dasein,” which is Heidegger’s explication of the 
Greek eū zēn, living well.  We saw above how phrōnesis and conscience as ordinarily 
understood can be seen as disclosing what we take to be the best, or most proper, way of 
living.  Something similar is retained in Heidegger’s conception of conscience.  The 
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proper way to be Dasein, for Heidegger, is to exist authentically in Heidegger’s sense of 
the term.  Heidegger says that an “authentic [eigentliches] potentiality-for-Being is 
attested by the conscience” (BT 277/234).
44
  We find again the root eigen in the adjective 
eigentlich, which has traditionally (at least within the context of English language 
Heidegger scholarship) been translated as ‘authentic’.   
We can find clarification of the second sense of eigen as ‘own’ by briefly looking 
at Heidegger’s interpretation and appropriation of certain aspects of Kierkegaard’s 
conception of conscience in contrast to Heidegger’s interpretation of phrōnesis.45  For 
Aristotle, the orthōs lōgos of phrōnesis, its constant directedness towards the good, is 
endangered by the possibility of its corruption and distortion by pleasure and pain (NE 
1140b17-18).  Heidegger reads this possible distortion of phrōnesis by pleasure and pain 
as potentially covering over our being, i.e. keeping the structure of our being as agents 
from being disclosed in phrōnesis (PS 36).  We can see easily how this might happen.  
There are many occasions in our everyday activity in which we fail to do something that 
we know we should do (i.e. we do not pay attention to our conscience) because doing the 
right thing seems painful or there is a more pleasant option.   
In Being and Time, Heidegger focuses not on the potential distortion of 
conscience by pleasure and pain, but instead shifts to the potential covering over of our 
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being due to our tendency to lose ourselves in the superficial ways of understanding 
ourselves and the world that dominate the public sphere of our everyday existence.  It is 
this focus on the distorting and concealing effect of the public sphere, the sphere of ‘the 
One’ (das Man) that Heidegger seemingly gets from Kierkegaard.  Consider the 
following characterization of Kierkegaard’s conception of conscience from John van 
Buren:  
For Kierkegaard, it is the conscience that leads the 
individual from ‘being closed off’ to ‘becoming manifest,’ 
from ‘dispersion’ to self-recuperation, from objective to 
subjective truth, from the anonymous publicness to the 
secret of hidden inwardness.
46
 
 
This helps us understand what Heidegger means when he says things like: 
And to what is one called when one is thus appealed to [by 
the call of conscience]?  To one’s own Self.  Not to what 
Dasein counts for, can do, or concerns itself with in being 
with one another publicly, nor to what it has taken hold of, 
set about, or let itself be carried along with (BT 317/273). 
 
Conscience, for Heidegger, calls us back to our own selves in the sense that it 
calls us to understand ourselves not in terms of what we do publicly or in terms of 
prevailing ways of understanding our being.  Conscience calls us to understand our own 
being in a manner that stems from and is appropriate to our being itself. 
We can make a connection here between Heidegger’s interpretations of Kant and 
Aristotle.  The call of conscience calls us to our most proper way of existing. This 
parallels the manner in which phrōnesis reveals to us what we take to be the proper way 
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to live in general.  In the course of his interpretation of Kant, Heidegger identifies the 
most proper way of being human as being self-responsible.  We can a further connection 
in the etymology of the German ‘eigen’ when taken to mean ‘own’.  Becoming 
responsible is a matter of coming to own one’s actions. 
The next task is to explain how the call of conscience discloses the structure of 
our being in greater detail.  Heidegger begins by considering our everyday understanding 
of conscience and the call of conscience.  He plausibly maintains that the call of 
conscience tells us that we are guilty (BT 326/281).  From this starting point, Heidegger 
proceeds to analyze what is really at the core of our normal understanding of guilt.  He 
isolates two main ways in which we (or at least German speakers) understand being 
guilty. The first common meaning of being guilty is captured by ‘owing something’ or 
‘having debts’ (BT 327/281).
47
  The second common meaning is ‘being responsible for 
something’, in the sense of causing something to happen or bringing something about 
(BT 327/282).  Together these two common meanings give us the general idea of 
“coming to owe something to Others”, whether this be by breaking a law, coming to be 
indebted to other people or being responsible for something done to other people (BT 
327/282).  It is easy enough to find experiential corroboration for this idea.  We often feel 
guilty when we realize that we have done something that violates some norm or law, or 
when we realize that we are responsible for doing something that harmed someone else. 
Heidegger does not stop here.  He attempts to abstract from these normal ideas of 
being guilty to reach the underlying, unifying essence of what it means to be guilty. In 
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other words, he tries to identify the formal structure of guilt.  His first pass at a more 
formal conception of what it means to be guilty is: “Being-the-basis for a lack of 
something in the Dasein of an Other...This kind of lacking is a failure to satisfy some 
requirement which applies to one’s existent Being with Others” (BT 328/282). The idea 
is that when we feel ourselves to be guilty, there is a sense of a debt that has not been 
fully repaid or a rule that has not been followed.  When we are addressed as guilty by our 
conscience, we are brought to an awareness of a certain lack in the way we are acting 
with respect to other people.   
Heidegger wants to further push his conception of guilt past the common ways of 
conceiving it in order to bring out what is essential to the experience of guilt at the 
ontological level.  He makes this clear by stating that the “idea of guilt must not only be 
raised above the domain of that concern in which we reckon things up, but it must also be 
detached from any relationship to any law or ‘ought’” (BT 328/283).  Bearing in mind the 
prior understanding of being guilty as showing some lack in one’s interaction with others, 
Heidegger defines the existential idea of guilt as “ ‘Being-the-basis for a Being which has 
been defined by a ‘not’—that is to say, as ‘Being-the-basis of a nullity’” (BT 329/283).  
Here talk of violation of laws or norms or incurring debts with others is dropped, and 
Heidegger strips the concept of guilt down to what he sees as the essential core of being 
guilty—being the basis of a nullity or lack.  Every time we feel guilty, we feel that we are 
responsible for (i.e. we are the basis or ground for) some lack or nullity stemming from 
our violating a norm or law, incurring a debt or doing something that harmed another.   
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This existential definition of guilt requires further explication.  Heidegger does 
this by moving further beyond the common understanding of guilt by examining the three 
aspects of our existence—thrownness, projection and falling—and finding in each an 
essential nullity that is not related to the lack of compliance with moral norms.  With 
regards to thrownness, Heidegger says: “As being, Dasein is something that has been 
thrown; it has been brought into its ‘there’, but not of its own accord” (BT 329/284).  By 
this Heidegger is emphasizing the fact that we come into the world that is not of our own 
making, and we do so through no choice of our own.  Furthermore, “[a]s being, it 
[Dasein] has taken the definite form of a potentiality-for-Being which has heard itself and 
has devoted itself to itself, but not as itself” (BT 329-330/284).  Not only are we thrown 
into a world without our choice, but also we are always already existing in a certain way 
before we can actively choose how we want to exist.  For example, I was already thrown 
into being a middle-class American child in the late Twentieth-Century before I was 
capable of choosing what sort of person I wanted to be.  Heidegger makes it clear that we 
can never go back behind this initial thrownness and appropriate it in such a way that the 
nullity inherent in it is removed.  The socio-historical situation into which we have been 
thrown is the basis for our being.  No matter how we decide to move forward, anything 
that we do will have been done on the basis of the situation in which we find ourselves.  
This leads Heidegger to conclude that, “‘Being-a-basis’ means never to have power over 
one’s ownmost Being form the ground up”, and furthermore, this “‘not’ belongs to the 
existential meaning of ‘thrownness’” (BT 330/284). 
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Nevertheless, this does not mean that we are completely determined by the 
situation in which we find ourselves.  As we have seen in the preceding chapters, we do 
have to take up one (or several) of the possible ways of living and understanding 
ourselves that are provided by the situation into which we are thrown.  Heidegger asks: 
“How is Dasein this thrown basis?”  He answers: “Only in that it projects itself upon 
possibilities into which it has been thrown” (BT 330/284).  Having grown up in middle-
class, late Twentieth-Century America provided me with a range of possible ways of 
living and ways in which I can understand and define my life.  Insofar as I have to 
understand my life in some way, I am limited to the range of possibilities provided by the 
situation in which I have been thrown.  However, it is still the case that “Dasein is its 
basis existently—that is, in such a manner that it understands itself in terms of 
possibilities” (BT 331/285).  This means that our being is such that we are pushing 
forward into future possibilities that go beyond the situation in which we find ourselves.  
Heidegger’s use of the term ‘exist’ and related terms such as ‘existently’ is meant to 
emphasize the way in which we always are projecting ourselves out beyond the current, 
actual state of affairs (the prefix ex- is used here for this purpose).   
Heidegger then turns to the consideration of the nullity essentially involved in this 
projective aspect of our existence.  Here Heidegger says, “in having a potentiality-for-
Being it [Dasein] always stands in one possibility or another: it constantly is not other 
possibilities, and it has waived these in its existentiell projection” (BT 331/285).  What 
Heidegger is saying here is that in any given situation, we take up a certain course of 
action or type of life to live and do not take up other ways of acting or being.  At every 
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given moment there are possible ways of being that we are not taking up.  This nullity is 
contained in the very essence of the projective aspect of our existence.  According to 
Heidegger, we must always “take over Being-a-basis” (BT 330/284), i.e. it is the nature 
of being human that we must always appropriate or take over the situation into which we 
have been thrown by taking up certain possible ways of being provided by the situation.  
The nullity of projection is essential to our ability to take over the thrown basis of our 
being.  This appropriation of the situation is only possible on the basis of taking up 
certain, concrete possible ways of being, while excluding others.  To return to our 
example, suppose one finds oneself growing up in late Twentieth-Century America.  This 
is a situation into which one has been thrown, without having had a prior say about the 
matter.  Nonetheless, one is obligated to make something of situation, to make something 
of one’s life by taking up one way of living or another.  For example, one could be a 
lawyer or an engineer, but in doing so one would be excluding the possibility of say 
being a professional athlete.  In a more general way, one could be cynical and anti-social, 
excluding the possibilities of being optimistic and outgoing.  In every way of taking over 
the situation, there is essentially a nullity. 
Finally, Heidegger takes up the third aspect of our existence, falling.  With 
regards to this he says: “In the structure of thrownness, as in that of projection, there lies 
essentially a nullity.  This nullity is the basis for the possibility of inauthentic Dasein in 
its falling” (BT 331/285).  Earlier in Being and Time, Heidegger describes falling as our 
inherent to tendency to be absorbed in the world of our everyday concerns, and thus to 
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“fall” away from our authentic mode of existence (BT 220/175).  Here there is obviously 
nullity involved.  Insofar as we are falling, we are not ourselves.   
Now let us try to bring this discussion of guilt back into connection with the 
preceding discussion of conscience.  As we know from our ordinary experience of 
conscience, the call of conscience is not normally experienced voluntarily (BT 334/288).  
That is, we usually do not and cannot willfully ascribe guilt to ourselves.  Most of the 
time, feelings of guilt come upon us during or after action.  This means, for Heidegger, 
that we cannot will ourselves to disclose the structure of our being to ourselves through 
the experience of the call of conscience.  The best we can do is to be “ready to appealed 
to” by conscience (BT 334/288).  Heidegger characterizes our state of being in which we 
are ready to be appealed to as resoluteness (Entschlossenheit); i.e. resoluteness is 
“wanting to have a conscience” (BT 343/296).  Something needs to be said here about the 
German term ‘Entschlossenheit’.  It comes from the past participle (entschlossen) of the 
verb ‘entschließen,’ which means to resolve.  Entschlossenheit would then mean 
something like being resolved or “resolvedness,” so resoluteness works as a translation.  
However, the root of the original verb ‘entschließen’ is ‘schließen,’ meaning ‘to close’.  
By adding the negative ‘ent-’ prefix, the original meaning is negated, so that entschließen 
can also be thought of as meaning ‘to open’.  It is this latter meaning of entschließen that 
Heidegger is employing in his initial introduction of the concept of resoluteness (although 
we will see below that the first meaning of being resolved will be important for 
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Heidegger as well).
48
  Bearing this in mind, resoluteness can at least partially be thought 
of as an openness to hearing the call of conscience.  
It is wrong, however, to attempt to understand resoluteness as a passive 
withdrawal from acting that merely waits for the call of conscience.  The first meaning of 
resoluteness as being resolved or decided, something which leads to committed action, is 
also essential here.  Heidegger makes this clear by stating that “[t]o hear the call [of 
conscience] authentically, signifies bringing oneself into a factical taking-action” (BT 
341/294) and that “[a]s resolute, Dasein is already taking action” (BT 347/300).  If we 
pause to reflect on this, we can see that this makes sense.  Our primary experience of the 
call of conscience occurs during action itself.  As we gain more experience, we may 
experience the call of conscience before or after acting, but the experience of the call is 
always related to some concrete taking action. 
Heidegger further clarifies what he means by wanting to have a conscience by 
saying that, “this [wanting to have a conscience] is a way a letting one’s ownmost Self 
take action in itself of its own accord in its Being-guilty, and represents phenomenally 
that authentic potentiality-for-Being which Dasein itself attests” (BT 342/295). In 
resoluteness, we are acting in such a way that we simultaneously hold ourselves open to 
hearing the voice of conscience, i.e. we hold ourselves open for understanding ourselves 
as guilty.  This shows how the structure of resolute action can be understood in terms of 
the general conception of action developed in the first chapter.  Remember that on the 
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Heideggerian conception of action developed in the first chapter, action involves being 
drawn toward something that matters to us (the passive aspect) and having a self-
understanding that allows these things to matter to us (the active aspect).  In resolute 
action, we allow the call of conscience to draw us to understand ourselves as guilty. 
Can we provide a more concrete understanding of what Heidegger means by 
acting in such a way that we understand ourselves as guilty?  The prior discussion of 
Heidegger’s interpretation of phrōnesis might be of help here.  We attempted to illustrate 
above how the concrete structure of action is disclosed by the deliberation of phrōnesis in 
the form of the practical syllogism.  Phrōnesis has the “for-the-sake-of-which” of the 
action in view and discloses the situation of action on the basis of this “for-the-sake-of-
which”.  This disclosing of the situation on the basis of the for-the-sake-of-which leads to 
the action.  We also saw above how this might be work in a concrete example by 
considering the married man talking to a woman at the bar.  In this example, phrōnesis 
(or conscience) discloses the concrete structure of the particular action.  That is, it 
discloses the way in which the man’s understanding of himself as a devoted husband (the 
for-the-sake-of-which here) discloses the situation in all of its particularity and leads to 
his breaking off the conversation or leaving the bar. 
What gets disclosed in Heidegger’s conception of being guilty is not only the 
concrete structure of this particular action, but also the formal structure of our being as 
agents as such.  When understanding ourselves as guilty in Heidegger’s sense, we grasp 
not only the particular situation of action as it is disclosed by a particular for-the-sake-of-
which.  We grasp the way in which we find ourselves in situations that not of our making 
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and are not in our control.  “What one has in view here,” Heidegger says, “is a ‘not’ 
which is constitutive for this Being of Dasein—its thrownness” (BT 330/284).  This 
experience of nullity here is grasping the fact that thrownness is constitutive for our 
existence.  In other words, acting in such a way that we understand ourselves as guilty 
discloses to us that thrownness is an aspect of our being.  As we have shown in the first 
chapter, to say that thrownness is an essential aspect of our being can be understood as 
saying that in all of our actions, there is a passive aspect.  That is, before we make any 
decisions, we always already find ourselves in a situation to which we must respond and 
in the context of which things matter to us. 
Similarly, we grasp not only the particular for-the-sake-of-which towards which 
we are projecting ourselves.  Instead, we grasp our being in its general structure as 
essentially projection out towards certain possibilities.  We understand this projective 
ability as a nullity in the sense that we are always pushing out beyond the concrete 
situation in which we find ourselves and that this projective ability is constitutive for our 
existence.  We find ourselves obligated to appropriate the situation, to take it over by 
taking up some particular possibility of being that it provided by it.  What is disclosed to 
us here by acting while understanding ourselves as guilty is that our being is constituted 
not only by thrownness, but also by our taking up of possibilities provided by the 
situation, which Heidegger calls understanding.  When we take up these possible ways of 
understanding ourselves, we allow things and activities encountered in the situation into 
which we are thrown to matter to us.  In this way, when understanding ourselves as 
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guilty, we reveal to ourselves the active aspect of human agency, through which things 
are allowed to matter to us on the basis of the possible self-understanding that we take up. 
Finally, we grasp the way in which this dynamic structure of our being is covered 
up in our everyday existence by our reliance on the common way of understanding things 
and ourselves as static and purely present-at-hand.  That is, we come to grasp our 
tendency to “fall” into the superficial, prevailing ways of understanding ourselves and 
our tendency to become absorbed in our everyday concerns and activities. In other words, 
we grasp how we are not properly ourselves in our everyday existence insofar as we do 
not properly disclose the structure of our being to ourselves.  Insofar as we do this, we 
come to understand that one constitutive aspect of our existence is what Heidegger calls 
falling.   
It is not enough, however, to understand resoluteness as wanting to have a 
conscience in the sense of being open to understanding oneself as guilty.  Heidegger goes 
on to say that resoluteness is also constituted by “anxiety as the way of being attuned” 
(BT 343/296).  Once again, a comparison with phrōnesis can help us see how anxiety fits 
into Heidegger’s conception of resoluteness and why “being attuned” by anxiety is 
important for resoluteness.  As mentioned above, phrōnesis can be distorted by pleasure 
and pain.  According to Aristotle, temperance (sophrosūne) preserves phrōnesis from 
being corrupted by pleasure and pain (1140b11).  Heidegger takes this to mean that 
sophrosūne “preserves it [phrōnesis] against the possibility of being covered over” (PS 
36).   
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We can think of anxiety performing a similar function in Heidegger’s conception 
of resoluteness.  As we have seen for Heidegger, when acting inauthentically, we fail to 
understand our own being properly because we are either directed outwards towards 
things and people in the world of our everyday concerns or fall into the tendency to 
understand ourselves in terms of the prevailing, superficial understandings of our being. 
This means that when acting inauthentically, we fail to hear the call of conscience, i.e. to 
fail to properly disclose our being to ourselves.  During the experience of anxiety the 
“totality of involvements of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand discovered within-
the-world, is, as such, of no consequence” (BT 231/186).  In other words, when 
experiencing anxiety, all of the normal daily activities in which we usually involve 
ourselves come to be seen as completely insignificant.  Anxiety thus brings us out of our 
tendency to understand ourselves “in terms of the ‘world’ and the way things have been 
publicly interpreted” (BT 232/187).  In this way anxiety can be said to properly attune us 
so that we are ready to hear the call of conscience, ready to understand ourselves as 
guilty, insofar as it holds at bay our tendency to cover over the structure of being by 
being absorbed in the world of our everyday concern.  This is why Heidegger says that 
the “call whose mood has been attuned by anxiety is what makes it possible first and 
foremost for Dasein to project itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being” (BT 
322/277). 
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Summary of the Preceding Analysis of Conscience and Resoluteness 
Let us briefly outline the steps taken and connections made in the preceding 
interpretation.  In his interpretation of phrōnesis, Heidegger is looking for a way of 
existing, a way of acting in which our being is revealed to us in the appropriate way.  
That means this way of acting should allow us to adequately grasp the dynamic nature of 
our being in its concreteness, thereby avoiding the inevitable distortion associated with 
the traditional philosophical method of cognitive, conceptual reflection.  In addition to 
this, when acting authentically, our focus should be brought back from the external aims 
of everyday action onto our own being.   
Phrōnesis reveals the aspects of any particular action—the good towards which 
the action is directed, the situation of action and the way in which the situation is 
disclosed in terms of this good.  Phrōnesis does this in a way that transcends lōgos in the 
ordinary sense and instead makes use of a practical form of noūs, the ability to purely and 
simply grasp the archē and situation of action.  As we have seen, lōgos in a very basic 
sense is operative in the disclosure of the situation in terms of the for-the-sake-of-which 
of the action.  This means that phrōnesis discloses the structure of action in a way that is 
pre-conceptual and pre-theoretical.  We then endeavored to show how this interpretation 
of phrōnesis can be connected with our normal understanding of conscience.  The aim of 
phrōnesis is also the being of the agent himself, unlike in our productive activity during 
which we are focused on the accomplishing of external goals. 
Heidegger transforms the ordinary understanding of conscience in such a way that 
responding to the call of conscience (i.e. understanding oneself as being guilty) comes to 
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be understood as acting in such a way that the general structure of our being is revealed 
to us in the proper way.  Being guilty comes to be understood as being the basis a nullity, 
a nullity that permeates and is in fact constitutive of the three aspects of our being—
thrownness, understanding and falling.  By acting in such a way that we understand 
ourselves as guilty, we come to understand how our being as agents is constituted by a 
passive aspect, an active aspect and our tendency to “fall” into whatever activities and 
ways of understanding ourselves that are currently prevalent.  This disclosure of our 
being takes place at the experiential, pre-conceptual level in the moment of acting itself.  
In this way, Heidegger has developed an account of a way of acting in which we 
overcome the obstacles to properly understanding our own being that are encountered in 
inauthentic action and finds the phenomenological attestation for the possibility of 
authentic existence, i.e. authentic being-towards-death. 
The Connection between Conscience, Resoluteness and Death 
Now we are faced with the challenge of explaining how exactly Heidegger 
connects the phenomena of death, conscience and resoluteness and showing how these 
phenomena can be put together in an account of authentic action.   
As we saw above, it is the conscience that is supposed to attest to an authentic 
way of existing.  This means that conscience points us towards (i.e. reveals to us) our 
most proper (ownmost) way of existing.  We have seen that conscience points us towards 
understanding ourselves as guilty as our ownmost way of existing.  When we understand 
ourselves as guilty, we reveal to ourselves the nullity that is inherent in the three 
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ontological aspects of our being (disposition, falling, and understanding).  Our ownmost 
possibility for being is one in which the structure of our being is revealed to us.  Being-
towards-death is also supposed to be our ownmost potentiality for being.  This would 
imply that the concrete, phenomenological experience of authentic being-towards-death 
is the understanding of oneself as guilty.  The way of acting in which we understand 
ourselves as guilty is resoluteness.  The task is to show how being-towards-death is 
authentically experienced in resoluteness. 
According to Heidegger, the only way of experiencing death, in the sense of 
being-towards-death, is in the resolute understanding of oneself as guilty.  Why is this?  
When we act in such a way that we understand ourselves as guilty, we experience the 
way in which our being is permeated by nullity.  What is death but the nullity of our 
existence?  When we experience the nullity of our existence when acting resolutely, we 
find the only possible way to experience our own mortality.   Heidegger states: 
We have conceived death existentially as what we have 
characterized as the possibility of the impossibility of 
existence—that is to say, as the utter nullity of Dasein.  
Death is not ‘added on’ to Dasein at its ‘end’; but Dasein, 
as care, is the thrown (that is, null) basis for its death.  The 
nullity by which Dasein’s Being is dominated primordially 
through and through, is revealed to Dasein itself in 
authentic Being-towards-death (BT 354/306). 
 
Furthermore, “[a]uthentic ‘thinking about death’ is a wanting-to-have-a-conscience” (BT 
357/309). 
We can see why Heidegger would make this claim when we remember the earlier 
discussion of the seeming impossibility of ever experiencing our own death.  We must 
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also remember that Heidegger re-conceives death as a possibility, namely, the “possibility 
of the impossibility of any existence at all” (BT 307/262).  When we are engaged in 
resolute action, we act with an acute understanding of the way in which our choice of one 
possible course of action necessarily closes the possibility of taking another course of 
action.  When considered at the everyday, mundane level, such a consideration appears to 
be trivial, but when considered from the point of view of an entire lifetime, Heidegger’s 
connection of resoluteness and being-towards-death becomes much more plausible.  As 
we grow older, certain possibilities are no longer available to us.  For example, it might 
have been possible at one time that I could someday become a professional athlete, but 
unfortunately that is no longer a possibility for me.  As we become older still, the scope 
of possible actions and ways of living becomes narrower and narrower.  What is dying 
but this closing down of possibilities?
49
  Whenever we act with this understanding of the 
way our current action necessarily closes off the possibility of other courses of action, we 
act with an understanding of our own mortality.  In other words, we achieve authentic 
being-towards-death.   
It might be asked what exactly authentic being-towards-death adds to the 
conception of authentic action worked out just in terms of conscience, guilt and 
resoluteness.  To begin with we must remember that a strong sense of responsibility for 
our actions requires there to be some possible self-understanding that is drawn purely 
from our own being as individual agents and not from the surrounding social context. We 
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find this possibility in death, but as we have seen, we must still show how authentic 
being-towards-death can be experienced concretely.  Furthermore, Heidegger is clear that 
authentic being-towards-death, thought of as running ahead (Vorlaufen), is the necessary 
completion of resoluteness.  He says, “[o]nly in resoluteness that runs ahead is the ability 
to be guilty understood authentically and wholly,” and “only as running ahead does 
resoluteness become a primordial Being towards Dasein’s ownmost ability to be”  (BT 
354/306, translation modified).  Why does Heidegger claim that resoluteness only 
becomes authentic when combined with running ahead towards death?  The following 
passage provides some explanation: 
What if resoluteness, in accordance with its own meaning, 
should bring itself into its authenticity only when it projects 
itself not upon random possibilities which just lie closest, 
but upon that uttermost possibility which lies ahead of 
every factical potentiality-for-Being of Dasein, and, as 
such, enters more or less undisguisedly into every 
potentiality-for-Being of which Dasein factically takes 
hold? (BT 349-350/302) 
 
If in resoluteness we are not projecting ourselves towards the possibility of death, 
we run into the problems associated with grasping our being in its totality that Heidegger 
outlines in his discussion of death.  If in resoluteness we are still directed towards the 
normal everyday ways of understanding ourselves (e.g. as philosophers, teachers, 
husbands, etc.), our actions are still directed out towards something beyond ourselves, 
and we do not grasp our being in its totality. 
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Conclusion 
Let us now try to summarize the steps taken to develop an account of authentic 
action in this chapter and the previous chapter.  Based on Heidegger’s interpretation of 
Kant’s practical philosophy from the previous chapter, we determined that in order to be 
responsible for our actions in the strong sense, there had to be some possible self-
understanding that was drawn from our own individual existence and not from the social 
context.  For Heidegger, this one possibility is the being-towards-death.  We also saw 
how Heidegger, when discussing Kant’s conception of pure willing, found this way of 
being responsible for our actions in the consciousness of our being bound by the moral 
law and also being authors of the moral law.  Specifically, responsible action occurs in 
the performative act of binding oneself by the moral law.  This binding of oneself 
requires knowledge of the moral law (i.e. the ability to represent the moral law to oneself) 
and the knowledge that the moral law is grounded in one’s own faculty of reason. 
In this chapter we saw how Heidegger conceives of authentic being-towards-death 
as a form of self-knowledge in which we understand ourselves as being bound by the 
limits of the situation in which we find ourselves and yet also being the ultimate ground 
for the possibility of anything encountered in the world mattering to us in any way 
whatsoever.  We also showed how this formal understanding of authentic being-towards-
death can acquire some phenomenological concretion in the experience of the conscience 
and in resolute action.  We can now go a step further in clarifying why resolute action is 
responsible action in the strong sense.  Resolute action is the performative act of binding 
oneself to the prescription for action given by the self-understanding one takes up and the 
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situation in which one finds oneself.  As we have seen from Heidegger’s interpretation of 
phrōnesis, resolute action involves a clear knowledge of that for the sake of which one is 
acting (i.e. the self-understanding that guides the action), the situation of action and the 
way in which one’s self-understanding articulates the situation of action.  Kant’s binding 
of oneself to the moral law is transformed into the giving of oneself over to the demands 
of situation as articulated by the self-understanding one has taken up. 
Let us return to the Luther example to better illustrate what this would look like in 
a more concrete sense.   We can analyze Luther’s action according to the Heideggerian 
conception of authentic action as follows.  Luther is acting with a clear understanding of 
the situation in which he finds himself and a clear knowledge of his understanding of 
himself as a Christian of a certain sort.  This knowledge leads him to realize what action 
the situation demands of him.  He achieves responsibility in the strong sense when he 
allows himself to be bound by what is prescribed by the situation and his self-
understanding.  Luther need not explicitly formulate this knowledge conceptually or 
propositionally.  Rather, as we have seen in Heidegger’s discussion of phrōnesis, this 
knowledge involved in acting is initially pre-conceptual and pre-thematic.  Furthermore, 
the content of the action is unimportant when considering whether or not the agent is 
responsible for her action in the strong sense.  Rather, the action that determines 
responsibility in the strong sense is the way in which the agent gives herself over to the 
demands of situation in a clear-sighted way.  It is also important to stress that for Luther 
to be responsible for his action in the strong sense, he must act with knowledge of the 
way in which it is his projection towards a particular self-understanding that allows for 
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the demands of the situation to have any claim on him.  If Luther feels himself to be 
completely at the mercy of larger social and historical forces, then he fails to achieve 
responsibility in the strong sense in his action. 
With this example, we finally see the various considerations in our discussion of 
authentic action coming together.  We see here how responsibility in the strong sense 
requires the proper sort of self-knowledge and how Heidegger develops his account of 
acting with this self-knowledge through his analysis of death, conscience and 
resoluteness.   
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DISSERTATION CONCLUSION   
  
In the Introduction, I claimed that the aim of this project was to develop an 
interpretation of the conception of action found in Heidegger’s early thought that was 
more faithful to Heidegger’s writings from this period and was a more plausible 
conception of action than either of the two prevalent interpretations—the Dreyfusian and 
existentialist interpretations.  The problems with the Dreyfusian understanding of action 
as skillful coping are that this interpretation focuses almost exclusively on Heidegger’s 
account of inauthenticity in Division I of Being and Time, ignoring or failing to 
adequately accommodate Heidegger’s account of authenticity in Division II, and that the 
understanding of action as skillful coping unreflectively guided by impersonal social 
norms provides no clear way of giving an account of how we can have ownership of our 
actions or become responsible for our actions.  The account of Heidegger’s conception of 
action that I have put forward here provides a solution to these problems by showing how 
Heidegger’s conception of authenticity from Division II of Being and Time, coupled with 
Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s practical philosophy from The Essence of Human 
Freedom, can give us a way of understanding how we can be responsible for our actions 
on the Heideggerian conception of action. 
The existentialist interpretation is in some ways the mirror image of Dreyfus’s 
interpretation.  The existentialist interpretation uses sections of Division II of Being and 
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Time to argue that action for Heidegger, or at least truly authentic action, takes place 
when the individual agent breaks free of the arbitrary constraints of social norms and 
determines her actions purely through her own will.  This account of Heidegger’s early 
conception of action largely ignores Heidegger’s focus on the passive aspect of human 
action, both in his early lectures and in Being and Time.  As we have seen, acting 
authentically is not a matter of overcoming the constraints placed on the individual by 
situations of action, but is rather understood as acting with knowledge of the way in 
which one’s actions are necessarily constrained and the way in which one’s own being 
makes this constraint possible.  The Heideggerian conception of action put forward here 
also provides a way of understanding how agents can be responsible for their actions 
without this strong sense of responsibility collapsing into the decisionism of the 
existentialist interpretation. 
If it is accepted that the Heideggerian conception of action developed here avoids 
some of the problems associated with the Dreyfusian and existentialist interpretations, the 
general plausibility of this conception of action considered in its own right, i.e. not 
merely as an interpretation of Heidegger’s thought, is still an open question.  Although it 
is beyond the scope of my current project to consider this question in detail, I would like 
to conclude this project by making some very preliminary suggestions about how this 
Heideggerian conception of action might be extended beyond Heidegger’s thought and be 
used as a basis for developing a general conception of human action.   
In the last century, there have been two main ways of understanding human 
action.  This is, of course, an over-simplified story of the development of the 
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philosophical and scientific understanding of action, but it will do for our purposes here.  
In the first half of the Twentieth-Century, the dominant way of understanding human 
action, at least in the social sciences, was behaviorism.  Behaviorism in its most general 
form is the view that all human actions can be understood as responses to stimuli 
encountered in the surrounding environment.  Behaviorism has its roots in the attempt to 
understand and explain behavior in terms of objective and quantifiable phenomena that 
are empirically verifiable and conform to causal laws.  Speaking for proponents of 
making behavior an object of this sort of scientific study, B.F. Skinner says: 
We are concerned, then, with the causes of human 
behavior.  We want to know why men behave as they do.  
Any condition or event which can be shown to have an 
effect upon behavior must be taken into account.  By 
discovering and analyzing these causes we can predict 
behavior; to the extent that we can manipulate them, we 
can control behavior.
50
 
 
With this aim in mind, behaviorists attempt to explain behavior without recourse 
to unobservable subjective phenomena such as desires, the will, intentions, etc.  The 
earliest forms of behaviorism attempted to analyze behavior in terms of a fairly simple 
stimulus/response model, according to which an external stimulus applied to an organism 
causes the organism to respond in a certain way.  This combination of a stimulus and 
corresponding response is called a reflex, a name which in Skinner’s words is used “on 
the theory that the disturbance caused by the stimulus passed to the central nervous 
system and was ‘reflected’ back to the muscles”
51
.  The overall picture, then, is that an 
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organism receives some stimulus through its nervous system.  This stimulus causes a 
responsive movement of the muscles of the organism, which is understood as behavior.  
Notice that everything is accounted for at the physiological, observable level without 
requiring recourse to subjective, internal phenomena.   
In the middle of the century, after devastating critiques had been leveled against 
behaviorism, we find the resurgence of causal theories of action in the Analytic tradition 
that focus on understanding human action as being caused by our mental states or mental 
events (e.g. beliefs, desires, intentions, etc.).  The specific version of the causal account 
that I would like to focus on here is that given by Davidson in his essay, “Actions, 
Reasons, and Causes.”
52
  I realize that there have been many other sophisticated and 
influential versions of the causal account since this essay was first presented in 1963, and 
that Davidson modified and supplemented his account in later writings.  However, it was 
this essay that first established the current dominance of the causal account and outlined 
the basic framework which has guided the debate in the philosophy of action for the last 
forty plus years.   
Davidson’s view of action is not novel or terribly complex, which he readily 
admits.  He begins by carefully defining some important terms that he believes will help 
us get clear about what we mean we say someone had a reason for doing something.  
Doing something for a reason amounts to “having some sort of pro-attitude towards 
actions of a certain kind” and “believing (or knowing, perceiving, noticing, remembering) 
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that [an] action is of that kind.”
53
  Pro-attitudes are things like desires, wants, urges, etc.  
Davidson’s view then is that when someone is said to have a reason for performing a 
particular action, she has a desire (want, urge, etc.) to perform a certain kind of action and 
she has a belief (knowledge, perception, etc.) that the action under consideration is of the 
desired kind.  Davidson goes on to define the combination of a pro-attitude with the 
related belief as the primary reason for an action.  It is the primary reason that is the 
cause of an action.  If we can give the primary reason for an action, then we will have 
explained the action.   
At first glance it seems that it might be possible to collapse the Heideggerian 
conception of action developed here into one of these two general ways of understanding 
action.  The behaviorist might say that what this Heideggerian conception of action really 
amounts to is saying that we are socially conditioned to respond to certain stimuli in 
certain ways.  Conversely, the Analytic philosopher of action that focuses on the causal 
efficacy of our mental states when explaining action might say that Heidegger’s 
conceptions of disposition and understanding can really be cashed out in terms of mental 
states and their causal powers.  For instance, we could return to our earlier example of 
being a philosopher and being drawn towards publishing journal articles and explain this 
activity according to Davidson’s causal theory of action.  We could explain this on the 
Davidsonian view by saying that I have a desire to be a philosopher and a belief that 
publishing articles in respectable journals is an action that will lead to the satisfaction of 
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this desire.  This combination of belief and desire is what causes me to write articles and 
submit them. 
As we have endeavored to show through the previous chapters, the Heideggerian 
conception of action found in his early thought is not reducible to behaviorism.  While 
the Heideggerian conception of action developed here incorporates the behaviorist claim 
that our actions are often triggered by things we encounter in the situation of action, we 
have also maintained that this response to environmental stimuli is made possible by our 
capacity to understand ourselves and the situation of action in certain ways, thereby 
allowing things to matter to us or affect us.  It is a little more difficult to show why the 
Heideggerian conception of action developed here is not reducible to the mental 
causation theory of action.  We can say, with Dreyfus, that mental causation theories of 
action focus too much on the role of explicit mental states in our actions.  This strategy 
does not seem to be completely satisfactory, since it remains difficult to account for cases 
of explicit deliberation if the role of mental states is completely marginalized.   
In the first chapter, we briefly tried to show how explicit deliberation can be seen 
as a more sophisticated and abstract form of the articulation of the situation of action that 
is often performed by our largely tacit self-understandings.  In this case the deliberation 
and the accompanying mental states are determinative for the action insofar as they let 
things matter to us, i.e. the process of explicit deliberation makes it possible for things 
and activities to matter to us.  I have suggested throughout (especially in the fourth 
chapter in the discussion of the two types of causality found in Kant’s practical 
philosophy) that this capacity to let things matter to us is something different than 
  
185 
straightforward, efficient causality. Taking this approach does not necessarily show that 
the Heideggerian conception of action cannot be reduced to the mental causation 
conception of action.  Rather, it shows how the mental causation theory of action can be 
incorporated into the Heideggerian conception of action, albeit in slightly modified form.  
In effect, the burden of proof would be shifted to the supporter of the mental causation 
theory to show how much of our seemingly unreflective activity is best understood by the 
mental causation approach and how mental states can be thought of as causes for our 
actions. 
This leads us to an interesting and important way of distinguishing the 
Heideggerian conception of action from both behaviorist and mental causation 
understandings of action.  The key conceptual similarity for behaviorist and mental 
causation theories of human action is that both make use of (at least in their simplest 
form) a certain conception of causality, namely, efficient causality.  In its most basic 
form, this conception of causality holds that all events are determined by some prior 
event(s).  It is typically thought that all explanation of human action (and indeed all 
proper explanation of anything) must ultimately come down to a causal explanation of 
this sort.  The behaviorist would hold that human action can ultimately be understood as 
responses that are caused by prior environmental stimuli. The proponent of a mental 
causation theory of action would hold that all proper human actions are caused by prior 
mental events.  For the behaviorist, the causality operative in human action works from 
the bottom up.  By that I mean physical stimuli encountered in the environment are 
perceived or sensed by us, and then the resulting perception or sensation triggers a 
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response at the mental level.  For the mental causation theorist, the process is reversed.  
According to the mental causation theorist, the causality operative in human action works 
from the top down.  At the mental level, we form certain belief, desires, intentions, etc., 
and then these mental events bring about our actions.  Both behaviorists and proponents 
of mental causation employ what can be called a linear conception of causality. 
The Heideggerian conception of action developed here is different because, as we 
have seen, action is to be understood as a reciprocal interdependence of active and 
passive aspects that seems to involve a very different understanding of causality, if it can 
even be called causality at all.
54 
 The Heideggerian position is not the self-contradictory 
view that our actions are efficiently caused by being drawn towards certain things and 
activities available in a situation and simultaneously efficiently caused by the self-
understandings that we take up.  Our being drawn towards certain activities can be 
understood as something like a response to our environment, and as such, can be 
understood in terms of efficient causality.  However, the way in which we articulate the 
situation of action through taking up various ways of understanding ourselves is not to be 
understood as a competing form of efficient causality.  As we have shown, this 
articulation is better understood as letting things matter to us.   
We find then that this Heideggerian conception of action might allow us to 
combine what seems intuitively right about both behaviorism and mental causation 
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theories of action without feeling obliged to reduce one to the other to alleviate worries 
about conflicting causal explanations.  The Heideggerian conception of action 
incorporates the behaviorist view that much of our activity can be understood as a 
response to our environment that takes place without explicit mental awareness.  This 
Heideggerian conception of action can also incorporate the mental causation theorist 
view that our actions are not completely determined by our environmental setting and 
that there is a way of understanding actions as being grounded in the individual agent.  
Much more would need to be said to strengthen and expand this general Heideggerian 
conception of action, but I would like to think it offers an alternative way of 
understanding human agency, which has been largely neglected in the past century. 
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